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Chapter 1
Introduction
Most economic textbooks and models assume that individuals are driven by a desire to
maximize their welfare without any regard for that of others. Over the past twenty years,
however, laboratory experiments have repeatedly yielded evidence raising questions about
whether all people are self-regarding. Participants in hundreds of di¤erent experiments
around the world have been found to take actions that are costly to them in order to
punish unfair behavior, reward generous actions, or simply to help others, even in one-shot
interactions (see e.g., Camerer, 2003). Although di¤erent explanations for this behavior
have been proposed over the years such as that subjects make errors, the explanation that
has received the most attention is that at least some individuals are other-regarding.
As a response to this evidence, a new generation of economic models emerged in
the last decade in which individuals are assumed to exhibit social preferences, that is,
the agentsutility is assumed to depend partly on the welfare (and sometimes even the
actions) of other individuals (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Cox et al., 2007; Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). These models have helped organize
many of the behavioral regularities observed in laboratory experiments such as voluntary
contributions to the production of public goods and gift exchange between rms and
workers. In addition, they have provided the theoretical basis for countless new studies.
However, in spite of two-decades worth of experiments, our knowledge about the nature
of social preferences and their economic signicance is incomplete.
This thesis aims to contribute to our understanding of social preferences and why
they may matter. It consists of four chapters. The rst study presented in Chapter 2
(with Arno Riedl) investigates workerspreferences for reciprocation in a gift-exchange
10
game (henceforth GEG) and whether the GEG can be sustained in the long run. In
the experiment, we elicit subjectsreciprocal preferences in a rm-worker gift-exchange
setting and relate them to actual behavior in a repeated gift-exchange game. Our research
strategy is similar to that of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) who examine the impact of
reciprocal preferences on voluntary contributions to a public good. We nd that only a
small minority of 10 percent of workers is materially selsh whereas 90 percent exhibit
reciprocal preferences. However, the intensity of reciprocal preferences is weak in the
sense that rms maximize prots by not relying on gift-exchange but by o¤ering the
lowest possible wage. Workers behavior in the repeated gift-exchange game is predicted
by their elicited preferences, but the correlation between preferences and behavior is
imperfect. Together with prot maximizing behavior of rms these observations can
explain the observed unraveling of gift-exchange over time in our experiment and some
recent eld experiments. Our ndings o¤er an explanation for the unraveling of gift-
exchange observed in some other gift-exchange experiments in the laboratory.
My second study discussed in Chapter 3 (with Nikos Nikiforakis) further explores
the predictive power of elicited social preferences. Unlike the experiment in Chapter 2,
the study examines whether individuals that behave pro-socially in one game do the same
in a strategically di¤erent game. This is what is implicitly assumed by models of social
preferences that aim to provide a parsimonious explanation for pro-social behavior. For
example, according to these models, all else equal, an individual that dislikes strongly
inequality in payo¤s should be willing to reciprocate high wages in a gift-exchange game
with high levels of e¤ort, and to contribute a positive amount towards the public good
if others do the same. The laboratory experiment aims to investigate the existence of a
link between preferences for reciprocation and cooperation at the individual level. We
perform a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior in two of the most widely used
games in the literature: the public-good (PGG) and gift-exchange game (GEG). After
eliciting subjects cooperation preferences in the PGG using the method of Fischbacher et
al. (2001), participants play the GEG for ten periods. We nd that subjects classied as
cooperators in the PGG reciprocate higher wages by exerting higher levels of e¤ort in the
gift exchange game, but they do not o¤er higher wages.
Chapter 4 presents the results from an experiment examining the robustness of the
preferences elicited with the strategy method used in Chapter 3 (and also provided the
11
inspiration for the method used in Chapter 2). Evidence from laboratory experiments in-
dicates that many individuals are willing to cooperate provided that others in their group
do the same. At the same time, there is also evidence that framing a¤ects cooperation
in public-good games and other social dilemmas. However, it remains unknown whether
framing a¤ects subjectsbeliefs or whether it a¤ects their cooperation preferences. The ex-
periment reported in this chapter investigates whether preferences for cooperation elicited
using the method of Fischbacher et al. (2001) are subject to framing e¤ects. In particular,
the experiment varies two features of the Fischbacher et al. (2001) method: the sequence
and order in which the contributions of other group members are presented. The pre-
dictive power of the elicited preferences is evaluated in a one-shot and a nitely-repeated
public-good game. The results indicate that the order in which the contributions of others
are presented, by and large, has no impact on the elicited preferences and their predictive
power. In contrast, presenting the contributions of others in a sequence has a pronounced
e¤ect on the elicited preferences and reduces substantially their predictive power.
The experiment presented in Chapter 5 (with Arno Riedl) di¤ers from the work
presented in the previous chapters in that it takes for granted the existence of social
preferences. The study focuses on the impact social networks may have on alleviating one
of the most well-known economic problems: adverse selection in the labor market. In the
last decade, the economics literature has investigated the link between social networks
and phenomena such as crime, wage dispersion, price formation, and virus spreading. In
addition, empirical studies have found evidence that rms often hire workers using the
social contacts of their workers. The aim of the experiment in this chapter is to investigate
whether rms use the social network of their workers to hire new workers, under what
conditions they do so, and ultimately, whether social networks reduce the adverse selection
problem. Our results show that rms are indeed signicantly more likely to make "referral
o¤ers" when the worker hired in the rst stage is of high ability due to the homophily
between workers. Referral o¤ers are higher on average than public o¤ers. We also nd
that rms are more likely to make higher o¤ers to attract high-ability workers with a
better network. Finally, we nd that the proportion of high-ability workers in the second
stage is higher when there is a social network.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by summarizing the main ndings and considering
questions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Imperfect reciprocators and the
unravelling of gift exchange
2.1 Introduction
The question of how to overcome moral hazard has been a topic of continuing interest
for economists. Several mechanisms have been proposed to reduce workerspropensity to
shirk (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1981, Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984, Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
Akerlof (1982, 1984) was the rst to suggest that workers may be driven by fairness and
a taste for reciprocity, which may help overcome moral hazard. In his model workers may
be willing to exert higher levels of e¤ort in response to higher wages, even when e¤ort is
not enforceable. In anticipation of workersreciprocity, prot maximizing rms may be
willing to o¤er wages above workersreservation wages. Akerlof (1982) coined the term
gift-exchange to describe this reciprocal relation between rms and workers. Fehr et al.
(1993, henceforth FKR) were the rst to test Akerlofs hypothesis in the laboratory and
developed the gift-exchange game (henceforth, GEG) for this purpose.
The GEG is a simple two-stage game. In the rst stage, a rm o¤ers a wage to
a worker who, in the second stage, decides how much e¤ort to exert. E¤ort is costly
for the worker and benecial for the rm. Therefore, under standard assumptions of
rationality and material self-interest, the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of
the nitely-repeated GEG is for the worker to exert minimum e¤ort and for the rm to
o¤er the smallest possible wage, satisfying workers participation constraint. Both parties
would be materially better o¤, however, if the rm o¤ered a higher wage and the worker
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reciprocated by exerting higher levels of e¤ort. In contrast to the standard prediction and
in line with Akerlofs prediction, FKR found that workers do reciprocate higher wages
with higher e¤ort levels. This result attracted considerable attention as it suggested that
reciprocal behavior may indeed help to overcome the moral hazard problem inherent in
incomplete contracts. Consequently, in a stream of studies the existence and robustness
of gift exchange in various situations has been investigated.1
Most studies corroborate the initial nding of workerswillingness to reciprocate high
wages with higher e¤ort levels as a robust phenomenon in laboratory experiments. How-
ever, some studies have also shown that the sustainability of gift exchange may depend on
a number of factors, as salience of monetary incentives (Charness et al., 2004), potential
e¢ ciency gains (Engelmann and Ortmann, 2009), participantsbackground (Hannan et
al., 2002), the presence of a minimum wage (Kagel and Owens, 2010), or the ability to es-
tablish a long-term relationship between rms and workers (Brown et al., 2004). Further,
few eld experiments suggest that workerspositive e¤ort response to an unexpectedly
high wage may fade out over time (Gneezy and List, 2006, Kube et al., 2013).
This chapter presents the results from a laboratory experiment investigating the funda-
mental issue of workerspreferences for reciprocity in the GEG. Specically, we investigate
the intensity of these preferences, their heterogeneity among workers, and how this relates
to the wage-e¤ort dynamics in a nitely-repeated GEG. For this purpose, the experiment
consists of two parts. In the rst part, we elicit (amongst others) workersreciprocal pref-
erences in a one-shot GEG. In the second part, workers play a nitely-repeated GEG.2
The results indicate that only a minority of subjects in the role of a worker exhibits
materially selsh preferences, whereas 90 percent of the workers exhibit reciprocal pref-
erences. That is, a huge majority is willing to respond to higher wages with higher e¤ort
levels, even in a one-shot situation. Importantly, however, all reciprocal workers show a
relatively weak intensity of reciprocal preferences, in the sense that rms could earn a
1See, e.g., Fehr et al. (1997, 1998b,a), Fehr and Falk (1999), Charness (2004) for studies on gift
exchange and, e.g., Fehr and Gächter (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), Camerer and Fehr (2004),
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Sobel (2005), Falk and Fischbacher (2006) for a more general dis-
cussion of reciprocity. Fehr et al. (2009), Charness and Kuhn (2011), Cooper and Kagel (2012), Casoria
and Riedl (2013) provide recent surveys on gift exchange experiments and related issues.
2To our knowledge only a few other studies have elicited workerspreference for reciprocity in the GEG
(Maximiano et al., 2007, Gächter and Thoni, 2010, Maximiano et al., 2013). These papers di¤er from
our study as they do not classify workers types as we do in this paper and they also do not investigate
the relation of elicited preferences on behavior in the nitely-repeated game. Moreover, these studies use
variants of the GEG with multiple workers.
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e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Table 2.1: Cost of e¤ort
higher prot, would they o¤er the smallest possible wage. In the nitely-repeated GEG
we observe a steady decline of e¤ort and wage levels over time. We observe that in
the repeated GEG workers behavior is strongly correlated with their elicited preferences.
However, we also observe that their exerted e¤ort is not fully consistent with the elicited
preferences. We argue that the observed downward cycle of wages and e¤ort can be at-
tributed to a combination of rmsmaximizing prots, workersrelatively weak intensity
of reciprocal preferences, and the imperfect correlation between preferences and behav-
ior. This also o¤ers an explanation for the unraveling of gift-exchange observed in some
other gift-exchange experiments in the laboratory (Brown et al., 2004, Engelmann and
Ortmann, 2009) and the eld (Gneezy and List, 2006, Kube et al., 2013).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the design
of the experiment. In Section 3 we present the results and Section 4 concludes.
2.2 The experiment
2.2.1 Experimental design
The experiment consists of two parts. In the rst part, we elicit participantsreciprocal
preferences in the gift-exchange game using the strategy method introduced by Selten
(1967) (see Brandts and Charness, 2011, for a recent survey). In the second part, partici-
pants play a nitely-repeated version of the gift-exchange game. In the following, we rst
introduce the gift-exchange game we implemented. Thereafter, we discuss the details of
the two parts of the experiment and report on the experimental procedures.
The implemented gift-exchange game is a two-person game consisting of two stages.
The rst player (rm) decides on a wage w 2 f0; 5; 10; 15; :::; 100g to be paid to the
second player (worker). Knowing the wage, the worker decides on a level of e¤ort e 2
f1; 2; 3; :::; 10g to exert. E¤ort is costly for the worker and the costs of e¤ort c(e) are
shown in Table 2.1.
The prot of the rm and the earnings of the worker are given by
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f = 10e  w + 50
wo = w   c(e) + 20
respectively. These payo¤ functions closely resemble those used in Brown et al.(2004).
Assuming common knowledge of rationality and narrow material self-interest the
unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is given by the rm o¤ering the lowest possible
wage (w = 0) and the worker exerting the lowest possible e¤ort (e = 1). The resulting
payo¤s are (f ; wo) = (60; 20): However, a number of experiments have shown that many
workers are willing to respond to higher wages with higher e¤ort levels. That is, e¤ort
is an increasing function of wage: e = e(w) and e0(w) > 0. For a prot maximizing rm
anticipating this relation, the maximization problem becomes
max
e
f = 10e(w)  w + 50:
This implies that, if workers are su¢ ciently reciprocal, it may be protable for rms to
o¤er positive wages. This will be the case when e0(w) > 1
10
as this implies df
dw
jw=0> 0: For
example, let us assume that there is a linear relationship between e¤ort and wage, that is,
e(w) = kw + c, where k captures the strength of workersreciprocity and c a constant.3
If k > 1
10
, then it will be protable for a rm to o¤er a wage w > 0. Conversely, if
0 < k < 1
10
; then rms maximize their prot by o¤ering the minimal wage, w = 0.
2.2.2 Part 1: Elicitation of reciprocal preferences and beliefs
To elicit workersreciprocal preferences in the GEGwe use the strategy method. Assuming
that workers reciprocal preferences do not change, at least in the short term, the results
from the strategy method will allow us to test the impact of these preferences on workers
e¤ort choices in the nitely-repeated GEG. It also allows us to examine the intensity of
reciprocal preferences and whether the extent of reciprocity will be su¢ cient for rms to
earn higher prots with positive wages than with the lowest possible wage of zero.
At the start of Part 1, participants in the experiment were randomly assigned the
3As we will see, this assumption is in line with our data.
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role of either a rm or a worker. These roles remained xed throughout the experi-
ment. Each participant in the role of a worker was asked to ll out a wage-e¤ort table
were s/he had to state the e¤ort level s/he was willing to exert for each possible wage
w 2 f0; 5; 10; 15; :::; 100g o¤ered by the rm. Hence, each worker had to make 21 e¤ort
decisions.
Each participant in the role of a rm had to decide on the wage that would actually
be paid to a randomly matched worker. All rms and workers made their decisions
independently and anonymously. The actual wage and the chosen e¤ort corresponding
to that wage determined participants earnings in this part,4 which guaranteed incentive
compatibility of both e¤ort and wage choices.
After having made their wage and e¤ort decisions, rms and workers were asked to
state their beliefs regarding the actions of their matched counterparts. That is, each
worker had to provide an estimate of the wage s/he would be o¤ered by the rm and
each rm had to provide an estimate of the e¤ort chosen by the matched worker for the
actually o¤ered wage. Participants were rewarded for the accuracy of their estimates.
If the estimate was exactly right, three additional points were earned. If the estimate
deviated by one unit (two units) from the actual decision, then two (one) additional
point(s) were earned. Larger deviations earned nothing. At the end of Part 1, each
worker was informed about the wage actually o¤ered by the matched rm and each rm
got to know the e¤ort exerted by the matched worker. They were also informed about
the accuracy of their estimates.
2.2.3 Part 2: The nitely-repeated gift-exchange game
The second part of the experiment consisted of a gift-exchange game repeated for ten
periods. Each participant stayed with the same role (rm or worker) as in Part 1, but
workers and rms were randomly re-matched at the beginning of each period. Each
period consisted of two stages. In the rst stage, rms had to decide on a wage level
and to provide an estimate of the e¤ort that would be chosen by the matched worker.
At the same time, workers had to indicate the wage they believed the matched rm will
o¤er. In the second stage, workers learned the actual wage and had to decide on the
4For example if the rm o¤ers a wage of 15 in the strategy method and the worker entered 2 in the
table, the rms earning is 55 and the workers earning is 34.
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e¤ort level. Since the game is played for an ex ante known nite number of periods, the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the stage game is also an equilibrium of the nitely
repeated game.
2.2.4 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Maastricht University Behavioral and Experimental
Economics laboratory (BEElab). Four sessions were run with a total of 40 participants.
All participants were students at Maastricht University. They were recruited via e-mail
and had to register on-line. Interactions in the experiment were fully computerized using
Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At the beginning of each session participants were randomly
allocated to a closed cubicle where they could make their decisions in complete anonymity
from the experimenter and other subjects.
The instructions (see Appendix A.2) were given to participants on paper and each of
the parts was explained in detail. Instructions for Part 1 were handed out rst. Partici-
pants were informed that there would be a second part to the experiment, but they had
no prior knowledge of what the content of the second part would be. Instructions for the
second part were not given until the end of Part 1. After participants read the instruc-
tions, they were asked to answer a set of control questions. The aim of these questions was
to evaluate their understanding of the experiment. The experiment did not start until all
participants had answered correctly the control questions. Procedures for the second part
of the experiment were the same. On average, sessions lasted 90 minutes and participants
earned on average 19 Euros per session.
2.3 Results
We rst analyze workerselicited reciprocal preferences in Part 1 and then proceed to
examine whether they can explain the behavioral dynamics in the nitely-repeated GEG.
2.3.1 Reciprocal preferences
Result 1 Ninety percent of workers exhibit reciprocal preferences and only ten percent are
fully selsh.
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SUPPORT: For the classication of workers as reciprocal or selsh types we adapt the
method introduced by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010).
The rules for determining the type of a worker are as follows. If the e¤ort choices of
a worker exhibit a monotonic pattern with at least one increase with increasing wage,
then the worker is classied as having reciprocal preferences (or being a reciprocator).
A worker is also classied as being a reciprocator if there is a signicant positive cor-
relation at the 1-percent level between e¤ort and wage, using Spearmans rank correla-
tion coe¢ cient. Workers who always exert the lowest possible e¤ort (i.e., e = 1 for all
w 2 f0; 5; 10; 15; :::; 100g) are classied as selsh. Workers who do not meet any of these
criteria are classied as other. Using the described criteria, we can classify 10 percent of
workers as selsh and 90 percent as reciprocators. We do not identify any other types.
The share of reciprocators is remarkably high. However, the fact that a worker exerts
higher e¤ort for higher wages does not necessarily imply that a high wage is protable
for the rm. Whether high wages are protable for rms depends on the intensity of the
workers reciprocal preferences. For instance, in our experiment, if w = 50 and e = 5 then
a rm earns 50 and the worker 64. In such a case a prot maximizing rm would be better
o¤ o¤ering the smallest possible wage, w = 0, which secures a prot of 60. For w = 50
to be more protable for the rm than w = 0, a worker must exert an e¤ort of at least 6.
Hence, only if the intensity of workersreciprocal preferences is strong enough rmswill
have an incentive to o¤er high wages, which is a necessary condition for gift-exchange to
prevail.
For this purpose, we develop a measure that allows us to quantify the intensity of
reciprocal preferences and determine whether it is su¢ cient to sustain gift-exchange. We
call this measure the reciprocation index, RI, which classies workers with respect to the
extent of their reciprocation. For each individual i, the index is dened as
RIi =
MP
k=0
(eki   e)
M(e  e)
where eki is the e¤ort level of individual i for w = k, e is the maximum e¤ort possible (in
our case, 10) and e is the lowest e¤ort possible (in our case, 1), and M is the number of
di¤erent wage levels (in our case, 21). The index ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 depicts a
selsh worker who always chooses the lowest possible e¤ort, and 1 depicts a worker who
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always chooses the highest possible e¤ort irrespective of the wage s/he receives.
In the following, we distinguish between strong and weak reciprocators. A worker is
said to be a strong reciprocator when s/he displays an intensity of reciprocal preferences
that makes it protable for the rm to o¤er a wage above the lowest possible wage. That
is, for all wages above zero the rm earns a prot at least as high as the prot it could
guarantee by o¤ering exactly zero.5 Weak reciprocators are said to be those who, although
responding to higher wages with higher e¤ort, on average, leave rms worse o¤when they
o¤er wages higher than the lowest possible wage than when they o¤er exactly that wage.
In our experiment, the prot a rm can guarantee itself by paying the lowest possible
wage (w = 0) is  = 60. The reciprocation index of a worker i who, on average, chooses
e¤ort levels that leave the rm with  = 60 is RIi = 0:57. Therefore, we call worker i a
strong reciprocator if RIi  0:57; and a weak reciprocator if RIi < 0:57. Note, that this
classication does not imply that rms matched with a weak reciprocator will be worse
o¤ for all wages larger than the lowest possible wage. However, rms matched with weak
reciprocators will be better o¤ o¤ering them w = 0.
Result 2: All workers with reciprocal preferences are weak reciprocators, in the sense that
a rm maximizes its prot by o¤ering the lowest possible wage.
SUPPORT: Figure 2-1 displays the distribution of the reciprocation index of workers as
reciprocators. Selsh participants have an index of 0 and are not shown. As can be
clearly seen none of the reciprocal workers has a reciprocation index equal to or greater
than 0.57. Consequently, all workers with reciprocal preferences are weak reciprocators.
Figure 2-2 shows the average e¤ort as a function of wage for our identied types. In
the gure, reciprocatorsand selshare dened as explained in the support of Result 1.
The reference level of e¤ort, r(w), is the e¤ort level that guarantees the rm a prot of
at least 60 for each wage level. It is given by
r(w) =
8<: argmine f(w; e)  60g if w  95
10 otherwise.
for each wage w 2 f0; 5; 10; 15; :::; 100g6
5Classifying workers in that way as strong reciprocators is rather conservative as it assumes narrowly
selsh rms which engage in gift-exchange only if it increases their prots. Later we briey discuss an
alternative approach in which reciprocators are classied as strong when they choose e¤ort levels that
make rms not worse o¤ than themselves.
6Not that for w  95 there is no level of e¤ort that guarantees rms a payo¤ of 60. It is interesting
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Figure 2-1: Distribution of the reciprocation index
Figure 2-2 highlights two points.7 First, overall, there is a clear positive relation be-
tween wages o¤ered by rms and e¤ort expended by workers. Second, while nearly all
workers can be classied as reciprocators, their intensity of reciprocal preferences is below
the reference level of e¤ort, r(w). A linear regression analysis (OLS and Tobit) with e¤ort
as the dependent variable and wage as the independent variable corroborates the expres-
sion gained from the gure. The OLS-estimated coe¢ cient for wage is approximately
0:09, which is slightly below the marginal e¤ort of 1/10, necessary for positive wages to
be protable for rms. Therefore, the extent of workers reciprocal preferences is not
su¢ cient to make rms better o¤ in monetary terms, than they were when they would
o¤er the lowest possible wage. Consequently, in case workers reciprocal preferences carry
over to the nitely-repeated GEG, the prospects of sustaining gift-exchange are rather
grim. This is what we explore next.
to note that, in only 2 out of 200 instances, a rm o¤ered w  95; a level of wage that implies f < 60
for all e¤ort levels.
7A graph showing the relationship between potential wages and level e¤orts for each individual can
be see in the appendix A.1.1.
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Figure 2-2: E¤ort as a function of wage (all workers and by type)
2.3.2 The nitely-repeated gift-exchange game
In this section, we will rst investigate whether there is a positive wage-e¤ort relationship
in the repeated gift-exchange game and whether workers behavior is consistent with their
elicited preferences. Then, we will look at the level and dynamics of wages and e¤orts
and how these could be related to workerspreferences.
Result 3: In the repeated gift-exchange game, workers reciprocate a higher wage with
higher e¤ort. Moreover, workers elicited reciprocal preferences are a good predictor of
e¤ort choices in the repeated game.
SUPPORT: Table 2.2 presents the results from GLS random e¤ects panel regression analy-
sis with the e¤ort exerted by worker i in period t, eit, as the dependent variable.8 Model
1 investigates how workers e¤ort choices respond to received wages, controlling for time
e¤ects. The signicantly positive coe¢ cient of the wage variable indicates that workers
reciprocate higher wages with higher e¤ort choices, which is in line with most previous
results of gift-exchange experiments. The estimated coe¢ cient is rather small, however.
As discussed above, from a rms perspective gift exchange is protable only if the mar-
8Since e¤ort is bounded below by 1 and above by 10, we also ran Tobit regression with individual-level
random e¤ects. The results reported in Appendix A.1.2 are qualitatively similar to those reported
here. See Charness et al. (2004) for a discussion of estimation methods in repeated gift-exchange games.
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Dependent variable: e¤ort
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Workers used All workers Reciprocators All workers Reciprocators
Period  0:010  0:021  0:033  0:038
(0:037) (0:040) (0:035) (0:039)
Wage 0:038 0:042
(0:005) (0:005)
Predicted e¤ort 0:540 0:532
(0:059) (0:063)
Constant 1:456 1:560 1:041 1:129
(0:303) (0:323) (0:318) (0:348)
R2(overall) 0:23 0:26 0:24 0:22
Wald 2(2) 76:51 79:11 89:65 77:69
Observations 200 180 200 180
*** Indicates signicance at 1 percent level; standard errors in parantheses:
Regressions are GLS random e¤ects models clustered on individuals;
(Clustering on sessions level yields similar results; see Appendix A.1.1, A.1.2)
Table 2.2: Explaining e¤ort choices in the repeated GEG
ginal e¤ect is larger than 0.1. This suggests that gift-exchange will be di¢ cult to sustain.
Model 2 estimates the same relationship but excludes workers classied as selsh in Part
1. As expected the positive wage-e¤ort relationship is stronger than in Model 1. However,
given the small number of non-reciprocators in our sample, the change is only marginal.
To test whether workerse¤ort choices can be predicted with their elicited reciprocal
preferences we construct the variable predicted e¤ort. For each wage actually received
in the repeated GEG, this variable takes the value of the e¤ort chosen in the strategy
method in Part 1. Elicited preferences have predictive power for actual e¤ort choices in
the repeated GEG when the coe¢ cient is signicantly positive. Perfect consistency would
be reected by a coe¢ cient that equals 1. This is tested in Model 3. As the estimated
coe¢ cient is positive and highly signicant the results indicate that workers indeed show
behavior consistent with their elicited preferences. However, the estimated coe¢ cient is
only slightly above one-half and, hence, elicited preferences do only imperfectly predict
behavior. The same result holds when looking only at reciprocators (Model 4). Note
that, because workers state reciprocal preferences in Part 1 and are behaving reciprocally
in the repeated GEG, the explanatory variables wage and predicted e¤ort are highly
correlated (Spearmans = 0.785, p value < 0.0001). Therefore, in regressions with both
variables included one of them becomes insignicant and the coe¢ cients are biased. We
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Figure 2-3: Average wage over time
have also run regressions where we added the expected wage as explanatory variable. The
regression results do not change and expected wages are never signicant. This indicates
that any potential e¤ect of the expected wage on e¤ort choices is overwritten by the
actually received wage.
Result 4: In the nitely-repeated game, gift-exchange unravels. That is, wages and e¤ort
levels decline over time toward the lowest possible values.
SUPPORT: Figures 2-3 and 2-4 show the evolution of average wage and e¤ort over the
10 periods of the repeated GEG. (The gures also depict the average wage and e¤ort
for actual wages from Part 1 as "period 0".) Both, wage and e¤ort, decline over time,
although the decline is not monotonic at the aggregate level. The average wage in Part
2 of the experiment declines from 30.25 and 20.8 in period 0 and period 1, respectively,
to 2.5 in period 10. The average wage over periods 1-10 is 14.2. In the last period, 85
percent (17 of 20 instances) of the wages are equal to zero. The average e¤ort in Part 2
declines from 2.9 and 2.2 in period 0 and period 1, respectively, to 1.4 in period 10. The
average e¤ort over period 1-10 is 1.9. In the last period, the lowest possible e¤ort level
of zero is chosen in 90 percent of the cases (18 of 20) and the average e¤ort is only 1.4.
Hence, gift-exchange is clearly not maintained in Part 2 of the experiment.
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Figure 2-4: Average e¤ort over time
Result 5: Given the workerse¤ort responses to wages, rms maximize prots by o¤ering
the lowest possible wage.
SUPPORT: Figure 2-5 presents the expected prot of rms in the nitely-repeated GEG
for the di¤erent possible levels of wage, given the e¤ort levels chosen by workers in Part
1 of the experiment. Figure 2-6 presents the same information, but given the e¤ort levels
in Part 2.9 These gures clearly illustrate that the prot maximizing strategy for rms is
to o¤er w = 0 which guarantees  = 60 in both parts of the experiment.
2.4 Discussion and conclusion
There exists considerable evidence indicating individualswillingness to reciprocate higher
wages with higher e¤ort levels in gift-exchange settings (Casoria and Riedl, 2013). Re-
cently, however, there has been a discussion about the limits of gift-exchange in repeated
9Note that since w > 0 was observed in only 37.7 percent of cases, we create bins of wages for Figure
4b. Bins are constructed such that there is a similar number of observation in each bin with w > 0: In
particular, there are 137 observations with w = 0; 21 observations with w 2 [5; 20], 23 observations with
w 2 [25; 40]; 19 observations with w 2 [45; 60] and 20 observations with w 2 [65; 100]: To calculate the
average prot in each bin, we use the actual average wage o¤ered within this bin by rms (i.e., we do
not take the midpoint of the interval). In the strategy method, there are 20 observations for each level
of wage.
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interactions in the laboratory (Brown et al., 2004, Engelmann and Ortmann, 2009) as well
as in the eld (Gneezy and List, 2006, Kube et al., 2013). To improve our understanding
of when and why gift-exchange may unravel, we conducted a laboratory experiment using
the strategy method to elicit reciprocal preferences of workers in a gift-exchange setting.
In a second part, the same participants played a standard nitely-repeated gift-exchange
game using random matching.
The results indicate that almost all workers (90 percent) in our sample exhibit recipro-
cal preferences. Nevertheless, with repetition gift-exchange unraveled as wages and e¤orts
converged to the minimum levels possible. Two aspects of workersbehavior appear to
be able to account for the observed unravelling of gift-exchange. The rst factor is the
relatively weak intensity of elicited preferences for reciprocation. This is reminiscent of
the phenomenon of self-servingly biased fairness preferences in bargaining (Babcock et
al., 1995, Gächter and Riedl, 2005) and conditional cooperation in public-good games
(Fischbacher et al., 2001, Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010).
The second factor is that the extent of reciprocation is even weaker in the nitely-
repeated game than would be expected given the elicited preferences in the rst part of the
experiment. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) observe a similar phenomenon in repeated
public-good games. In their experiment, behavior is also only imperfectly predicted by
elicited preferences. They identify "confused subjects" and beliefs about others contri-
butions to the public good as explanatory factors for the discrepancy between elicited
preferences and behavior. In our experiment none of these factors can help explaining the
gap between preferences and behavior. First, none of our workers appears to be confused
in the preference elicitation part. All are easily and clearly classiable as either selsh or
reciprocal. Second, beliefs in our case expected wages turn out to be unimportant in
the determination of e¤ort choices. This is also not too surprising given the sequential
nature of the gift-exchange game. This leaves us with speculating about the reason of the
imperfect correlation between elicited preferences and behavior. In our view, a reasonable
explanation is that reciprocal preferences are actually not xed but may respond to the
environment the worker is in and the experiences a worker has. Such an explanation
is consistent with theoretical ideas arguing that (social) preferences may respond to the
economic environment and past experiences in a given environment, which recently also
have been found some empirical support (Bowles, 1998, Brandts et al., 2009, Bowles and
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Polania-Reyes, 2012). In our study the relatively low wages experienced in Part 1 of
the experiment and in early rounds of Part 2 of the experiment may have crowded out
reciprocal preferences or at least further weakened their intensities.
An alternative explanation for the relatively weak intensity of reciprocal preferences
may be that workers care about the inequality in earnings between themselves and the
rms. Taking this possibility into account, one may wonder whether equality of earnings
requires lower levels of e¤ort than those which secure rms a prot of 60. This is not the
case, however. The level of e¤ort required to minimize the earnings di¤erence between
rms and workers is indeed e = 1 when w  20, but it increases quickly for w 2 [25; 75].
For example, a worker who wishes to minimize inequality in earnings for w = 65 should
already choose e = 9. Specically, the level of e¤ort required to minimize inequality in
earnings is greater than the level of e¤ort that guarantees rms a prot of 60 when w > 60.
To test formally how concerns for inequality may a¤ect e¤ort levels, we constructed the
variable fair fair e¤ort = argeminff   wg and ran a Tobit regression with individual
random e¤ects for the reciprocal workers using the level of e¤ort expended by the worker in
the strategy method as the dependent variable and fair e¤ort as the independent variable.
For comparison, we ran a similar regression using the reference level of e¤ort r(w) as
the independent variable.10 Both explanatory variables are signicantly correlated with
e¤ort, but the log-likelihood of the second empirical model is substantially lower than
that of the rst model (-461.9199 vs. -536.40822 ) suggesting that it provides a better
explanation for workers behavior.
In summary, the experimental results indicate that reciprocal preferences that are
too weak to make high wages protable for the rm can help explain the unravelling
of gift-exchange in previous experiments (Brown et al., 2004, Gneezy and List, 2006,
Engelmann and Ortmann, 2009, Kube et al., 2013). In addition, we identify the imperfect
"translation" of reciprocal preferences into reciprocal actions as another potential reason
for the breakdown of gift-exchange. As neither confusion nor beliefs can explain this
phenomenon, it may be a worthwhile avenue for future research.
10Recall, that r(w) is the minimal e¤ort level that guarantees the rm a prot of at least 60 for each
wage level.
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Chapter 3
Cooperators and reciprocators: A
within-subject analysis of pro-social
behavior
3.1 Introduction
Behavioral economists have developed models of social preferences to provide a parsimo-
nious explanation for the pro-social behavior observed in a wide range of games (e.g.,
Bolton and Ockenfels, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Cox et al., 2007; Fehr and
Schmidt, 2000). Although these models have been used extensively by experimental
economists to obtain theoretical predictions for their studies, there is hardly any evidence
about the correlation of pro-social behavior across strategically di¤erent games at the
individual level. Our study contributes to lling this gap in the literature.
We utilize a within-subject design to compare behavior in two of the most widely-
studied games in the literature: the linear public-good game and the gift-exchange game.
The games share an important property. They are both social dilemmas with a unique,
ine¢ cient Nash equilibrium under the standard assumptions. At the same time, they are
strategically di¤erent. The public-good game is a simultaneous-move game, whereas the
gift-exchange game is a sequential-move game. Therefore, they seem a natural starting
point for a within-subject comparison of pro-social behavior.
Our goal is to investigate whether individuals that behave pro-socially in one game
are also more likely to behave pro-socially in the other game. The aforementioned models
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of social preferences assume this to be the case. For example, individuals that dislike in-
equality in earnings or care strongly for the welfare of the worse-o¤member in their group
should be willing to reciprocate high wages in the gift-exchange game and to contribute
to the public good if others do the same, all else equal. If they are not, that is, if we nd
no correlation of pro-social behavior at the individual level, this will raise questions about
whether social preferences are the cause of deviations from the standard predictions.
Despite the importance of such an analysis, there is only one study comparing pro-
social behavior across strategically di¤erent games.1 Blanco et al. (2011) use four one-shot
games (a modied dictator game, an ultimatum game, a two-person public-good game and
a sequential prisoners dilemma). The authors estimate individual Fehr-Schmidt utility
functions and test their predictive power. While Blanco et al. nd signicant correlations
of pro-social behavior across games, they also report a multiplicity of motives driving this
behavior which cannot be easily accounted by a single behavioral model. For this reason,
in our analysis below, we restrict ourselves to reporting correlations of behavior across
games without testing a specic model.
Our study complements that of Blanco et al. by using di¤erent games and protocols
to theirs. First, while the gift-exchange game is a sequential social dilemma, it di¤ers
from a sequential prisoners dilemma in that each player has multiple actions available.
Larger action sets have been shown to a¤ect pro-social behavior negatively (Gangadharan
and Nikiforakis, 2009). Second, Blanco et al. (2011) use four two-person games. In
contrast, we examine behavior in a three-person public-good game and a two-person gift-
exchange game. We think this is interesting as most public-good games use more than
two players. In addition, there is evidence that cooperation rates tend to be higher and
not to decline over time in two-person public-good games (Gangadharan and Nikiforakis,
2009). Finally, while Blanco et al. (2011) utilize four one-shot games, for reasons we
explain in the following section, we employ a nitely-repeated gift-exchange game and
also use the strategy method to elicit cooperation preferences in the public-good game.
1See Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman et al. (2007) for a within-subject analysis of behavior in
di¤erent dictator games.
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3.2 The experiment
A total of 48 students from Maastricht University participated in the experiment that was
conducted using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). On average, the four experimental sessions
lasted 90 minutes and participants earned 19 Euros. The instructions (see Appendix B)
informed subjects that the experiment consisted of two parts, but they were unaware of
the content of the second part until the rst part was completed.
3.2.1 Part 1: The public-good game
In this part, subjects played a one-shot public good-game. The payo¤ of individual i
was given by i = 20   gi + 0:5
P3
j=1 gj; where gi 2 f0; 1; :::20g is is contribution to
the public account, and 0.5 is the marginal return from the public account. Subjects
contributions to the public account were elicited using the method of Fischbacher et al.
(2001; FGF). In particular, participants had to decide on (i) an unconditional contribution
to the public account and (ii) a conditional contribution for each possible (rounded)
average contribution of the other two group members (0,1,...20).
All decisions were incentive compatible. After all individuals made their decisions, the
computer selected randomly two subjects in each group and their unconditional contribu-
tion was implemented. The contribution of the third group member was chosen based on
his/her conditional contribution and the average unconditional contribution of the other
two group members. Subjects did not receive feedback about the choices of the other
group members until the end of the second part.
We chose to use the FGF method as it allows for a straightforward comparison of pro-
social behavior in the public-good game with that in the gift-exchange game. Unlike the
unconditional contribution and similar to the second movers decision in the gift-exchange
game (see below), the conditional contribution is essentially belief-free. Therefore, this
method provides ideal conditions for nding a correlation of pro-social behavior at the
individual level.
3.2.2 Part 2: The gift-exchange game
In the second part, participants played a gift-exchange game for ten periods, using
random matching. In each period, the rst mover (FM) had to decide a wage w 2
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e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Table 3.1: Cost of e¤ort
f0; 5; 10; 15; :::; 100g to o¤er to the second mover (SM), who upon seeing the wage, had
to choose a level of e¤ort e 2 f1; 2; 3; :::; 10g. The cost of e¤ort c(e) is given in Table 3.1.
FMs payo¤ was given by FM = 10e w + 50; and SMs by SM = w  c(e) + 20: Roles
remained xed throughout this part.
The main reason for using a nitely repeated rather than a one-shot gift-exchange
game is that it allows learning about the incentives in the game. Assuming that pro-
social behavior is driven by social preferences, this should reduce errors and increase the
chance of nding signicant correlations across the two games. The repeated interactions
also allow participants to learn from otherschoices. Therefore, they should minimize the
likelihood of a consensus e¤ect (see Altmann et al., 2008; Blanco et al., 2011), that is,
that pro-social individuals have overall more "optimistic" beliefs about the willingness of
others to reciprocate high wages.
3.3 Results
We rst explore the relation between choices in the public-good game and SMs behavior
in the gift-exchange game. Based on models of social preferences, we anticipate that
high contributors in the public-good game will be more reciprocal on average than others.
For our analysis, we classify subjects as cooperators or non-cooperators using the FGF
criteria.2 A cooperator is an individual that is willing to contribute more, the more other
group members contribute.
Result 1: Only cooperators reciprocate signicantly higher wages with higher levels of
e¤ort in the gift-exchange game.
2Following FGF, participants who  with respect to the contribution of others  show either a
monotonic pattern with at least one increase or have a positive Spearman-rank correlation that is sig-
nicant at the 1-percent level are classied as (conditional) cooperators. For brevity, we use the term
cooperator rather than conditional cooperator. We pool selsh and other types in one category, unlike
FGF, as there are very few non-cooperators amongst second movers (cooperators: 18, selsh: 4; other:
2). Pooling the two types together, if anything, is expected to reduce the likelihood of nding signcant
di¤erences between cooperators and non-cooperators.
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SUPPORT: On average, over the ten periods of the experiment, cooperators chose an e¤ort
of 2:26, while non-cooperators chose an e¤ort of 1:53. This is a rather small di¤erence,
but it does not take into account the wages received by individuals, which were overall low
on average ( w = 17:40). Table 3.2 presents the results from a random-e¤ects regression
analysis with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the e¤ort exerted by SM,
while the independent variable of interest is the wage SM received. Model 1 indicates
that cooperators reciprocate higher wages with higher e¤ort (p value<0:001). Model 2
illustrates that the relationship between e¤ort and wage is much weaker and statistically
insignicant for non-cooperators (p value=0:386). Model 3 shows that the responsiveness
to higher wages across types is not signicantly di¤erent across types. This may seem
surprising at rst, but as it turns out the reason is that the majority of observations
involves w  20. When w  20; however, as e¤ort increases so does inequality to the
disadvantage of SM. Thus, even pro-social SMs would be expected to choose e = 1: If
we exclude observations with w  20; in Model 4, we nd that the di¤erence in the
responsiveness to higher wages across types is signicant (p value=0:028). This is the
case although we are left with a small fraction of the total number of observations (69 out
of 240). Finally, Model 5 indicates that our conclusions are una¤ected if we use a Tobit
model. Further analysis (not presented here) shows that Result 1 is robust if we focus on
behavior only in period 1, while we also do not observe a decrease in e¤ort over time.3
Next we investigate the relation between choices in the public-good game and FMs
behavior in the gift-exchange game. Note that if cooperators and non-cooperators have the
same beliefs about the SMs behavior, then we should not expect substantial di¤erences
in the wages o¤ered by FMs. The reason is that even money-maximizing FMs may have
an incentive to o¤er high wages if they believe they are likely to be reciprocated with
higher e¤ort.
Result 2: Cooperators do not o¤er signicantly higher wages than non-cooperators in the
gift-exchange game.
SUPPORT: The average wage o¤ered by a cooperator (non-cooperator) in the rst period
is 33:75 (37:50). A Mann-Whitney two-sided test fails to reject the hypothesis that the
two types o¤er the same wages (p value= 0:88).4 Across the 10 periods, the average
3For completeness, we report that there is no correlation between e¤ort in the gift-exchange game and
the unconditional contribution in the public-good game (random-e¤ects regressions: p value> 0:65).
4There were 12 cooperators and 12 non-cooperators amongst FMs (6 selsh, 6 others) using the FGF
33
Dependent variable: e¤ort exerted by SM
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Information used cooperators non-cooperators all SM wages>20 Tobit
Wage received 0:058 0:019 0:020  0:007  0:037
(0:015) (0:020) (0:022) (0:013) (0:062)
Cooperator  0:010  1:230  1:132
(0:273) (2:248) (19:252)
Cooperator * wage 0:038 0:056 0:112
(0:026) (0:024) (0:058)
Constant 1:211 1:233 1:227 2:776 0:471
(0:157) (0:215) (0:225) (2:107) (19:232)
Observations 180 60 240 69 69
*p-value<0.1,**p-value<0.05,***p-value<0.01;
Jackknife-robust standard errors are in parentheses;
Linear regressions with individual-level random-e¤ects
Table 3.2: Explaining second movers e¤ort choices in the repeated GEG
wage o¤ered by cooperators is higher than that o¤ered by non-cooperators (22:79 vs.
12:00). However, even if we treat the average wage of each individual across periods as an
independent observation (which increases statistical power, but is rather "heroic" given
the random-matching protocol), the di¤erence fails to be signicant at the 10-percent
level (p value= 0:132). Similar conclusions are derived if we perform a random-e¤ects
linear (or Tobit) regression analysis with wage o¤ered as the dependent variable and a
cooperator dummy as the independent variable (p value> 0:20).5 We also fail to nd a
signicant relationship at the 10-percent level between wage o¤ered and the unconditional
contribution in the public-good game as the explanatory variable (p value> 0:118).6 It
is worth noting that the coe¢ cient of the unconditional contribution is relatively small.
In particular, we nd that an individual contributing 10 ECUs more to the public account
than others will give only a 7.3 ECUs higher wage in the gift-exchange game (recall w
can be 100). We also nd no evidence of cooperators having more optimistic expectations
about the extent of SMs willingness to reciprocate either in the rst period or across all
rounds (p value> 0:20). As mentioned, this could account for the absence of a signicant
di¤erence in the wages o¤ered by cooperators and others.
criteria for classication.
5We ran several random-e¤ects regressions with and without clustering at the individual or session
level.
6Note that we also do not nd a correlation if we restrict our analysis to the rst period of the
experiment ( p value>0.6).
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the rst evidence linking pro-social behavior at the individ-
ual level in two of the most commonly-used games in the experimental literature. In
our experiment, individuals willing to cooperate with other group members in a public-
good game were also willing to reciprocate higher wages with higher levels of e¤ort in
a gift-exchange game. This is not the case for individuals who did not show a propen-
sity to cooperate with others. Our ndings therefore contribute to a still small body of
evidence investigating the consistency of pro-social behavior in di¤erent environments.
Such research is important for better understanding how this behavior can be captured
in behavioral models.
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Chapter 4
Cooperation preferences and framing
e¤ects
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results from a laboratory experiment investigating the sensitivity
of cooperation preferences to framing e¤ects. Cooperation preferences can be dened as
the willingness to cooperate with others when private and group interest are at odds
(Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). Evidence from laboratory experiments indicates that,
while some people are unwilling to cooperate with others, many individuals are willing
to cooperate provided that others in their group do the same (e.g., Fischbacher, Gächter
and Fehr, 2001; Kocher et al., 2008; Rustagi, Engel and Kosfeld, 2010; Thöni, Tyran
and Wengström, 2012). At the same time, there is also evidence that framing a¤ects
cooperation in public-good games and other social dilemmas. Despite this, it remains
unknown whether cooperation preferences are sensitive to framing e¤ects.
A framing e¤ect is said to occur when seemingly supercial changes in the presenta-
tion of a task a¤ect behavior without a¤ecting material incentives. For example, Andreoni
(1995) nds that contributions in a public-good game are considerably lower when the
experimental instructions emphasize the negative externality imposed to others by not
contributing to the public good, than when they highlight the positive externality gen-
erated by contributions. Similarly, individuals are more likely to cooperate with others
when the prisoners dilemma is called the "Community Game" than when it is called the
"Wall Street Game" (Kay and Ross, 2003; Liberman et al., 2004; Ross and Ward, 1996)
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or the "Stock Market Game" (Ellingsen et al., 2012).1
Recent studies have argued that framing a¤ects cooperation not by changing pref-
erences, but by changing beliefs about the actions of others (Dufwenberg et al. 2011;
Ellingsen et al., 2012; Nikiforakis, 2010). However, none of the aforementioned studies
has elicited individualspreferences for cooperation. Framing has been known to a¤ect
choices in non-strategic environments where beliefs about the actions of others should play
no role, such as when choosing a lottery (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1986). Therefore,
it remains an open question whether cooperation preferences are una¤ected by framing.
To elicit cooperation preferences in the present experiment I use the method of Fis-
chbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001; henceforth, FGF). This method has been used in a
number of studies, including Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) who showed that the elicited
preferences for cooperation are positively correlated with contributions in a nitely-
repeated public-good game.2 Participants in the experiment are asked in an incentive-
compatible way to state how much they are willing to contribute to a public account given
the average contribution of the othersgroup members. The elicited contribution sched-
ules reect a subjects cooperation preferences. The ndings indicate that the majority
of participants provides monotonic and increasing contribution schedules. That is, they
are willing to contribute more as the average contribution of others increases.
In the present study, framing takes the form of altering the way in which the strategy
method is administered. Two features of the FGF method, as it has been used so far, are
that the possible contributions of others are presented (i) simultaneously in a table, and
(ii) in an order (i.e., 0, 1, 2, ... 20). These features, however, could a¤ect the elicited
preferences for cooperation. For example, the ordering of others contributions could
serve as a cue for subjects to condition their contribution on that of others. Similarly,
the simultaneous frame in the strategy method may place subjects in a "cold" state when
making their decisions (e.g., Brandts and Charness, 2000; Brosig, Weimann and Yang,
2003; Gueth, Huck, and Mueller, 2001), while the sequential frame may place them in a
1Other studies that nd framing e¤ects in social dilemmas are Bougherara, Denant-Boemont, Masclet
(2011), Brandts and Schwieren (2009), Brewer and Kramer (1986), Cookson (2000) , Cubitt et al., (2011),
Fosgaard, Garn Hansen and Wengström (2011), Kotani, Managi, Tanaka (2008), McCusker and Carnevale
(1995), McDaniel and Sistrunk (1991), Nikiforakis (2010), Park (2000), Rege and Telle (2004), Sell and
Son (1997), Sonnemans et al. (1998), van Dijk and Wilke (2000), and Willinger and Zielgelmeyer (1999).
2For other studies using this method see Burlando and Guala (2005), Cheung (2012), Herrmann and
Thöni (2009), Kocher et al., (2008), Muller, Sefton, Steinberg, Vesterlund (2008), Rustagi, Engel and
Kosfeld (2010), Thöni, Tyran and Wengström (2009), and Volk, Thöni and Ruigrok (2012).
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state that is more similar to that in the standard public-good game. At the same time,
however, ordering and sequentiality could a¤ect the level of noise in the elicitation of
cooperation preferences and a¤ect its predictive power.3
The experiment consists of three parts. In the rst part, I elicit subjectscoopera-
tion preferences using the FGF method under three di¤erent frames. In the CONTROL
treatment, all possible contributions of others are presented simultaneously in a table,
but, unlike FGF, in a random order. In the second treatment (ORDERED), as in FGF,
the possible contributions of others are presented simultaneously and in an ascending
order. In the third treatment (SEQUENTIAL), the possible contributions of the other
group members are presented in the same random order as in the CONTROL treatment,
but sequentially, one by one. In the second and third part of the experiment, I evaluate
the predictive power of the elicited cooperation preferences in a one-shot and a nitely-
repeated public-good game in which subjects are rematched in every period.
In a recent article, Levy-Garboua, Maa, Masclet and Terracol (2012) elicit subjects
risk preferences using the Holt and Laury (2002) method under a variety of frames and
nd that both the ordering of options as well as whether choices are made simultaneously
or sequentially a¤ect the consistency of choices and the extent of risk aversion.4 These
ndings suggest that the number of participants with non-monotonic elicited cooperation
preferences may be higher in the SEQUENTIAL relative to the CONTROL treatment
but lower in the ORDERED compared to the CONTROL treatment.5 However, it is
unclear under which condition the elicited preferences will be better predictors of actual
contributions in the public-good game. For example, although the extent of noise may be
greater in the SEQUENTIAL relative to theCONTROL treatment, contribution schedules
may still be better predictors of behavior, if the sequential frame places individuals in a
similar (hot) state as in the one-shot and nitely-repeated game.
The experimental results indicate that this is not the case. The predictive power of
3For example, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) classify 10 percent of their subjects as "confused" if
they could not be classied as either selsh, conditionally cooperative or triangular. The authors report
that contributions in the nitely-repeated game of confused subjects were not well predicted by their
contribution schedules.
4A subject is said to be inconsistent in Levy-Garboua et al. (2012) when their preferences cannot be
explained with a standard utility function. The authors nd that the rate of inconsistent choices and the
level of risk aversion are higher when choices are made sequentially, and when choices are not orderred.
Levy-Garboua et al. (2012) do not test the predictive power of the elicited risk preferences.
5As I discuss later in the paper, non-monotonic contribution schedules cannot be explained by most
standard models used to explain behavior in social dilemmas.
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the contribution schedules is higher in CONTROL than in SEQUENTIAL, both in the
one-shot and in the nitely-repeated game. This is partly due to the high number of
individuals providing non-monotonic contribution schedules (90 percent of all subjects in
this treatment). In contrast, the ordering of otherscontributions, by and large, does not
a¤ect the predictive power of the elicited schedules. This is the case, despite the fact
that, similar to Levy-Garboua et al. (2012), the rate of participantswith non-monotonic
contribution schedules is higher in CONTROL (50 percent) than in ORDERED (30 per-
cent). In general, the frames a¤ect neither contributions nor beliefs in the rst two parts
of the experiment, but some di¤erences are observed in the third part in SEQUENTIAL.
I conclude that the simultaneous presentation of others contributions in an order are
appealing features of the FGF method.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present the experimental design
in detail. In section 3, I discuss the experimental results, while section 4 concludes.
4.2 The experiment
The experiment consists of three parts. The existence of the three parts is public knowl-
edge, but participants are not informed about the content of each part in advance. In the
rst part, I elicit participantscontribution schedules using variants of the FGF strategy
method. In the second part, participants play a one-shot public-good game, and in the
third part, they play a nitely-repeated version of the game. The experiment consists
of three treatments. The treatment manipulation occurs only in the rst part of the
experiment. The second and third part are identical across treatments.
This section begins by presenting the basic public-good game. This is followed by a
detailed presentation of each of the three parts and the experimental treatments. The
section concludes with a discussion of the experimental procedures.
4.2.1 The public-good game (overview)
Participants are randomly divided into groups of three players. Each group member is
given an endowment of 20 tokens and has to decide how to divide them between a private
and a public account. The payo¤ function for each group member i is:
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i = 20  gi + 0:5
3X
j=1
gj;
where gi 2 f0; 1; :::20g is the contribution of individual i to the public account. The
marginal return of the public account is 0.5, i.e., contributing 1 token to the public
account yields a private return of 0.5. Therefore, if an individual wishes to maximize
his/her material payo¤, s/he should not contribute to the public account. However, since
there are three individuals in the group, each token contributed to the public account
increases group earnings by 1.5. Therefore, there is a tension between private and group
interest.
In a one-shot public-good game, individuals wishing to maximize their material payo¤
have a dominant strategy to contribute zero to the public account. However, as men-
tioned, this prediction fails to account for the fact that many subjects contribute positive
amounts to the public account, and the fact that many of them are classied as "condi-
tional cooperators", i.e. individuals who contribute if they believe others do so. Fehr and
Schmidt (1999, Proposition IV) show that if some group members dislike inequality in
material payo¤s su¢ ciently, then positive contributions can be sustained in equilibrium in
the public-good game. The authors also show that the contribution of inequality-averse
individuals will increase monotonically with the average contribution of other players in
their group. Therefore, the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) provides an explanation for
conditional cooperation in public-good experiments.6 The intuition is that the inequality-
averse individuals will su¤er from the inequality when contributing less than the others.
Similar predictions are obtained using the model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
4.2.2 Eliciting contribution schedules and beliefs
In the rst part of the experiment, I employ the method of Fischbacher, Gächter, Fehr
(2001) for eliciting contribution schedules in the public-good game. Participants are
randomly matched to form an anonymous group of three players and told that they
will have to make three kinds of decisions. First, they have to decide on an unconditional
contribution to the public account. Second, they have to decide how much they are willing
6Note that the Fehr-Schmidt model cannot readily explain conditional cooperation in the experiment
of FGF (or the one in this paper) as subjects are allowed to condition their behavior only on the average
contribution of their peers and not on the existence or the extent of inequality in earnings.
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to contribute for each possible (rounded) average contribution of the other two members
of his group (0,1,...20). I will refer to this set of 21 decisions as the contribution schedule.
Third, participants have to estimate the (rounded) average unconditional contribution of
the other two group members.
The three treatments di¤er only with regards to the way in which the contribution
schedule is elicited. In the CONTROL treatment, the possible contributions of the other
group members are presented simultaneously, i.e, in a contribution table, but in a ran-
dom order.7 In the ORDERED treatment, all possible contributions by the other group
members are presented simultaneously in a table, in an ascending order. That is, the
ORDERED treatment replicates the design of FGF. In the SEQUENTIAL treatment,
the ordering of otherscontributions was the same as in the CONTROL treatment, but
otherscontributions were presented sequentially, in 21 successive screens.
All decisions are incentive compatible. In particular, after all participants made their
decisions, two subjects in each group were randomly selected and their unconditional
contribution was the one relevant for determining their contribution to the public account.
For the third subject, the contribution schedule determined their contribution to the
public account. In particular, their contribution was chosen based on their contribution
schedule and the average unconditional contribution of the other two group members.
To incentivize participants to truthfully reveal their beliefs, they are told that they will
receive 3 tokens for stating a belief that exactly matches the average contribution of the
other two group members. If their belief is within +/-1 of the average, they will receive 2
tokens. If their estimate is within +/-2 of the average they will receive 1 token. Otherwise,
they will not receive any additional tokens.
4.2.3 The one-shot public-good game
In the second part of the experiment, participants are informed that they will be placed
in a new group and that they will play a one-shot public-good game. The one-shot game
allows to analyze playersindividual responses in a one-shot interaction without repetition
e¤ect and learning.
7The order was determined by placing 21 numbered pieces of paper in a basket and picking them out
sequentially and without replacement before the start of the rst experimental session. The order was
kept constant in subsequent sessions.
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In order to evaluate the predictive power of the individuals contribution schedule,
I also elicit their beliefs about the average contribution of the other group members.
Furthermore, to avoid choices in the strategy method a¤ecting decisions in the one-shot
game, participants do not receive feedback about the outcomes of the rst part of the
experiment.
4.2.4 The nitely-repeated public-good game
At the start of the third and nal part of the experiment, participants are informed
that they will play the public-good game for ten periods and that the composition of
their group would be randomly determined at the start of each period. I note that,
following Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), before playing the nitely-repeated game, they
are informed about their earnings from the rst and second part of the experiment, and
the average contributions of their fellow group members. In each period, participants
have to decide how much to contribute to the public account and, in addition, provide
an estimate of how much they believe the other two group members would contribute on
average. Participants receive feedback similar to that in the one-shot game at the end of
each period.
4.2.5 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the University of Zurich using Z-tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Three sessions were run for each treatment with a total of 96 participants (30
in CONTROL, 33 in ORDERED, and 33 in SEQUENTIAL). Each subject participated
only in one experimental treatment. At the beginning of each session participants were
randomly allocated to a closed cubicle, where they could make their decisions in complete
anonymity from the other participants. Sessions lasted on average 90 minutes and partic-
ipants earned 46.17 CHF on average. At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate
between the Swiss Franc and the American Dollar was 1 CHF=$1.23
The experimental instructions (see Appendix C.2) were adopted from FGF and given
to subjects on paper. Instructions for Part 1 were handed out rst. Participants were
informed that there would be a second and third part to the experiment, but they had no
prior knowledge of what the content of these parts would be. Instructions for the second
part were not handed out until the end of rst part, and similarly for the third part. In the
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instructions, the contribution table was presenting and explained in the CONTROL and
ORDERED treatments. In the SEQUENTIAL treatment, two screens were presented to
the participants and they did no know the sequence of otherscontribution before playing
the game.
After participants had read the instructions, they had to answer control questions
which tested their understanding of the experiment. The experiment did not start until
all participants had answered correctly the control questions. The procedures for the
second and third part of the experiment were the same. At the end of the experiment the
total amount of tokens earned by participants was converted to Swiss francs at the rate
of 1 token = 0.6 CHF for the strategy method and the one-shot game, and, since each
individual made 10 decisions in the third part, at the rate of 1 token = 0.06 CHF for the
nitely-repeated game.
4.3 Results
This section is divided into four parts. The rst part examines the impact of the di¤er-
ent frames on the contribution schedules and, in particular, whether it a¤ects the rate
of non-monotonic contribution schedules. The second part investigates the predictive
power of the contribution schedules under the di¤erent frames in the one-shot public-
good game, while the third part does the same for the nitely-repeated game. The fourth
part discusses other experimental ndings such as the impact of the di¤erent frames on
the distribution of cooperation preferences and the levels of contribution in the one-shot
and nitely-repeated games.
4.3.1 Non-monotonic contribution schedules
All studies using the FGF method for eliciting cooperation preferences nd that a non-
trivial fraction of individuals provides non-monotonic contribution schedules. As men-
tioned, there are reasons to expect that there may be more (less) non-monotonic contribu-
tion schedules in the SEQUENTIAL (ORDERED) treatment compared to the CONTROL
treatment.
Let G denote the average contribution of ones group members, G 2 f0; 1; :::20g;
and gi(G) the contribution of individual i given the average contribution of his peers.
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A contribution schedule is weakly monotonic if gi(G + 1)  gi(G) for all G 2 [0; 19],
or gi(G + 1)  gi(G). A contribution schedule that does not satisfy either of these
conditions is non-monotonic. For example, an individual who always contributes gi(G) =
0 has a weakly monotonic schedule. A perfect conditional cooperator contributes gi(G) =
G and has a strictly monotonic schedule. An individual who contributes gi(0) = 0;
gi(1) = 2; gi(2) = 1;and gi(3) = 4 has a non-monotonic schedule. To have a measure
of how "noisy" these schedules are, I will sometimes refer to the number of switches in
the non-monotonic schedule of an individual. For example, in the previous example,
individual i made one switch when he contributed gi(2) = 1 (since before that he had an
increasing contribution schedule), and a second switch when he contributed gi(3) = 4.8
The individual contribution schedules can be seen in Appendix C.1.
Result 1: The proportion of individuals with non-monotonic contribution schedules is
substantially higher in the SEQUENTIAL treatment than in the CONTROL treatment,
and substantially lower in the ORDERED treatment than in the CONTROL treatment.
SUPPORT: Figure 4-1 shows that the proportion of individuals with a non-monotonic con-
tribution schedule is 50.0 percent in CONTROL, 30.3 percent in ORDERED, and 87.9
percent in SEQUENTIAL. A Chi-square test using each individual as an independent
observation indicates that the rate of non-monotonic contribution schedules is statisti-
cally higher in SEQUENTIAL than in CONTROL (p value=0.0011) and ORDERED
(p value=0.0001). While the rate is considerably higher in CONTROL than in the OR-
DERED (65 percent higher), the di¤erence marginally fails to be signicant at a conven-
tional level (p value=0.1292).9
Result 2: The average number of switches is signicantly greater in the SEQUENTIAL
than in the CONTROL treatment. The number of switches is not signicantly di¤er-
ent in the ORDERED and in the CONTROL treatment. Amongst the subjects with
non-monotonic contribution schedules, the average number of switches does not di¤er
8Such contribution schedules are di¢ cult to reconcile with most models of social preferences as dis-
cussed in the previous section. Models of non-linear altruism could provide a justication for non-
monotonic contribution schedules. According to these models an individual could contribute more when
she believes other contribute low amounts, and less when others contribute more. These models however
cannot account for contribution schedules exhibiting multiple "switching points". Most subjects who do
not have a weakly monotonic schedule have multiple switching points (9 out of 10 in ORDERED, 25 out
of 29 in SEQUENTIAL and 12 out of 15 in CONTOL).
9For completeness, I report that the rate of non-monotonic contribution schedules is signicantly
higher in SEQUENTIAL than in ORDERED (p value=0.0001).
44
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f n
on
-m
on
ot
on
ic
 c
he
du
le
s
ORDERED CONTROL SEQUENTIAL
Treatments
Figure 4-1: Percentage of subjects with non monotonic schedules
signicantly across treatments.
SUPPORT: The average number of switches is 2.0 in the CONTROL treatment, 3.5
in SEQUENTIAL and 1.2 in ORDERED. Since there are more than two treatments, I
rst report the results from a two-tailed Kruskal-Wallis test. I then proceed to pair-
wise treatment comparisons only if the Kruskal-Wallis indicates signicant di¤erences
across treatments. The Kruskal-Wallis test reveals a signicant di¤erence across treat-
ments (p value=0.0001). Using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test with each individual
as an independent observation, I nd that the di¤erence is signicant between CON-
TROL and SEQUENTIAL and (p value=0.0084). The di¤erence between CONTROL
and ORDERED narrowly misses the 10-percent level of signicance (p value=0.1084).10
Nevertheless, the number of switches amongst individuals with non-monotonic schedules
is similar across treatments (3.9 in ORDERED, 4.0 in CONTROL and 4.0 in SEQUEN-
TIAL) and not signicantly di¤erent (Kruskal-Wallis; p value=0.8776). This indicates
that the di¤erence in the number of switches on average is due to the higher percentage
of non-monotonic contribution schedules in SEQUENTIAL (see Result 1).
The greater extent of non-monotonic schedules in SEQUENTIAL may be partly at-
10The di¤erence between SEQUENTIAL and ORDERED is highly signicant (p value=0.0000)
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tributed to the fact that individuals cannot revise their choices once made. However,
half of the participants also fail to report a weakly monotonic contribution schedule
even in CONTROL where revisions are possible. Given the impact of the frames on
the monotonicity of contribution schedules, the next subsection investigates whether and
how the di¤erent frames also a¤ect the predictive power in the one-shot public-good game.
4.3.2 Predictive power of schedules in the one-shot public-good
game
A natural way to investigate the predictive power of the contribution schedules is to
examine whether the actual contributions of participants in the one-shot game deviate
from those in the contribution schedules. Recall that participants were asked to state
how much they believed their peers would contribute on average in the one-shot game.
Following Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), I use this belief and the contribution schedule
to obtain a prediction about how much an individual will contribute in the one-shot game.
For example, if someone believes that his peers will contribute on average 5, the predicted
contribution is obtained by looking at the contribution the individual stated he would
make if the others contributed 5 on average in the contribution schedule.
Result 3: On average, contribution schedules are accurate predictors of contributions in
the one-shot game only in the ORDERED treatment.
SUPPORT: Let Deviation be the di¤erence between a subjects actual and predicted con-
tribution. Figure 4-2 presents the distribution of Deviation in each treatment. As can be
easily seen, relative to theCONTROL treatment, more subjects deviate from the predicted
contribution in the SEQUENTIAL treatment, and less in the ORDERED treatment. The
average deviation is 1.4 tokens in CONTROL, 1.8 tokens in SEQUENTIAL and 0.2 in the
ORDERED. A two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test using each individual as an indepen-
dent observation indicates that the deviation is not signicantly di¤erent from 0 in the
ORDERED condition (p value=0.8266), but it is in the CONTROL (p value=0.0653)
and in the SEQUENTIAL treatment (p value=0.0047).11
11This di¤erence is not statistically signicant between SEQUENTIAL and CONTROL
(p value=0.3300). Despite the large di¤erence, a Mann-Whitney test fails to reject the hypothesis
that average devation is the same in ORDERED and CONTROL (p value=0.2406). The di¤erence in
average devation between ORDERED and SEQUENTIAL is statistically signicant (p value=0.0375).
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Figure 4-2: Distribution of deviation from the predicted contribution (one-shot)
The average deviation from the predicted contribution is one obvious indicator for
evaluating the predictive power of contribution schedules. In this case, however, it masks
the fact that the schedules predict perfectly the contribution of nearly 50 percent of sub-
jects in the CONTROL and ORDERED treatments. Figure 4-2 shows that the relative
e¢ cacy of the schedules in ORDERED is due to the (roughly) equal number of posi-
tive and negative deviations from the predicted contribution. For this reason, next, I
investigate the predictive power of the contribution schedules using a di¤erent measure.
Result 4: Relative to the CONTROL treatment, the probability an individuals contribu-
tion di¤ers from their predicted contribution is higher in SEQUENTIAL, and (insignif-
icantly) lower in ORDERED. This probability of deviation is higher for individuals with
noisy contribution schedules and for those with high beliefs about the contribution of their
peers.
SUPPORT: Table 4.1 reports the results from a regression analysis investigating the de-
terminants of an individuals deviation from their predicted contribution. The dependent
variable is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if Deviation 6= 0 and the value of 0 if
Deviation= 0: Model 1 includes only treatment dummies as regressors (CONTROL be-
ing the omitted category). The regression shows that the probability of deviating from
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Dependent variable: rate of deviation
Model 1 2 3 4
ORDERED 0:0147 0:0588 0:0678 0:0872
(0:1227) (0:1252) (0:1299) (0:1303)
SEQUENTIAL 0:2263 0:1273 0:1219 0:1414
(0:1153) (0:1296) (0:1336) (0:1300)
Switcher 0:3138 0:2933
(0:1041) (0:1089)
Beliefs 0:0322 0:0308
(0:0113) (0:0113)
Totalswitch 0:0621
(0:0255)
Observations 96 96 96 96
*p-value<0.1,**p-value<0.05,***p-value<0.01; Probit regression;
Entries are marginal e¤ects. Standard errors are in parentheses
Table 4.1: Probability of deviating from the predicted contribution in the one-shot game
the predicted contribution is 22.6 percent points higher in SEQUENTIAL than in CON-
TROL (p value=0.050). The di¤erence between CONTROL and ORDERED is small
(1.5 percent points) and statistically insignicant (p value=0.904). Model 2 includes the
variable "Switcher" as an explanatory variable. Switcher is a dummy variable taking
the value of 1 if the contribution schedule of a particular individual includes more than 1
switches.12 Model 2 indicates that the probability a "switcher" deviates from his predicted
contribution across treatments is 31.38 percent points higher than that of a non-switcher
(p value=0.003). The fact that the size of the SEQUENTIAL coe¢ cient is approximately
halved and is no longer signicantly di¤erent from zero (p value=0.326) indicates that
the di¤erence across the two treatments is mainly due to the higher number of individuals
with non-monotonic contribution schedules in this treatment. To test this explanation fur-
ther, I ran a regression which in addition to the regressors in Model 2, included interaction
terms between the treatment and switcher dummies (not reported). The only signicant
variable in this regression is the Switcher variable (marg. e¤ect: 36.27 percent points;
p value=0.047). The coe¢ cient for SEQUENTIAL is slightly lower than in Model 2 and
remains statistically insignicant (marg. e¤ect: 10.78 percent points; p value=0.591).
The fact that the interaction terms are insignicant indicates the switchers are as likely
12The rationale for this is that, as mentioned earlier, none of the standard models of social preference
can account for more than one switches. Note that "triangle" contributors have one switch in their
contribution schedules.
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to deviate from the predicted contribution in all treatments and corroborates Result 2.
Model 3 adds an individuals Belief as a regressor. The results indicate that the higher
the belief of an individual about the average contribution of his peers, the higher is the
probability they deviate from their predicted contribution (marginal e¤ect: 3.22 percent
points; p value=0.005). This seems intuitive. For example, while an individual may
have stated that she would contribute 15 if she knew for sure that others did the same
(strategy method), in the one-shot game, she cannot be sure whether this will be the
case. Therefore, she may be more likely to deviate from her predicted contribution than
if she believed others would contribute 5. The reason is that participants, on average,
contribute less than their beliefs. Therefore, the extent of the deviation is lower when
beliefs are low. A similar nding regarding beliefs is also reported in Fischbacher and and
Gächter (2010). Finally, Model 4 replaces the Switcher dummy variable with the total
number of switches in an individuals contribution schedule. As can be seen, the higher
the number of switches in a contribution schedule, the higher is the probability that an
individual deviates from his predicted contribution (p value=0.015):13 The marginal ef-
fect shows that an additional switch in the contribution schedule increases the probability
of deviating from the predicted contribution by 6.21 percent points.
4.3.3 Predictive power of schedules in the nitely-repeated public-
good game
The approach for evaluating the predictive power of the contribution schedules in the
nitely-repeated game is the same as in the previous section. In each of the ten peri-
ods, I estimate an individuals Deviation by comparing their actual to their predicted
contribution.14
Result 5: Contribution schedules accurately predict contributions in the nitely-repeated
game in the CONTROL and the ORDERED treatments, but not in the SEQUENTIAL
treatment.
SUPPORT: Figure 4-3 presents the distribution of Deviation in each treatment. As
13The results are qualitatively una¤ected if we use dummies to control for the number of switches
instead of the total number of switches.
14Note that participants received feedback about the contributions of their peers and their private
earnings at the end of each period, but also at the start of the rst period (i.e., regarding decisions in the
one-shot game).
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Figure 4-3: Distribution of deviation from the predicted contribution (nitely repeated)
can be seen, more subjects appear to deviate from their predicted contribution in the
SEQUENTIAL than in the CONTROL treatment. The CONTROL and ORDERED
treatments give similar results. The average deviation across the 10 periods is 0.3 in
CONTROL, -0.6 in the ORDERED, and 1.4 in SEQUENTIAL. To control for the panel
nature of the data in the third part of the experiment, I ran a linear regression controlling
for random e¤ects at the session level. The average deviation is signicantly di¤erent
from zero in SEQUENTIAL (p value=0.003), but not in CONTROL and ORDERED
(p value=0.637 and 0.322, respectively):15 These results are robust if I evaluate behavior
at di¤erent points of part 3, such as in period 1 and the rst ve periods.
Result 6: The probability an individuals contribution di¤ers from their predicted con-
tribution in the nitely-repeated game is higher in SEQUENTIAL than in CONTROL.
The di¤erence between CONTROL and ORDERED is not statistically signicant. The
probability of deviating from the predicted contribution is higher for individuals with noisy
contribution schedules and with high beliefs about the contribution of their peers.
15Average deviation is signcantly di¤erent between SEQUENTIAL and CONTROL (p value=0.081),
and between ORDERED and SEQUENTIAL (p value=0.005). Average devation is not signicantly
di¤erent between ORDERED and CONTROL (p value=0.302).
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SUPPORT: Table 4.2 reports the results from a regression analysis investigating the de-
terminants of an individuals deviation from their predicted contribution. The dependent
variable, as in the previous subsection, is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if Devi-
ation 6= 0 and the value of 0 if Deviation= 0 for a given subject in a given period: Given
the interdependence of contributions at the session level, the model controls for random
e¤ects at the session level. The logic of the empirical investigation is the same as in the
previous section for the one-shot game, building the model up gradually.
The results in Table 4.2 are qualitatively the same as those in Table 4.1 for the one-shot
game. The regression shows that the probability of a subject deviating from her predicting
contribution is 29.5 percent points higher in the SEQUENTIAL than in the CONTROL
treatment (p value<0.001). Contributions in the ORDERED treatment are 4.9 percent
points less likely to di¤er from the predicted contribution than in the CONTROL treat-
ment, but the di¤erence is far from being statistically signicant (p value=0.427). Model
2 shows that a "Switcher", that is, an individual with noisy contribution schedule is 28.2
percent points more likely to deviate from his predicted contribution (p value<0.001).
However, unlike in the one-shot game, the coe¢ cient for SEQUENTIAL remains signi-
cant in Model 2 (p value=0.002), although the coe¢ cient drops from 28.2 to 21.1 percent
points. Model 3 controls for an individuals Belief about others contribution. Similar to
the one-shot game, the higher the belief of an individual about the average contribution of
her peers, the higher is the probability she deviates from her predicted contribution (marg.
e¤ect: 4.7 percent points; (p value<0.001). Note that the coe¢ cient for SEQUENTIAL
is no longer signicant in Model 3. This indicates that the higher rate of deviations in this
treatment is mostly due to the higher beliefs about the contributions of others.16 Model
4 replaces the Switcher variable with the total number of switches in an individuals con-
tribution schedule, and adds a (linear) control for time e¤ects. The results indicate that
the higher the number of switches in a contribution schedule, the higher is the proba-
bility that an individual deviates from his predicted contribution (p value<0.001). The
marginal e¤ect shows that, similar to the one-shot game, an additional switch in the con-
16To test this explanation, I ran a regression separately for each treatment with the sole regressors
being Switcher and Belief. The latter is always statistically signicant, while the former is signcant in
all treatments except in the SEQUENTIAL. A closer inspection at the data indicates the both switchers
and non-switchers have substantially higher levels of beliefs in this treatment. As a result, both are about
75 percent likely to deviate from their predicted contribution - a rate which is considerably higher than
in the other treatments. I discuss the impact of framing on contributions and beliefs in more detail in
the next subsection.
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Model 1 2 3 4
ORDERED  0:0492  0:0127  0:03480  0:0154
(0:0620) (0:0725) (0:0576) (0:0592)
SEQUENTIAL 0:2950 0:2112 0:0646 0:0717
(0:0558) (0:0690) (0:0610) (0:0616)
Switcher 0:2822 0:2649
(0:0346) 0:0356
Beliefs 0:0474 0:0486
(0:0059) (0:0063)
Totalswitch 0:0603
(0:0079)
Period 0:0107
(0:0063)
Observations 960 960 960 960
*p-value<0.1,**p-value<0.05,***p-value<0.01;
Probit regression with random e¤ects at the session level;
Entries are marginal e¤ects. Standard errors are in parentheses
Table 4.2: Probability of deviating from the predicted contribution in the nitely-repeated
game
tribution schedule increases the probability of deviating from the predicted contribution
by 6 percent. The probability of deviating from ones predicted contribution decreases by
1 percent in every period. The reason is that, as in all public-good experiments, contri-
butions decline over time. As we will see in the next subsection, most people contribute
small amounts in response to low contribution by their peers.
4.3.4 Cooperation preferences, contribution levels and beliefs
So far, the analysis has focused on how the di¤erent frames a¤ect the monotonicity and
predictive power of the contribution schedules. In this section, I investigate the impact
of the di¤erent frames on the levels of contribution in the three parts of the experiment
and subjects beliefs. Before doing this, however, I will examine how the frames im-
pact the di¤erent types of cooperation preferences seen in previous studies. Fischbacher,
Gächter and Fehr (2001) proposed a classication of the di¤erent patterns observed in
the contribution schedules. In particular, individuals that always contribute zero in the
strategy method, irrespective of the contribution of their peers, are classied as "free
riders". Individuals who have a contribution schedule with either a weakly monotonic
pattern with at least one increase or a positive Spearman rank correlation signicant at
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Treatments/types CONTROL ORDERED SEQUENTIAL
Free Riders 30.00 36.36 3.03
Conditional Cooperators 43.33 39.39 78.79
Triangles 3.33 3.03 0.00
Others 23.33 21.21 18.18
Table 4.3: Distribution of types (percentages)
the 1-percent level are classied as "conditional cooperators".17 "Triangle contributors"
are participants who have a signicantly increasing schedule up to some maximum and a
signicantly decreasing schedule thereafter, using again as a criterion the Spearman rank
test at the 1-percent level of signicance. Participants that could not be classied in one
of the above categories are classied as "others" or "confused".
Result 7: The sequential treatment has a pronounced impact on the elicited contribution
schedules relative to the CONTROL treatment. In contrast, the ordering of the others
contribution does not a¤ect the elicited contribution schedules.
SUPPORT: Table 4.3 presents the results of the FGF classication method in each treat-
ment. While the distribution of types appears to be similar in CONTROL and OR-
DERED, it is strikingly di¤erent in SEQUENTIAL. As can be seen, only 1 out of 33 partic-
ipants (3 percent) can be classied as selsh in the SEQUENTIAL treatment, compared to
12 out of 33 in theORDERED treatment (36.4 percent), and 9 out of 30 in the CONTROL
treatment (30 percent). Similarly, 43 percent of individuals are classied as conditional
cooperators in the CONTROL treatment, 39.4 percent in ORDERED, and 78.8 percent
in SEQUENTIAL.18 A Fischers exact test rejects the hypothesis that the distribution of
types is the same across the three treatments (p value=0.003). Pairwise Fischer exact
tests reveal that this di¤erence is due to the SEQUENTIAL treatment. In particular, the
di¤erence between CONTROL and SEQUENTIAL is signicant (p value=0.004), while
17Note that conditional cooperators can have non-monotonic schedules and, indeed, some of them did.
18It is also worthwhile pointing out that only 3 of the 13 individuals classied as conditional cooperators
in ORDERED have a non-monotonic contribution schedule. In contrast, 8 of 13 conditional cooperators
in CONTROL, and 24 of the 26 in SEQUENTIAL have non-monotonic schedules. The proportion of
conditional cooperators with non-monotonic schedules, relative to the CONTROL treatment, is lower in
ORDERED (p value=0.0183) and higher in SEQUENTIAL (p value=0.03). Conditional cooperators
are switching more often on average in SEQUENTIAL (3.0 switches) and CONTROL (2.1 switches)
compared to ORDERED (0.5 switches). A Mann-Whitney test indicates that the di¤erence between
ORDERED vs CONTROL is statistically signicant (p value=0.0398), while that between CONTROL
and SEQUENTIAL is not (p value=0.1239).
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Figure 4-4: Average conditional contribution in the strategy method
that between ORDERED and CONTROL is not (p value=0.947).
Additional support for Result 7 can be found in Figure 4-4 and Table 4.4.19 Figure 4-4
presents the average conditional contribution in the rst part of the experiment. Similar
to previous experiments, the average conditional contribution is monotonically increasing
and lies below the 45-degree line in all treatments. However, as can be seen, conditional
contributions tend to be higher in SEQUENTIAL, than in the other two treatments.
The results of a linear regression with individual random e¤ects reported in Table 4.4
conrm that the average conditional contribution di¤ers signicantly in SEQUENTIAL.
In particular, the slope of the conditional contribution is higher by 20.9 degrees in SE-
QUENTIAL than in CONTROL. This di¤erence is non-trivial and statistically signicant
(p value<0.001). It implies that for every additional token contributed to the public ac-
count by ones peers, the contribution will be 0.209 higher than in the CONTROL. The
di¤erence in slopes between CONTROL and ORDERED is smaller (5.2 degrees) and
narrowly misses the 10-percent level of signicance (p value=0.101).
Result 8: By and large, beliefs and unconditional contributions are not signicantly
di¤erent across treatments in the rst and second part of the experiment. In the third part,
19Figure 4.4 and Table 4.4 below excludes subject 1202 who gave 20 when others gave 0 and had a
Spearman correlation coe¢ cient of -1
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Dependent variable: conditional contribution strategy method
Model 1
Otherscontribution 0:3320
(0:2296)
ORDERED 0:7085
(1:0552)
SEQUENTIAL  0:0320
(1:0474)
ORDERED * Otherscontribution  0:0524
(0:0319)
SEQUENTIAL * Otherscontribution 0:2087
(0:0317)
Constant 0:6331
0:7580
Observations 95
*p-value<0.1,**p-value<0.05,***p-value<0.01;
Linear regression with individual random e¤ects
Table 4.4: Determinants of conditional contribution in the strategy method
contributions are higher in SEQUENTIAL, due to higher beliefs about the contributions
of others.
SUPPORT: [First part of the experiment] The average belief regarding othersaver-
age (unconditional) contribution in the rst part of the experiment is 7.16 (CONTROL),
5 (ORDERED), and 8 (SEQUENTIAL). A Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the hypothesis
that beliefs are the same across treatments (p value=0.0408). Using a two-tailed Mann-
Whitney test with each individual as an independent observation, the di¤erence between
CONTROL andORDERED is marginally statistically signicant (p value=0.0999), while
that between CONTROL and SEQUENTIAL is not (p value=0.6265). In contrast, a
Kruskal-Wallis test fails to reject the hypothesis that subjectsunconditional contribu-
tions (6.23, 4.42, 6.57, in CONTROL, ORDERED and SEQUENTIAL, respectively) are
the same across treatments in the rst part of the experiment (p value=0.1413).
[Second part of the experiment] A Kruskal-Wallis test fails to reject the hy-
pothesis that subjects beliefs (6.03, 5.81, 6.72, in CONTROL, ORDERED and SE-
QUENTIAL, respectively) are the same across treatments (p value=0.6003). While the
test rejects the same hypothesis for contributions (4.93, 3.85, 5.82, in CONTROL, OR-
DERED and SEQUENTIAL, respectively; p value=0.0703), a two-tailed Mann-Whitney
test with each individual as an independent observation indicates that neither the di¤er-
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Figure 4-5: Average contribution over time
ence between CONTROL and ORDERED is statistically signicant (p value=0.3170)
nor is that between CONTROL and SEQUENTIAL (p value=0.2714).
[Third part of the experiment] As can be seen in Figure 4.5, while contributions
appear to be very similar across all periods in CONTROL and ORDERED, contributions
tend to be higher in the SEQUENTIAL treatment than in the CONTROL. In particular,
average contribution is 1.7 in CONTROL, 1.8 in ORDERED and 4.3 in SEQUENTIAL.
Similarly, on average, beliefs are higher in SEQUENTIAL (5.5), than in CONTROL (2.12)
and ORDERED (2.42). This seems surprising given that beliefs and contributions did
not di¤er signicantly in the rst two parts of the experiment (Result 7). The di¤erence
appears already in the rst period of the third part where beliefs in SEQUENTIAL are
6.2, 3.8 in CONTROL, and 4.8 in ORDERED. Given the panel nature of the data and the
use of random matching in this part of the experiment, to compare behavior across treat-
ments Table 4.5 presents the results from a linear regression with random e¤ects at the
session level. Model 1 illustrates that the di¤erence between CONTROL and SEQUEN-
TIAL is statistically signicant (p value=0.005), but not that between CONTROL and
ORDERED (p value=0.945). The addition of subjectsbeliefs as an explanatory variable
in Model 2 indicates that once I control for beliefs, the di¤erence between CONTROL and
SEQUENTIAL is no longer signicant (p value=0.921). The coe¢ cient of subjectsbe-
liefs is highly signicant (p value<0.001) and indicates that a one unit increase in beliefs,
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Dependant Variable: Determinant of contribution in the repeated game
Model 1 2 3
ORDERED 0:0708  0:1913  0:01871
(1:0328) (0:2533) (0:3622)
SEQUENTIAL 2:8676  0:0276  0:2773
(1:0328) (0:2780) (0:4298)
Period  0:2035 0:0201 0:0167
0:0433 (0:0369) (0:0374)
Beliefs 0:8011 0:7678
(0:0342) (0:1094)
Beliefs * ORDERED 0:0025
(0:1190)
Beliefs * SEQUENTIAL 0:0660
(0:1184)
Constant 2:8173  0:0793 0:0099
(0:7697) (0:2961) (0:3890)
Observations 960 960 960
*p-value<0.1,**p-value<0.05,***p-value<0.01
Linear regression with individual random e¤ects
Table 4.5: Determinants of conditional contribution in the nitely-repeated game
increases the contribution of an individual by 0.80 tokens. Finally, Model 3 shows that
the relationship between beliefs and contributions is similar across treatments. This im-
plies that higher beliefs about otherscontribution drive the higher levels of contribution
in SEQUENTIAL. In Appendix C.1.2, I provide additional evidence from a regression
analysis of subjectsbeliefs. I show that the higher beliefs in SEQUENTIAL are due to a
stronger relationship between contributions in parts 1 and 2 (i.e., the feedback subjects
receive at the start of part 3), and beliefs. It is di¢ cult to explain why the sequential
frame has the e¤ect on belief formation.
4.4 Discussion
The aim of the experiment was to evaluate the sensitivity of cooperation preferences to
changes in the frame which have been recently shown to a¤ect the elicitation of (risk)
preferences (Levy-Garboua et al., 2012). In particular, using the method of Fischbacher,
Gächter and Fehr (2001; FGF) for eliciting cooperation preferences, I varied (i) the order
in which otherscontributions appeared in the experiment, and (ii) whether these contri-
butions were presented simultaneously or in sequence. In addition, the experiment aimed
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to evaluate the predictive power of cooperation preferences in a one-shot and a nitely-
repeated public-good game. In general, I found that the order in which the contributions
of others was presented had no impact on the elicited preferences and their predictive
power. However, presenting the contributions of others in a sequence had a signicant
e¤ect on the elicited preferences and reduced their predictive power. In this sense, my
ndings are similar to those of Levy-Garboua et al. (2012) who found that risk pref-
erences are a¤ected more by changes in whether the options are presented sequentially
or simultaneously, rather than the order in which the options are presented. Overall,
elicited preferences are more accurate at predicting behavior when otherscontributions
are presented simultaneously and in ascending order, like in Fischbacher, Gächter and
Fehr (2001).
What could explain the impact of the sequential frame in our experiment? One ex-
planation for the number of non-monotonic schedules in SEQUENTIAL may be that
individuals cannot revise their choices once made. While this explanation can partly
account for the level of noise in the contribution schedules, it cannot account for the
much higher levels of conditional cooperation and near absence of free riders seen in this
treatment. An explanation for this nding may be that individuals wish to maintain a
positive self-image. Gneezy et al. (2011) found that donations to charity are more likely
to happen after people lie or fail to return money they had received by mistake. The
authors discuss the concept of conscience accountingwhich means that people try to
compensate badactivities to protect their identity and self-image. It seems possible
that making 21 consecutive decisions not to contribute to the public account may be more
damaging for ones self image than submitting once a table with zero contributions.
An issue which may be interesting for future study is when cooperation preferences are
elicited. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) ran experiments with the FGF strategy method
either at the start or the end of the experiment to evaluate whether the timing of the
elicitation a¤ected contributions in a nitely-repeated game. They found that this was
not the case and that contributions were the same when cooperation preferences were
elicited at the start and the end of the experiment. This nding is the reason I elicited
preferences only at the start of the experiment. However, the nding that beliefs and
contributions in the nitely-repeated game are higher in SEQUENTIAL suggests that
eliciting cooperation preferences at the start of the experiment may inuence outcomes,
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at least under some frames. Therefore, it may be useful for future studies to randomize
when the strategy method is administered.
Finally, given the ndings from the present experiment, I believe that the FGF method
could be used to investigate whether other kinds of frames that have been shown to a¤ect
contributions in public-good games, such as the warm-glow/cold-prickle e¤ect of Andreoni
(1995) and the labelling of the game or strategies (e.g., Ellingsen et al., 2012; Kay and
Ross, 2003; Liberman et al., 2004; Ross and Ward, 1996) a¤ects only subjectsbeliefs, as
suggested in previous articles (Dufwenberg et al. 2011; Ellingsen et al., 2012; Nikiforakis,
2010) or also cooperation preferences.
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Chapter 5
Social networks in an experimental
labor market with adverse selection
5.1 Introduction
Social networks play an important role in labor markets. A number of empirical studies
have found evidence that rms often hire workers using the social contacts of their current
employees. Workers also nd jobs to apply for through their social network. For example,
Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) report that 30 to 60 percent of job vacancies in
the U.S. labor market are lled through friends or relatives. Similarly, Pellizari (2010)
nds that social networks are widely used in the European labor market, with half of
job vacancies in some countries being lled through personal contacts. Recently, Brown,
Setren and Topa (2012) using a dataset on individual employeesreferral status in the
US nd that referred workers are more likely to be hired, have a higher initial wage and
are less likely to quit.1 Firms like Ernst &Young, Deloitte, Rent-A-Car report that they
are increasingly using their current workers to nd new hires (New York Times, January
2013).
A factor that can explain the wide use of social networks is that they may alleviate
the problem of adverse selection rms face when hiring workers. Studies have shown that
workers have a tendency to refer other workers of similar ability (Rees, 1966; Granoveter,
1985, 1995). This tendency is sometimes referred to in the literature as "inbreeding" bias.
Therefore, rms may rely on the information provided by their workers when looking to ll
1See Jackson (2008) and Topa (2011) for reviews of the economics literature.
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job vacancies, especially if the workers are considered to be of high ability (Montgomery,
1991).2
In this chapter, we study whether social networks can alleviate the problem of adverse
selection in labor markets. In contrast to previous studies on social networks, our focus is
not on the quality of workers that are being referred to the rms, but rather on when rms
decide to use the social network of their employees to ll job vacancies. The advantage of
conducting a laboratory experiment is that it allows us to control for the probability that
a referred worker is of a certain ability.3 Our aim is to investigate whether rms use the
social network of their workers to hire new workers, under what conditions they do so,
and ultimately, whether social networks improve the quality of workers hired and increase
e¢ ciency.
In the experiment, workers can be either of high or low ability. Our game consists
of two stages. A rm seeks to hire one worker from a set of potential employees in each
stage. In our baseline treatment, workers in the two stages are not linked into a social
network and they can only make public o¤ers to workers via a public market. In our main
treatment, each worker in the rst stage is connected to another worker in the second
stage, and vice versa. The worker in the second stage is 75 percent likely to be of the
same ability as that of the worker in the rst stage. In the second stage, rms are given
the option of either making a referral o¤er to the worker in the social network of the
worker hired in the rst stage via a referral market, or make a public o¤er to all available
workers.
We have four research questions that we wish to address with our experiment. First,
we are interested to see whether rms are more likely to make referral o¤ers in the second
stage of our main treatment when the worker hired in the rst stage is of high ability,
than when they are of low ability. Second, are wages in the referral market higher than in
the public market? Third, are rms willing to make higher o¤ers in the rst stage of the
game in order to attract workers with a better network (i.e., high-ability workers). Four,
does the existence of a social network lead to a greater proportion of high-ability workers
2Of course, other reasons such as the lower cost of hiring may explain partly why rms use the social
networks of their employees to attract workers.
3There is a long tradition in economics of using laboratory experiments to examine issues pertaining
to labor markets. Most experimental studies have focused on the moral hazard problem and ways of
overcoming it. For example, Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), in line with Akerlof (1982, 1984),
developed the gift exchange game to capture extreme contractual incompleteness in a labor market
setting. They show that reciprocal fairness may overcome the moral-hazard problem.
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in the second stage, relative to the baseline treatment?
Our experimental results show that rms are indeed signicantly more likely to make
o¤ers in the referral market when the worker hired in the rst stage is of high ability,
and that referral o¤ers are higher on average than public o¤ers. With regards to our
third research question, we nd that rms are more likely to make o¤ers that satisfy the
participation constraint of high-ability workers in the rst stage in the presence of social
networks. Finally, we nd that the proportion of high-ability workers in the second stage
is higher when there is a social network.
Our study contributes to two related literatures. The rst investigates the role of social
networks in labor markets. In this mostly theoretical literature, most studies focus on
either how workers use their social networks to search for jobs or on the impact of di¤erent
network structures on market outcomes, while relatively few focus on the decision of rms
to use social networks for hiring.4 The study which is most closely related to ours is that
of Montgomery (1991) who develops a model that focuses on the decision of rms to
make referral o¤ers to workers belonging to the social network of their employees. While
there are di¤erences between our set up and that of Montgomery, the model predicts that
referral o¤ers will be higher than public o¤ers when there is a social network similar to
that in our experiment, and that rms will be more likely to make referral o¤ers if their
employee is one of high ability.5 The model also predicts that rms will be willing to o¤er
higher wages in order to attract workers with a better social network.
The empirical studies on the role of social networks in labor markets to date have
focused on the quality of workers that are being referred to rms through social networks.
Although there are apparent methodological issues with regards to measuring the extent
of inbreeding bias among workers and the latters productivity, the evidence seems to
indicate that social networks may improve the overall quality of workers hired and workers
and rms allocation, under certain conditions. Beaman and Magruder (2011) show that
social networks reduce adverse selection in a eld experiment in India, but only when
4See Boorman (1975), Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994), Pissarides (2000), Topa (2001), Calvo-
Armengol (2003), Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004), Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2005), Loury (2006),
Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008), Beaman (2010), Galeotti and Merlino (2010), Magruder (2010) and Zenou
(2013) for studies focusing on the workersdecision. See Montgomery (1991), Kugler (2002), Munshi
(2003), and Casella and Hanaki (2008) for studies focusing on the rms problem.
5In Montgomerys words given the inbreeding bias between workers of similar ability, a rm will
attempt to hire through referral only if it employs a high-ability worker.... Also see McPherson et al
(2001) who refers to people who interact with others who are like themselves as the homophily principle.
62
existing workers have correct incentives for referring their contacts. Dustmann, Glitz and
Schönberg (2011) show that job-search networks in a German metropolitan city give raise
to better matches of the workers with the rms and enhance e¢ ciency. In contrast, using
data from the Ghanian Colonial Army, Fafchamps and Moradi (2010) nd that social
networks do not lead to a better quality of workers, which they attribute to "referee
opportunism". As mentioned, in contrast to theses studies, our focus is on the use of a
social network given a specic inbreeding bias and not on the existence of the inbreeding
bias.
The second literature this chapter makes a contribution to is that investigating ways
of overcoming problems that arise from contractual incompleteness. Social networks are
one way of overcoming such problems. Another way is through the establishment of
long-term relationships. The relation between contractual incompleteness and long-term
relationships is studied in an experiment by Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) who show that
successful long-term relationships can lead to high e¤ort levels and high wages. They
investigate multilateral relationships and the possibility of social ties between rms and
workers. However, they do not allow for links between workers as we do in our experiment.
Our market experiment resembles the one by Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) except that
we focus on adverse selection and social networks instead of moral hazard and long-term
relationships.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the experimental design and
theoretical predictions. In Section 3, we present the results from the experiment, while
Section 4 concludes.
5.2 The experiment
The experiment consists of two treatments. In the rst treatment  the No Referrals
treatment (NR) there are no links among workers, and rms hire workers in an anony-
mous setting. In the second treatment  the Referrals treatment (R)  social ties are
introduced, and rms and workers can enter in a private relationship through a social
network.
The implementation is as follows. At the beginning of the experiment, each participant
was randomly assigned the role of either a rm or a worker. Roles remained xed through
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the experiment. In total 4 rms and 12 workers were active in each of the 15 trading
period. Moreover, each of the 15 trading periods consisted of two stages. Workers in
each stage were divided into two equally-sized groups of L and H workers. A di¤erent
set of workers was active in each of the two stages: six of the 12 workers were active in
stage 1 (3 H and 3 L stage-1 workers) and six other workers were active in stage 2 (3
H and 3 L stage-2 workers). The productivity of a worker and whether he was active in
stage 1 or stage 2 was randomly assigned at the beginning of each period. Firms could
o¤er a contract to the workers in a posted-o¤er market. Each rm could employ at most
one worker per stage, and workers could accept at most one wage. If a worker accepted
the wage o¤er, a labor contract was concluded between the rm and the worker. After
a contract was concluded, rms were informed of the productivity of their worker. Wage
o¤ers followed an improvement rule, that is, subsequent o¤ers involved higher wages. We
next discuss each of the treatments in detail.
5.2.1 The No Referrals treatment (NR)
In this treatment, contracts are o¤ered and accepted in a public market in both stages.
That is, all parties involved can observe the wages o¤ered and accepted.
5.2.2 The Referrals treatment (R)
The R treatment is our main treatment of interest as it allows rms to utilize the social
network of their workers. In particular, in the second stage of the R treatment, contracts
can be o¤ered either in a public or in a referral market. The social network is characterized
by a link between two workers. Each stage-1 worker is (randomly) linked to one stage-
2 worker. Workers are randomly assigned to a social network at the beginning of each
period. The probability that the worker in stage 2 is of the same type as that of the worker
in stage 1 is equal to 0.75. Following Montgomery (1991), we refer to this probability as
the "inbreeding-bias parameter". Firms can only use the referral market to make an
o¤er to the worker in the social network of their stage-1 worker. O¤ers made in the
referral market can be seen only by referral workers. In any given period, rms can make
multiple o¤ers in both markets. After a contract is concluded, rms are informed of the
productivity of their worker.
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5.2.3 The payo¤ functions
The problem of adverse selection in our experiment arises from the fact that there are
low and high productivity workers. Firms cannot observe the type of each worker. A
low-productivity worker (L) produces an output L; while a high productivity worker (H)
produces an output of H : The payo¤ of a rm in stage i = 1; 2 is given by:
if (S; w) =
8<: 
i
S   wi +B; if a contract is concluded
0; if no contract is concluded
where wi refers to the wage that is accepted in stage i and iS refers to the productivity
of the worker in stage i = 1; 2, S = L;H; with iL = 20 and 
i
H = 60:
6 A rm can
submit wages (any integer) between 0 and 60 points. To minimize the chance of losses
for rms hiring low-productivity workers which could make some participants unwilling
to o¤er positive wages, a "baseline productivity" B = 20 is added to the rms payo¤ if
a contract is concluded.
The payo¤ of a rm at the end of the period is the sum of payo¤ in stage 1 and 2 and
is given by:
f (1S; w
1; 2S; w
2) = 1f (
1
S; w
1) + 2f (
2
S; w
2)
The payo¤ of a worker in stage i is given by:
iw(
i
S; w
i) =
8<: wi; if a contract is concludedS; if a contract is not concluded or the worker is inactive in the stage
where S is the reservation wage of an unemployed worker who did not trade or is inactive.
In the experiment, L = 10 and H = 30. The reservation wages imply that a low ability
worker would not accept any wages less than 10 and a high ability worker would not
accept any wages less than 30. Each worker is either inactive in stage 1 or 2 and will then
receive S:
6A rms payo¤ can be negative if it hires an L worker at a high wage. At the beginning of each session,
each rm is given an "endowment" of 120 points. The endowment is meant to prevent participants from
going bankrupt. A rm could receive the lowest payo¤ six times in a row without going bankrupt
by o¤ering a wage of 60 and hiring a low productivity worker (20-60+20)*6=-120. To ensure that
experimental earnings are approximately the same for rms and workers, workers were also given an
endowment of 120 points once, at the start of the experiment.
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The payo¤ of a worker at the end of the period is the sum of payo¤ in stage 1 and 2
and is given by:
w(S; w) = 
i
w(S; w) + S:
5.2.4 Information
In both treatments, the number of periods, the payo¤ functions, the number of rms and
workers, the proportion of high and low productivity workers are public knowledge. In
the R treatment, "the inbreeding-bias parameter" is also public knowledge. As mentioned
above, rms and workers can observe all o¤ers made in the public market. In the R
treatment, o¤ers made in the referral market can be seen only by referral workers who
receives the o¤er. Referral workers can also see o¤ers made in the public market and
decide whether to accept an o¤er made in the public or the private market.
5.2.5 Procedures
There were 16 participants in each experimental session. We ran 6 sessions for the Referral
treatment and 5 sessions for the No Referral treatment. A total of 176 subjects partic-
ipated in the experiment and were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) at Maastricht
University. The experiment was conducted in the BEElab using Z-tree (Fischbacher,
2007).
At the beginning of each session participants were randomly allocated to a closed cu-
bicle where they could make their decisions in complete anonymity from the experimenter
and other subjects. The experimental instructions (available in the Appendix D.3) were
given on paper. After participants read the instructions, they were asked to answer a set
of control questions. The aim of these questions was to evaluate their understanding of the
experiment. The experiment did not start until all participants had answered correctly
all control questions.
Each of the 15 trading periods lasted 4 minutes; 2 minutes for each stage. On average,
sessions lasted 120 minutes (including instruction time). Participants, on average, earned
19 Euros.
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5.3 Theoretical framework
As a benchmark for evaluating the experimental results, we perform a Walrasian market
analysis (see Mas-Colell, 1995) for the NR treatment and stage 1 of the R treatment,i.e.,
the public market. We then derive some hypotheses for the impact of social networks in
the R treatment.
As assumed typically in the Walrasian analysis, we assume that rms are risk neutral,
seek to maximize their expected prots, and act as price takers. Similarly, we assume that
workers aim to maximize their prot from their labor. A unique wage w is an equilibrium
wage if the rms expectations regarding the average productivity of the workers are
fullled in equilibrium. We consider two types of self-conrming beliefs: optimistic and
pessimistic beliefs.
Let pL and pH be a rms subjective probabilities that a worker of type L and H will
be hired, respectively. The expected prot of a rm hiring a worker of either type at wage
w is given by:
E(w; (pL; L); (pH ; H)) = pL(L   w) + pH(H   w) +B:7
1. Optimistic beliefs of the rms: If all rms believe that all workers (i.e. workers of
both types) will be willing to o¤er their services for the wage they o¤er, the expected
revenue of a rm is:
ER((pL; L); (pH ; H)) =
1
2
20 +
1
2
60 = 40
which is the maximum wage the rm will be willing to o¤er.8 Both types of workers
will accept a wage of 40; since it exceeds their reservation wage. However, since
there are more workers than rms, a rm can reduce the o¤ered wage a bit and it
will still be accepted by all workers. The minimum wage for which this holds is 30.
For wages lower than 30, H workers will not accept a contract and receive instead
their reservation wage of 30. Since at a wage of 30 both L and H workers will be
willing to accept a contract, these beliefs are self-conrming. Hence, for this set of
7Since B does not a¤ect a rms marginal incentives, we omit it from the analysis that follows.
8Note that, in our experiment, a rm can have negative earnings only if it o¤ers a wage higher than
40 and hires a low-ability worker.
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beliefs, w = 30 is the unique equilibrium wage. Note that this equilibrium holds if
H workers are indi¤erent between accepting the wage or opting for the reservation
wage. Since at a wage of 30 both L and H workers will be willing to accept a
contract, these beliefs are self-conrming. If rms believe that workers will always
reject an o¤er of w = 30 then the equilibrium wage becomes w = 31
2. Pessimistic beliefs of the rms: If all rms believe that only L workers will be willing
to accept a given wage, the expected revenue of a rm is
ER((pL; L)) = 20:
Therefore, w = 20 is the maximum wage a rm will be willing to o¤er given these
beliefs. Since only L workers will be willing to accept such a wage, and given that
there are more rms than L workers in the market, a wage less than 20 cannot be an
equilibrium wage. Moreover, since only L workers will be active in the market when
w = 20, these beliefs are self-conrming and w = 20 is the unique equilibrium
wage.
In terms of market e¢ ciency, the equilibrium w = 20 is ine¢ cient as it excludes H
workers from the market. The equilibrium wage w = 30 maximizes the aggregate surplus
when three H workers and one L worker are employed. Therefore, we will say that the
market shows adverse selection if less than three H workers are hired in a given period.
Having established these benchmarks, we now present some hypotheses regarding the
impact of the social network in treatment R. Our experiment was inspired by Montgomery
(1991) who presents a model with inbreeding bias in a labor market. The main ndings of
Montgomerys model are the following: (i) A rm will o¤er a wage in the referral market
if, and only if, it employed an H worker in stage 1. (ii) Wages in the referral market will
be higher than in the public market. (iii) Firms will be willing to pay a "wage premium"
in stage 1 in order to attract H workers as this will improve their chances of also hiring
an H worker in stage 2. In Appendix D.1, we show that our game has equilibria with
similar properties.
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5.4 Results
We begin our analysis by presenting our main results. We then proceed to examine other
interesting aspects of the data and, in particular, the dynamic of the market where we
investigate how wage o¤ers and acceptances evolve within a given period. In general, we
are interested to see if the existence of social networks a¤ects the distribution of wages, the
productivity of workers that are being hired, and how rms use the opportunity to make
referral o¤ers. As we focus on labor market outcomes, our analysis considers accepted
wages. For completeness, Appendix D.2 presents the results with all wages o¤ered (i.e.,
even those that are not accepted)
5.4.1 Main results
Our rst result discusses the impact of the social network on the allocation of H and L
workers.
Result 1: There are more low-ability (L) than high-ability (H) workers hired in both
treatments. Nevertheless, the existence of a social network in treatment R increases the
proportion of high-ability (H) workers that are hired.
SUPPORT: Table 5.1 presents a summary of the experimental results. As can be seen,
in both stages of treatment NR, approximately, 1 H worker and 3 L workers are hired
on average. The proportion of H workers that are employed is larger in treatment R
(32.84% and 31.74 % in stages 1 and 2, respectively). Using the average number of H
workers hired in each session and in each stage as an independent observation, we nd
that the proportion of H workers hired across stages is signicantly higher in treatment
R (Mann-Whitney; p value=0.0285). This di¤erence cannot be explained by the wages
o¤ered by rms as they are not signicantly di¤erent across treatments (Mann-Whitney;
p value= 0.7150).
Table 5.1 illustrates that rms are more likely to hire H workers in the second stage of
the game in treatment R (31.74 %) where their workers belong to a social network, than
in treatment NR where such a network does not exist (25%). Moreover it is interesting
to see that in stage 1 of the R treatment the proportion of H workers hired (32.84 %) is
larger than in the NR treatment (25.19%) despite that wages are similar (Mann-Whitney;
p value=0.58). Firms may be more willing to make o¤ers that satisfy the participation
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Description of employment rate and average wage
Treatment No Referrals Referrals
Stage 1 2 1 2
Type H L H L H L H L
% employed 25.19 74.81 25 75 32.84 67.16 31.74 68.26
Average wage 30.82 24.31 31.05 23.71 30.9 23.71 31.62 21.85
Table 5.1: Employment rate and average wage by treatment, stage and type
constraint of high-ability workers in stage 1 as this increases the probability that they
will also hire a high-ability worker in the private market in stage 2. Our second result
investigates whether this is the case.
Result 2: Firms are more likely to make o¤ers that satisfy the participation constraint
of high-ability workers in the rst stage of treatment R, than in treatment NR.
SUPPORT: The reservation wage for H workers is 30. Therefore, H workers will accept
only wages that are higher than 30. Figure 5-1 shows the cumulative distribution of ac-
cepted wages in stage 1 in each treatment. This gure indicates that there is a higher
percentage of accepted w > 30 in the rst stage of the R treatment. Indeed in stage 1 of
the NR treatment 57.41 % of the accepted wages are below 30 against 45.67 % for the R
treatment. The fraction of accepted wages with w > 30 is greater in the rst stage of treat-
ment R (54.33%) than in treatment NR (42.59%). Using the proportion of accepted wages
strictly greater than 30 in stage 1 in each session as an independent observation, we nd
that the di¤erence is statistically signicant (Mann-Whitney; p value=0.0446). In conse-
quence, the median accepted wage is higher in the rst stage of treatment R (median wage
= 31) than in treatment NR (median wage = 25; Mann-Whitney; p value=0.1601).9This
result is interesting because it corroborates Montgomery´s ndings concerning the "wage
premium" in stage 1 of the period. In the experiment, rms seem to anticipate the
prospect of prots coming from the stage-2 worker of high ability who will be recruited
in the referral market. Our third result investigates the distribution of wages accepted.
Result 3: Two wages are the most accepted in each treatment, w = 31, w = 20. H
workers accept mainly w = 31 and L workers accept mainly w = 20 but also w = 31.
SUPPORT: Figure 5-2 presents the distribution of accepted wages by treatment, stage
9To calculate the p-value we take the median wage in each session and treatment.
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Figure 5-1: Cumulative distribution of accepted wages
and type of worker. As mentioned, given the productivity of H and L workers, the former
should not accept a wage that is strictly less than 30. An L worker should not accept a
wage strictly less than 10. Therefore, both types of workers should accept a wage o¤er
w  30. In each treatment and stage, we observe a concentration of wages between 15
and 25 and between 31 and 35 with a peak at 20 and 31. Wages of 20 mainly concern
L workers and wages of 31 and more were allocated among L and H workers.10 In each
stage and treatment, 31 is the modal wage, low productivity workers had a rent of 11 and
high ability workers had a rent of 1. On average, in both stages and treatments wages
accepted by H workers are not signicantly di¤erent from 31 (Wilcoxon sign-rank test;
p value=0.5002 for the NR treatment; p value=0.3400 for the R treatment). Since L
workers often manage to accept wages that were also meant for H workers, the wages
they accept are signicantly greater than 20 (Wilcoxon sign-rank test; p value=0.0431
for the NR treatment; p value=0.0277 for the R treatment).
Our next results focus on how rms make use of referral o¤ers and how they a¤ect
10Somewhat suprisingly, in stage 1 of the NR treatment, 15% H workers accept wages that are below
30 (9.09% in stage 2). In the R treatment, this number is 8.18% in stage 1 versus 5.66% in stage 2. This
behavior may be due to errors, but we continue to observe this type of behavior also later in the game.
Only 1% of the low ability workers accept a wage that is lower than 10 over the two treatments and
stages.
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Figure 5-2: Hiring rate and wage acceptance
the hiring of workers and the wages.
Result 3: Firms are signicantly more likely to make referral o¤ers when the worker
hired in stage 1 is of high ability.
SUPPORT: In treatment R, the probability that a rm employing an H worker in stage
1 hires in the referral market in stage 2, is 48% higher than that of a rm that hired
a low-ability worker (Random-e¤ects Probit, p value<0.01).11 This probability does
not change signicantly over time (Random-e¤ects Probit, p value=0.40). This nding
indicates that rms use the social network of their workers in order to overcome the
problem of asymmetric information.
Result 4: Accepted wages in the referral market are higher on average than those in the
public market.
SUPPORT: The average accepted wage in the referral market in the second stage of
treatment R is 29.05. In contrast, the average accepted wage in the public market is
23.15 in the second stage of the R treatment. In line therefore with our expectations and
Montgomery (1991), private o¤ers are signicantly higher than public o¤ers (Wilcoxon
11Random e¤ects are at the session level. The dependent variables are a dummy taking the value of 1
if the rm hired an H worker and 0 otherwise, and Period to control for any time e¤ect.
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signed-rank test at the session level; p value=0.0277 both for accepted wages). For
completeness, we report that wages accepted in the second stage of treatment NR are
signicantly lower than those in the referral market of treatment R (Mann-Whitney at
the session level; p value=0.010 for accepted wages).12
Result 5: The probability of hiring a H worker is higher in the referral than in the public
market.
SUPPORT: The probability of hiring aH worker is higher in the referral than in the public
market (Wilcoxon signed-rank test at the session level; p value= 0.0277). In particular,
66.34 % of the private o¤ers that are accepted are from a rm that hired a H worker
in stage 1. In contrast, in the second stage of the R treatment, 22.74% of the employed
workers in the public market are H workers.
In the next section we investigate the dynamic of the trading phases by looking at
how time enters in the decision process of rms and workers.
5.4.2 Other results: a look at the dynamics in the market
In this section, we rst take an overview at when wages were accepted, before examining
the temporal aspects of the data in more detail.
Recall that rms and workers have 120 seconds (2 minutes) to post and accept o¤ers.
We report the time in seconds and the results show the exact second an o¤er is posted or
accepted. In all gures, on the horizontal axis, an observation close to 0 means that an
o¤er was accepted or o¤ered at the beginning of the trading phase. If an observation is
close to 120 it means that an o¤er was o¤ered or accepted towards the end of the trading
phase. Crosses refer to L workers and circles to H workers. The tests use average time
of acceptance or average time wages were posted at the session level.
Figure 5-3 shows the time of acceptance at the individual level for each treatment and
each type and stage. Intuitively, L workers could wait until they have a signicant surplus
and accept wages earlier than H workers since their reservation value is lower. H workers
could also wait in order to accept w > 30 and accept wages later than L workers.
12Note that wages for L workers in the referral market are signicantly higher than those in the
public market in stage 2 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p value= 0.02). Conversely, H workers dont
have statistically signicant higher wages in the private market than in the public market (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test; p value=0.24).
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Figure 5-3: Time of wage acceptance
Average time of acceptance in seconds
Treatment No Referrals Referrals
L workers 78.66 86.06
H workers 98.52 101.13
Table 5.2: Timing of wage acceptance
In line with our previous results we notice that the market is characterized by adverse
selection in the sense that there are more crosses than circles. Nevertheless, in both stages
of the R treatment we notice more circles suggesting that the fraction of H workers is
higher than in the NR treatment. Moreover, we can see that L workers accept on average
lower wages than H workers (except some outliers). We also observe a high concentration
of crosses and circles at the right of the horizontal axis, indicating that most participants
wait until the end of a trading phase to accept a wage o¤er.
To complement our previous results we wish to answer the following questions: Do H
workers accept o¤ers later than L workers? Are higher wages o¤ered and accepted later?
How does the option to have referral o¤ers a¤ect the dynamic of the market?
Result 7: In both treatments and stages, H workers accept wage o¤ers later than L
workers .
SUPPORT: Table 5.2 presents the average time a wage o¤er was accepted in each treat-
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Average time in seconds by treatment
Treatment NR R
wage w  30 w > 30 w  30 w > 30
Average time w was o¤ered 45.74 97.47 39.50 91.57
Average accepted w was o¤ered 60.2 96.5 67.85 93.94
Average time w was accepted 74.11 97.67 80.47 96.92
Table 5.3: Timing of wage posting and acceptance
ment, for each type, pooling observations across stages and periods. In both treatments
we observe a tendency for H workers to accept wage o¤ers later than L workers. In
the NR treatment, L workers accept wages on average 78.66 seconds after the start of a
trading phase against 98.52 seconds for H workers. In the R treatment, L workers accept
wages on average 86.06 seconds after the start against 101.13 seconds for H workers. The
di¤erence is conrmed by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test 13 (p-value=0.0796 for the NR
treatment and p-value=0.0277 for the R treatment). Further, in the NR treatment, 23.96
% of the L workers and 52.55 % of the H workers accept wages in the last 5 seconds of
the trading phase. In the R treatment, 18.7 % of the L workers and 37.5 % of the H
workers accept wages in the last 5 seconds of a trading phase.14
It is now interesting to see the distinction between wage above and below 30. We also
look at rmsbehavior by analyzing the time wages are o¤ered.
Result 8: Firms o¤er wages above 30 later on in a trading period. Workers accept wages
above 30 faster than wages less or equal to 30.
SUPPORT: Table 5.3 presents the average time wages were posted and accepted in both
treatments for w  30 and w > 30; pooling observations across stages and periods.
The row "Average time w was o¤ered" refers to the time all wages were o¤ered. The
row "Average accepted w was o¤ered" refers to the time accepted wages were o¤ered.
Finally, the last row "Average time w was accepted" refers to the time at which a wage
was accepted. As can be seen, on average, in both treatments, w  30 is posted and
13For the Wilcoxon signed-rank test we take the average time of acceptance per session.
14The dynamic of the employment could be explained in the following way. In the R treatment on
average 3 L and 1 H workers are employed. 3 L workers accept o¤ers between 10 and 30 before H
workers make any decision. Then, once all L workers are employed a H worker accept an o¤er above
30 in the last 5 last second. Two High ability workers remain therefore unemployed. For w = 30 it is
attractive for L worker to accept this wage. Nevertheless, it is less appealing for H workers who may
want to wait more in order to increase their surplus. Once all L workers have been hired, the rm faces
3 H workers and has a probability of one of hiring a H worker and therefore it is optimal for it to o¤er
w = 31 (H worker prefers to have a prot of 1 instead of 0 by being unemployed)
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Average time in seconds R Treatment Public market Private market
Time of acceptance by H workers 101.23 86.65
Time of acceptance by L workers 86.83 73.07
Time of acceptance by H and L workers 90.12 80.12
Time accepted w was o¤ered 70.55 62.62
Table 5.4: Timing of wage o¤er and acceptance in the referral and public market
accepted before w > 30: Using each session as independent observation, the di¤erence
is statistically signicant in both treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p-value=0.0796
for "Average accepted w was o¤ered" and "Average time w was accepted" for the NR
treatment; p-value=0.0747 for "Average time w was accepted" and p-value=0.0277 for
"Average accepted w was o¤ered" in the R treatment). The results are similar if we
consider all wage o¤ered (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p-value=0.041 in the NR treatment;
p-value=0.0277 in the R treatment). Further, we notice that workers wait on average
longer before accepting a w  30 (13.93 seconds in NR and 12.62 seconds in R) than
w > 30 (1.17 seconds in NR and 2.98 second in the R). A Wilcoxon signed-rank test
indicates that the di¤erence is statistically signicant (p-value=0.0431 in the NR and
p-value=0.0277 in the R treatment.)
In the second stage of the R treatment we may wonder whether the introduction of
a social network may inuence the time wages are o¤ered and accepted in the referral
market. Result 9 explores this question.
Result 9: In the referral market, referral o¤ers are posted and accepted before public
o¤ers and more H workers are hired quicker.
SUPPORT: Table 5.4 describes the average time H and L workers accepted an o¤er in
the public and private markets in the second stage of the R treatment as well as the
average time a wage o¤er was posted. In the public market, H workers wait on average
101.23 seconds before accepting a wage o¤er against 86.83 seconds for L workers. In the
private market, H workers wait 86.65 seconds and L workers 73.07 before accepting a
wage o¤er. We nd that both types accept o¤ers more quickly in the private market
than in the public market. The di¤erence is statistically signicant (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test; H workers p-value= 0.0747, Wilcoxon signed-rank test; L workers p-value=
0.1159). Moreover, similar to the NR treatment, H workers accept wage o¤ers after L
workers in both markets (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p-value= 0.0277 for both markets).
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On the rmsside, we notice that on average, wages that were subsequently accepted were
o¤ered rst in the private market (62.62 seconds) and then in the public market (70.55
seconds). Nevertheless, the di¤erence is not statistically signicant (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test; p-value=0.2489).
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the results from a lab experiment investigating how rms
use the social network of existing employees to overcome adverse selection in a labor
market. We nd that the introduction of social ties a¤ects the functioning of the market.
The referral market alleviates the problem of adverse selection in the sense that more H
workers are hired. Firms take the opportunity of a referral market to hire H workers
and for that they will also have a tendency to o¤er more w > 30 and more quickly. The
inbreeding bias reduces the uncertainty for rms that are willing to increase the wage
they o¤er. More specically, we nd that (i) rms makes more referral wage o¤ers when
they current employee is a high ability worker, (ii) wages are higher in the referral market,
(iii) current workers in the referral treatment earn a "wage premium" due to the prospect
of hiring a high ability worker in the referral market and, (iv) the existence of a social
network reduces the proportion of low ability workers that are hired and creates a referral
market dominated by high ability workers.
Our experiment contributes to the literature on social and economic networks. More-
over, the experiment complements the experiment by Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) who
showed that implicit contracts as long-term relationship could overcome the moral haz-
ard problem. In line with them we nd that implicit contracts, i.e, social networks help
overcome adverse selection.
In this chapter we are also interested in the dynamics of the market. We nd that low
ability workers accept lower wage o¤ers earlier than high ability workers. On the rm´s
side, they rst o¤er wages below 30 and then higher wages. Finally, in the referral market
wages are o¤ered and accepted before those in the public market.
We note that despite the existence of a social network the problem of adverse selec-
tion is not totally overcome. Further research could investigate the impact of a higher
inbreeding bias on the labor market outcomes. Moreover, our study uses insights of
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Montgomery´s (1991) model, nevertheless, di¤erences such as the number of links al-
lowed between workers, free entry and exit of rms could be introduced and analyzed in
future research.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The four studies presented in this thesis investigated the nature and signicance of social
preferences in a variety of contexts. In doing so, they contribute to the vast but still
growing literature on the topic. I believe and hopefully readers of this thesis will agree
that the experiments have yielded some interesting insights. However, as is typically
the case with scientic investigation, the ndings raise a number of new questions that
could be interesting for future research. I would like to conclude my thesis by discussing
some of them.
In Chapter 2 we saw that only 10 percent of workers (i.e., second movers) in the gift-
exchange game exhibited no willingness to respond to higher wages with higher e¤ort.
The remaining 90 percent of workers exhibited reciprocal preferences. What is equally
noteworthy is the fact that reciprocal preferences were quite weak. This implies that rms
in the experiment were better o¤ not o¤ering "gifts" (i.e., higher wages) but the lowest
possible wage. In line with this, we observed gift-exchange unraveling over time in the
nitely-repeated game.
An obvious question that arises is how can one reconcile the evidence from the ex-
periment reported in Chapter 2 with those in early studies in which gift-exchange was
sustained over time. Di¤erent factors may account for the di¤erences. Future studies
could use the strategy method presented in Chapter 2 to examine them. For instance,
one possibility is that di¤erent experimental samples may exhibit stronger preferences for
reciprocation. Thus, one could try to replicate the ndings from this experiment using
di¤erent samples in di¤erent countries. However, I believe that the results may not be
very di¤erent in other subject pools. The reason is that the elicited cooperation prefer-
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ences of our experimental sample (in Chapter 3) resemble closely those in other studies.
Another factor may be the di¤erent parameters used in earlier studies. Our experiment
used payo¤ functions similar to those in Brown et al. (2004). They also found low levels
of gift-exchange. Future experiments thus could investigate how di¤erent payo¤ functions
a¤ect individuals preferences for reciprocation. This would help improve our under-
standing of how reciprocal preferences may best be modelled and assess the robustness of
gift-exchange.
The study reported in Chapter 3 presented evidence linking preferences for reciproca-
tion to those for cooperation at the individual level. In particular, we saw that partici-
pants classied as cooperators in a public-good game were the only subjects reciprocating
higher wages by exerting higher levels of e¤ort in the gift-exchange game. The evidence is
broadly consistent with models of social preferences that aim to provide a parsimonious
explanation for pro-social behavior. An open question is, what is the model that can best
predict pro-social behavior? Since there are still few within-subject analyses of pro-social
behavior, more experiments are needed to uncover behavioral regularities and help answer
this question. These studies could investigate behavior in di¤erent games, di¤erent en-
vironments and under di¤erent information conditions. Importantly, future experiments
should investigate the robustness of pro-social behavior over a longer time horizon than
the one investigated in our experiment.
The experiment presented in Chapter 4 provided evidence that cooperation prefer-
ences are subject to framing e¤ects. The study varied the sequence and order in which
the contributions of other group members are presented in the Fischbacher et al. (2001)
method. As we saw, the order, by and large, had no impact on the elicited preferences
and their predictive power. In contrast, presenting the contributions of others in a se-
quence had a pronounced e¤ect on the elicited preferences and reduced substantially their
predictive power. Importantly, the method as introduced by Fischbacher et al. (2001)
seems to be a good predictor of behavior both in the one-shot and the nitely-repeated
public-good game. One surprising nding seemingly worthy of future investigation is the
substantially higher contributions observed in the sequential frame. It suggests that the
administration of the strategy method at the start of the experiment could a¤ect behavior
in later stages of the experiment. It would also be worthwhile investigating di¤erent vari-
ants of the method in which, for example, participants are presented with the vector of
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individual contributions (rather than the average contribution of others) or the maximum
contribution of others.
The study in Chapter 5 examined the ability of social networks to alleviate adverse
selection in an experimental labor market. The social ties between workers is a form of
social preferences. The aim of the experiment in this chapter was to investigate whether
rms used the social network of their workers to hire new workers of similar ability and,
hence, whether social networks reduced adverse selection. As we saw, rms in the exper-
iment were more likely to make "referral o¤ers" when the worker hired previously was of
high ability due to the homophily between workers. Firms were also more likely to make
higher o¤ers to attract (high-ability) workers with a better network, while referral o¤ers
were higher on average than public o¤ers. Importantly, we saw that the proportion of
high-ability workers in the second stage was higher in the presence of social networks.
One interesting extension for future work would be to vary the extent of homophily
in the experiment. For example, are referral o¤ers more likely and referral wages higher
if workers are 90 percent (rather than 75 percent) likely to be matched with another
worker of similar ability? Does the proportion of high-ability workers increase? Another
interesting question is whether similar social networks can help overcome moral hazard.
Workers may be less willing to shirk if performing better than others improves the chances
of a friend or family member to be hired in the future. These are questions I intend to
investigate next.
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Appendix A
Imperfect reciprocators and the
unravelling of gift exchange
A.1 Additional statistics
A.1.1 Individual e¤ort of choices
0
5
10
0
5
10
0
5
10
0
5
10
0 50 100 0 50 100 0 50 100 0 50 100 0 50 100
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15
16 17 18 19 20
Conditional effort
In
di
vid
ua
l e
xp
re
ss
es
 e
ffo
rt
Potential wage (s trategy method)
Graphs by subject
Figure A-1: Individual e¤ort of choices in the strategy method
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A.1.2 Robustness estimates
Dependent variable: e¤ort
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Workers used All workers Reciprocators All workers Reciprocators
Period  0:071  0:083  0:140  0:144
(0:127) (0:125) (0:121) (0:122)
Wage 0:106 0:106
(0:016) (0:016)
Predicted e¤ort 1:387 1:340
(0:201) (0:201)
Constant  3:109  2:430  3:889  3:377
(1:239) (1:160) (1:295) (1:280)
Log-L  194:33  18_9:94  193:61  191:77
Wald 2(2) 47:92 49:14 51:02 48:19
Observations 200 180 200 180
***(**) indicates signicance at 1 (5) percent level;
Regressions are random e¤ects Tobit models clustered on individuals;
Standard errors in parantheses
Table A.1: Explaining e¤ort choices in the repeated GEG (tobit)
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Dependent variable: e¤ort
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Workers used All workers Reciprocators All workers Reciprotors
Period  0:013  0:024  0:040  0:046
(0:041) (0:044) (0:040) (0:044)
Wage 0:037 0:040
(0:005) (0:005)
Predicted e¤ort 0:465 0:454
(0:061) (0:065)
Constant 1:526 1:615 1:274 1:359
(0:368) (0:372) (0:386) (0:406)
R2(overall) 0:23 0:26 0:24 0:23
Wald 2(2) 60:95 63:36 62:91 52:83
Observations 200 180 200 180
*** indicates signicance at 1 percent level;
Regressions are GLS random e¤ects models clustered on sessions;
Standard errors in parantheses
Table A.2: Explaining e¤ort choices in the repeated GEG (GLS)
A.2 Instructions
A.2.1 General instructions
Welcome to this economic experiment. In the experiment you and other participants will
make decisions. Next to the fee of 3 Euro for showing up in time, you can earn money in
the experiment. How much you earn depends on your own decisions and the decisions of
other participants. At the end of the experiment the show-up fee and the earnings from
the di¤erent parts will be added up and condentially paid out to you in cash.
The experiment consists of di¤erent parts that are all independent of one another. For
each part you will receive specic instructions. These instructions will explain how you
make decisions and how your decisions and the decisions of other participants inuence
your earnings. Therefore, it is important that you read the instructions carefully.
From now on you are not allowed to communicate in any other way than specied
in the instructions. Please obey to this rule because otherwise we have to exclude you
from the experiment and all earnings you have made will be lost. Please also do not ask
questions aloud. If you have a question raise your hand. A member of the experimenter
team will come to you and answer your question in private.
Before we start with the rst part of the experiment we ask you to ll in a ques-
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tionnaire. This questionnaire is unrelated to the other parts of the experiment. You do
neither earn extra money for answering theses questions nor do your answers inuence
your earnings in the other part.
A.2.2 Specic instructions Part 1
In this part of the experiment you can earn money with the decisions you make. How
much you earn depends on your own decisions and the decisions of other participants. We
will not speak of Euro during the experiment, but rather of points. All you earnings will
rst be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment the total amount of points you
earned in this part will be converted to Euro at the following rate:
1 point = 12 Euro cent
At the beginning of this part of the experiment all participants will be divided into
pairs. You will not get to know the identity of the other person, neither during nor
after the experiment. The other person will also not get to know your identity. We now
describe how this part of the experiment proceeds. First you will be introduced to the
basic decision situation, thereafter you will learn more specically how the experiment is
conducted. You will also be asked some control questions that will help you to understand
the decision situation.
The decision situation:
You will be randomly paired with one other participant. In each pair one participant
will be randomly assigned the role of a rm and the other participant will have the role
of a worker. You will be informed about your role at the beginning of the experiment.
You - as every other participant - will keep the assigned role throughout this part of the
experiment.
You have to make a decision without knowing the decision of the other participant.
The other participant in your pair also has to make a decision without knowing your
decision. Which kind of decision you have to make depends on your role. If you are
assigned the role of a rm you have to make a wage o¤er. The wage you o¤er can be any
amount from 0 to 100 (as long as it is a multiple of 5). That is you can o¤er a wage of
0, or 5, or 10, ...., or 90, or 95, or 100. If you are assigned the role of a worker you have
to decide which e¤ort level you provide for each possible wage o¤ered by the rm. The
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e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Table A.3: E¤ort table
e¤ort level you choose can be any integer number from 1 to 10. That is you can decide to
provide e¤ort levels of 1, or 2, or 3, ...., or 8, or 9, or 10. You can choose di¤erent e¤ort
levels for di¤erent wage o¤ers but you can also choose the same e¤ort level for di¤erent
wage o¤ers. To each e¤ort level correspond some costs the worker has to bear for this
e¤ort level. How the e¤ort levels and costs are related is show in this table:
The earnings are calculated in the following way:
If you are a rm:
- rst, multiply the e¤ort level chosen by the worker with 10,
- second, subtract the wage you o¤ered,
- third, add an endowment of 50.
As formula:
Earnings of rm = 10 * e¤ort level wage o¤er + 50
Note: if the earnings of the rm determined in this way would be negative they are
set to zero. For example, if you are the rm and you o¤er a wage of 35 and the worker
chooses an e¤ort of 9 for this wage then you will earn 10*9 35 + 50 = 105 points; if you
are the rm and you o¤er a wage of 85 and
the worker chooses an e¤ort of 2 for this wage you would earn 10*2 85 + 50 = -15
points, which will be set equal to 0 points.
If you are a worker:
- rst, take the wage o¤ered by the rm,
- second, subtract the costs associated with e¤ort level chosen (see table),
- third, add an endowment of 20.
As formula:
Earnings of worker = Wage o¤er cost of e¤ort + 20
For example, if you are the worker, the rm o¤ers a wage 35 and you choose an e¤ort
of 9 for this wage
then you will earn 35 - 15 + 20 = 40 points; if you are the worker, the rm o¤ers a
wage of 85 and you
choose an e¤ort of 2 for this wage you would earn 85 1+ 20 = 104 points.
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Control questions decision situation:
Please answer the following control questions. These questions are arbitrary examples
of what could
happen in the experiment. In the experiment you will in the role of either a worker or
a rm. The
questions will concern both roles. They will help you to gain an understanding of the
calculation of your
earnings. Your earnings vary with your own decision and with the decisions of the
other person you are
paired with.
Please answer all the questions and write down your calculations.
1. Assume that the rm has chosen a wage of 0 and the worker has chosen an e¤ort
level of 0 for a
wage o¤er of 0.
What will your earnings be if you are the worker? ___________
What will your earnings be if you are the rm? ___________
2. Assume that the rm has chosen a wage of 100 and the worker has chosen an e¤ort
level of 10 for a
wage o¤er of 100.
What will your earnings be if you are the worker? ___________
What will your earnings be if you are the rm? ___________
3. Assume that the rm has chosen a wage of 80 and the the worker has chosen an
e¤ort level of 2 for a
wage o¤er of 80.
What will your earnings be if you are the worker? ___________
What will your earnings be if you are the rm? ___________
4. Assume that the rm has chosen a wage of 30 and the worker has chosen an e¤ort
level of 7 for a
wage o¤er of 30.
What will your earnings be if you are the worker? ___________
What will your earnings be if you are the rm? ___________
The experiment:
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Figure A-2: Screenshot: conditional e¤ort level
In experiment you will be confronted with the described decision situation only once.
Before the experiment starts you will be assigned either the role of worker or the role of
rm. What types of decisions you have to make depends on your role. Here we explain
rst the types of decisions for a workers and then the decisions for a rm.
Decisions for workers:
If you are a worker you have to indicate your e¤ort level for each possible wage o¤er
by the rm. What this means will be immediately clear to you if you take a look at the
computer screen shown below. This screen shows a table as it will be presented to you
in the experiment, in case you are a worker: The numbers to the left to the empty boxes
are the possible wage o¤ers of the rm. You simply have to insert in the boxes the e¤ort
level you will choose, conditional on the indicated wage o¤er. You have to make an entry
into each of the boxes. For example, you will have to indicate your e¤ort level if the rm
o¤ers a wage of 0 points, your e¤ort level if the rm o¤ers a wage of 5, 10, or 15 tokens,
etc. You can insert any integer number from 0 to 10 in each box. When making your
decisions you may want to consult the summary of the decision situation you received
with these instructions. When you have made your entry in each box, please click OK.
Note: You do not know the wage o¤er actually chosen by the rm when you make
your e¤ort level
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Figure A-3: Screenshot: expected wage
decisions.
After you have made your e¤ort decisions you have to estimate the wage o¤er actually
chosen by the
rm. You will be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:
- If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate exactly matches the actually
chosen wage
o¤er by the rm), you will receive 3 points extra to your other earnings from the
experiment.
- If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the actual result, you will receive 2 points
extra.
- If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the actual result, you will receive 1 point
extra
- If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the actual result, you will receive
no points extra.
You will make your estimation decision on a screen as shown below.
Decisions for rms:
If you are a rm you have to indicate the wage level you o¤er the worker. What
this means will be immediately clear to you if you take a look at the computer screen
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Figure A-4: Screenshot: wage o¤er
shown below. This screen shows a decision column as it will be presented to you in the
experiment, in case you are a rm: The numbers to the right of the empty circles are
the possible wage o¤ers of the rm. You simply have to click on one of the circles to
indicate your wage o¤er. You can only make one wage o¤er. When making your decisions
you may want to consult the summary of the decision situation you received with these
instructions. When you have made your entry in each box, please click OK.
Note: You do not know the e¤ort level actually chosen by the worker when you make
your wage o¤er decision. After you have made your wage o¤er decision you have to
estimate the e¤ort level actually chosen for your wage o¤er. You will be paid for the
accuracy of your estimate:
- If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate exactly matches the actually
chosen e¤ort by
the worker for your wage o¤er), you will receive 3 points extra to your other earnings
from the
experiment.
- If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the actual result, you will receive 2 points
extra.
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Figure A-5: Screeshot: expected e¤ort
- If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the actual result, you will receive 1 point
extra
- If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the actual result, you will receive
no points extra.
You will make your estimation decision on a screen as shown below.
After all participants of the experiment have made their decisions you will be informed
about the choice made by the participant with whom you are paired (and will be reminded
of your own choices). You will also be informed about the number of points you have
earned in this part of the experiment.
This is the end of the instructions. If you have a question please raise your hand.
A.2.3 Specic instructions Part 2
In this part of the experiment you can earn money with the decisions you make. How
much you earn depends on your own decisions and the decisions of other participants. We
will not speak of Euro during the experiment, but rather of points. All you earnings will
rst be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment the total amount of points you
earned in this part will be converted to Euro at the following rate:
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e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Table A.4: E¤ort table
1 point = 2 Euro cent
At the beginning of this part of the experiment all participants will be divided into
pairs. You will not get to know the identity of the other person, neither during nor after
the experiment. The other person will also not get to know your identity. The decision
situation in this part of the experiment is similar as in part 1, with one important exception
that will be explained below. For your convenience we briey describe the whole decision
situation.
The decision situation:
You will be randomly paired with one other participant. In part 1, in each pair one
participant was randomly assigned the role of a rm and the other participant was assigned
the role of a worker. You - as every other participant - will keep the role assigned in part
1 also throughout this part of the experiment. Compared to part 1, there is an important
di¤erence in the sequence of the decisions in this part of the experiment. Now the rm
rst has to make a wage o¤er and this wage o¤er will be transmitted to the worker. Only
then the worker has to decide on the e¤ort level.
If you are assigned the role of a rm you have to make a wage o¤er.
The wage you o¤er can be any amount from 0 to 100 (as long as it is a multiple of 5).
That is you can o¤er a wage of 0, or 5, or 10, ...., or 90, or 95, or 100.
If you are assigned the role of a worker you will get informed about the wage o¤er by
the rm, then you have to decide which e¤ort level you provide for the received wage o¤er
by the rm. The e¤ort level you choose can be any integer number from 1 to 10. That is
you can decide to provide e¤ort levels of 1, or 2, or 3, ...., or 8, or 9, or 10.
To each e¤ort level correspond some costs the worker has to bear for this e¤ort level.
How the e¤ort levels and costs are related is show in this table:
The earnings are calculated in the following way:
If you are a rm:
First, multiply the e¤ort level chosen by the worker with 10,
second, subtract the wage you o¤ered,
third, add an endowment of 50.
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As formula:
Earnings of rm = 10 * e¤ort level wage o¤er + 50
Note: if the earnings of the rm determined in this way would be negative they are
set to zero.
If you are a worker:
First, take the wage o¤ered by the rm,
second, subtract the costs associated with e¤ort level chosen (see table),
third, add an endowment of 20.
As formula:
Earnings of worker = Wage o¤er cost of e¤ort + 20
In this part of the experiment you will be engaged in the decision situation for 10
successive periods. In each period you will be randomly rematched with another partici-
pant. Thus, in no period will your pair consist of the same two people for sure. If you are
a rm, in each period you have to make a wage o¤er without knowing what e¤ort level
will be chosen by the worker. If you are a worker, in each period you have to decide on
the e¤ort level after being informed about the wage o¤er. At the end of a period rm
and worker will be informed about the o¤ered wage and chosen e¤ort levels in the pair in
that period. If you are a rm, in each period you will make your wage o¤er decision on a
computer screen as shown here:
On this screen, you have indicate the wage level you o¤er the worker. You simply
have to click on one. of the circles to indicate your wage o¤er. You can only make one
wage o¤er. In each period, after you have made and conrmed your wage o¤er you have
to estimate the e¤ort level actually chosen for your wage o¤er. In each period you will
indicate your estimation on a computer screen as shown here:
As in the part 1 of the experiment you can earn money with the accuracy of your
estimate.
- If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate exactly matches the actually
chosen e¤ort by
the worker for your wage o¤er), you will receive 3 points extra to your other earnings
from the
experiment.
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Figure A-6: Screenshot: wage o¤er repeated game
Figure A-7: Screenshot: expected e¤ort
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Figure A-8: Screenshot: expected wage
- If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the actual result, you will receive 2 points
extra.
- If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the actual result, you will receive 1 point
extra
- If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the actual result, you will receive
no points extra.
If you are a worker, In each period, before you are informed about the actually chosen
wage o¤er you have to estimate the wage o¤er actually chosen by the rm.
As in the part 1 of the experiment you can earn money with the accuracy of your
estimate.
- If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate exactly matches the actually
chosen e¤ort by
the worker for your wage o¤er), you will receive 3 points extra to your other earnings
from the
experiment.
- If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the actual result, you will receive 2 points
extra.
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- If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the actual result, you will receive 1 point
extra
- If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the actual result, you will receive
no points extra.
Next, in each period after receiving your wage o¤er, you will make your e¤ort level
decision. You will be informed about the wage o¤ered by the rm. You then have to
indicate the e¤ort level you choose. You simply have to click on one of the circles to
indicate your e¤ort level.
After the 10 periods of this part are over you will be asked to ll in a short question-
naire. Thereafter, the whole experiment is over and you will be condentially be paid out
your total earnings in the experiment in cash.
This is the end of the instructions. If you have a question please raise your hand.
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Appendix B
Cooperators and reciprocators: A
within-subject analysis of pro-social
behavior
B.1 General instructions
Welcome to this economic experiment. In the experiment you and other participants will
make decisions. Next to the fee of 3 Euro for showing up in time, you can earn money in
the experiment. How much you earn depends on your own decisions and the decisions of
other participants. At the end of the experiment the show-up fee and the earnings from
the di¤erent parts will be added up and condentially paid out to you in cash.
The experiment consists of di¤erent parts that are all independent of one another. For
each part you will receive specic instructions. These instructions will explain how you
make decisions and how your decisions and the decisions of other participants inuence
your earnings. Therefore, it is important that you read the instructions carefully.
From now on you are not allowed to communicate in any other way than specied
in the instructions. Please obey to this rule because otherwise we have to exclude you
from the experiment and all earnings you have made will be lost. Please also do not ask
questions aloud. If you have a question raise your hand. A member of the experimenter
team will come to you and answer your question in private.
Before we start with the rst part of the experiment we ask you to ll in a ques-
tionnaire. This questionnaire is unrelated to the other parts of the experiment. You do
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neither earn extra money for answering theses questions nor do your answers inuence
your earnings in the other part.
B.2 Specic instructions Part 1
In this part of the experiment you can earn money with the decisions you make. How
much you earn depends on your own decisions and the decisions of other participants. We
will not speak of Euro during the experiment, but rather of points. All you earnings will
rst be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment the total amount of points you
earned in this part will be converted to Euro at the following rate:
1 point = 30 Euro cent
At the beginning of this part of the experiment all participants will be divided into
groups of three. You will not get to know the identity of the other group members, neither
during nor after the experiment. The other group members will also not get to know your
identity.
We now describe how this part of the experiment proceeds. First you will be intro-
duced to the basic decision situation, thereafter you will learn more specically how the
experiment is conducted. You will also be asked some control questions that will help you
to understand the decision situation.
The decision situation:
You will be the member of a group of 3 people. Each group member receives an
endowment of 20 points. You and each other group member has to decide on the allocation
of his/her 20 points, simultaneously. You can put any (integer) share of these 20 points
into your private account or you can contribute any (integer) share to a project.
Your earnings from the private account:
For each point you put into your private account, you will earn one point. That is,
Earnings from private account= points in your private account= 20 your contribu-
tions to the project.
For example, if you put 20 points into your private account your earnings from your
private account will be 20 points. If you put, for example, 6 points into your private
account, your earnings from this account will be the 6 points. No one except you earns
points from your private account.
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Your earnings from the project:
For each point you contribute to the project, each group member will prot equally.
On the other hand, you will also prot from the other group memberscontributions to
the project. For each group member the earnings from the project will be determined as
follows:
Earnings from the project = sum of contributions of all group members 0:5
For example, if you contribute 20 points to the project and each of the other two
members also contributes 20 points to project then the sum of contributions is 60 points.
This means that you and each of the other two group members earns 60  0:5 = 30 points
from the project. If, for example, you contribute 6 points to the project, and one of the
other members contributes 2 points and the third 1 point to the project then the sum of
contributions is 9 points. In this case you and each of the other two group members earns
9  0:5 = 4:5 points from the project.
Your total earnings from the private account and the project:
Your total earnings are the sum of your earnings from your private account and from
the project. That is,
Total earnings= earnings from your private account + earnings from the project= 20
your contributions to the project + (0.5 * sum of contributions to the project).
For example:
- If the sum of contributions to the project was (20 + 20 + 20) = 60, then
your total earnings = (20  20) + (0:5  60) = 30
- If the sum of contributions to the project was (6+2+1)=9 and you contributed 6 to
the project, then
your total earnings = (20  6) + (0:5  9) = 18:5
- If the .sum of contributions to the project was (2+9+19)=30 and you contributed 2
to the project, then
your total earnings = (20  2) + (0:5  30) = 33.
Control questions decision situation:
Please answer the following control questions. These questions are arbitrary examples
of what could happen in the experiment. They will help you to gain an understanding of
the calculation of your earnings. Your earnings vary with your own decision and with the
decisions of the other group members.
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Please answer all the questions and write down your calculations.
1. Each group member is endowed with 20 points. Assume that none of the group
members (including you) contributes anything to the project.
What will your total earnings be? ___________
What will the total earnings of each of the other group members be? ___________
2. Each group member is endowed with 20 points. You contribute 20 points to the
project. Each of the other 2 group members also contributes 20 points to the project.
What will your total earnings be? ___________
What will the total earnings of each of the other group members be? ___________
3. Each group member is endowed with 20 points. The other 2 group members
contribute a total of 30 points to the project.
a) What will your total earnings be, if you in addition to the 30 points contribute
0 points to the project?
Your total earnings ___________
b) What will your total earnings be, if you in addition to the 30 points contribute
8 points to the project?
Your total earnings ___________
c) What will your total earnings be, if you in addition to the 30 points contribute
15 points to the project?
Your total earnings ___________
4. Each group member is endowed with 20 points. Assume that you contribute 8
points to the project.
a) What will your total earnings be, if the other group members in addition to your
8 points contribute in total another 7 points to the project?
Your total earnings ___________
b) What will your total earnings be, if the other group members in addition to your
8 points contribute in total another 12 points to the project?
Your total earnings ___________
c) What will your total earnings be, if the other group members in addition to your
8 points contribute in total another 22 points to the project?
Your total earnings ___________
The experiment
100
Figure B-1: Screenshot: unconditional contribution
In experiment you will be confronted with the described decision situation only once.
As you know, you will have an endowment of 20 points at your disposal. You can put any
share of it into a private account or you can contribute any share of it to a project. Each
participant has to make two types of decisions in this experiment, which we will refer to
below as the unconditional contributionand the contribution table.
1. Unconditional contribution decisions: Here you decide how many of the 20 points
you want to contribute to the project. When making your decisions you may want to
consult the summary of the decision situation you received with these instructions.
You will have to indicate your contribution decision on a computer screen as shown
here:
2. Contribution table decision: Here you have to ll in a contribution tablewhere
you indicate how many points you want to contribute to the project for each possible
average contribution of the other group members (rounded to the next integer). What
this means will be immediately clear to you if you take a look at the computer screen shown
below. This screen shows a table as it will be presented to you in the experiment: The
numbers to the left to the empty boxes are the possible (rounded) average contributions
of the other group members. You simply have to insert in the boxes how many points
you will contribute to the project, conditional on the indicated average contribution. You
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Figure B-2: Screeenshot: contribution table
have to make an entry into each of the boxes. For example, you will have to indicate how
much you contribute to the project if the others contribute an average of 0 points to the
project, how much you contribute if the others contribute an average of 1, 2, or 3 points,
etc. You can insert any integer number from 0 to 20 in each box. When making your
decisions you may want to consult the summary of the decision situation you received
with these instructions. When you have made your entry in each box, please click OK.
have to estimate the actual average unconditional contribution to the project (rounded
to an integer) of the other two group members. You will be paid for the accuracy of your
estimate:
- If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate exactly matches the rounded
actual average contribution of the other group members), you will receive 3 points extra
to your other earnings from the experiment.
- If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the actual result, you will receive 2 points
extra.
- If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the actual result, you will receive 1 point
extra
- If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the actual result, you will receive
no points extra.
102
Figure B-3: Screenshot: belief determination
- You will make your estimation decision on a screen as shown below.
After all participants of the experiment have made their unconditional contribution
decision, their contribution table decision, and their estimation a random mechanism will
select a group member from every group. For this randomly selected group member only
the contribution table will be the payo¤-relevant decision. For the other two group mem-
bers only the unconditional contribution will be the payo¤-relevant decision. Obviously,
when you make your unconditional contribution decisions and your contribution table de-
cisions you do not know whether the random mechanism will select you or not. Therefore,
you will have to think carefully about both types of decisions because both can become
payo¤ relevant for you. Two examples will make this clear.
EXAMPLE 1: Assume that the randommechanism selects you. This implies that your
relevant decision will be your contribution table. The unconditional contribution is the
relevant decision for the other two group members. Assume that they made unconditional
contributions of 1 and 3 points. The average contribution of these two group members,
therefore, is 2 points. If you indicated in your contribution table that you will contribute
1 point if the others contribute 2 points on average, then the total contribution to the
project is given by 1 + 3 + 1 = 5 points. All group members, therefore,earn 0:5 5 = 2:5
points from the project .Your total earnings would be 20 1+2:5 = 21:5 points. The other
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two group members earn the 2.5 points plus their respective earnings from their private
accounts .If, instead, you indicated in your contribution table that you would contribute
16 points if the others contribute two points on average ,then the total contribution of the
group to the project is given by 1+3+16 = 20 points. All group members therefore earn
0:5  20 = 10 points from the project. Your total earnings would be 20   16 + 10 = 14
points.The other two group members earn the 14 points plus their respective earnings
from their private accounts.
EXAMPLE 2: Assume that the random mechanism did not select you, implying that
the unconditional contribution is taken as the payo¤-relevant decision for you and one
other group member. Assume that your unconditional contribution is 16 points and
the other group member who was also not chosen contributes 20 points. The average
unconditional contribution of you and that of the other group member, therefore, is
(20+16)=2 = 18 points. If the group member who was selected by the random mechanism
indicates in the contribution table to contribute 1 point if the other two group members
contribute on average 18 points, then the total contribution of the group to the project is
given by 16+20+1=37 points.All group members will therefore earn 0:537 = 18:5 points
from the project. Your total earnings from the project would be 20   16 + 18:5 = 22:5
points. The other two group members earn the18.5 points plus their respective earnings
from their private accounts. If, instead, the randomly selected group member indicates in
the contribution table to contribute 18 points if the others contribute on average 18 points,
then the total contribution of the group to the project is given by 16+20+18 = 54 points.
All group members will therefore earn 0:5 54 = 27 points from the project. Your total
earnings from the project would be 20-16+27=31points. The other two group members
earn the 27 points plus their respective earnings from their private accounts.
The random selection of one of the group members will be implemented as follows.
Each group member is assigned an integer number between 1 and 3. Please recall, that
one participant, namely the one with the cubicle number 1, was randomly chosen at the
very beginning of the experiment. After all participants have made all their decisions,
this participant will throw a 6-sided die. The result of this throw determines for which
member number in each group the contribution table decisions are payo¤-relevant. The
member with number 1 is selected if the die gives 1 or 4; the member with number 2 is
selected if the die gives 2 or 5; the member with number 3 is selected if the die gives 3 or
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6.
If the participant at cubicle number 1 throws the member number that was assigned
to you, then your contribution table will be payo¤-relevant for you and the unconditional
contribution will be the payo¤-relevant decision for the other group members. Otherwise,
your unconditional contribution is the payo¤-relevant decision for you.
This is the end of the instructions. If you have a question please raise your hand.
B.3 Specic instructions Part 2
In this part of the experiment you can earn money with the decisions you make. How
much you earn depends on your own decisions and the decisions of other participants. We
will not speak of Euro during the experiment, but rather of points. All you earnings will
rst be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment the total amount of points you
earned in this part will be converted to Euro at the following rate:
1 point = 2 Euro cent
At the beginning of this part of the experiment all participants will be divided into
pairs. You will not get to know the identity of the other person, neither during nor after
the experiment. The other person will also not get to know your identity.
The decision situation in this part of the experiment is similar as in part 1, with
one important exception that will be explained below. For your convenience we briey
describe the whole decision situation.
The decision situation:
You will be randomly paired with one other participant. In part 1, in each pair one
participant was randomly assigned the role of a rm and the other participant was assigned
the role of a worker. You - as every other participant - will keep the role assigned in part
1 also throughout this part of the experiment.
Compared to part 1, there is an important di¤erence in the sequence of the decisions
in this part of the experiment. Now the rm rst has to make a wage o¤er and this wage
o¤er will be transmitted to the worker. Only then the worker has to decide on the e¤ort
level.
If you are assigned the role of a rm you have to make a wage o¤er.
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e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Table B.1: E¤ort table
The wage you o¤er can be any amount from 0 to 100 (as long as it is a multiple of 5).
That is you can o¤er a wage of 0, or 5, or 10, ...., or 90, or 95, or 100.
If you are assigned the role of a worker you will get informed about the wage o¤er by
the rm, then you have to decide which e¤ort level you provide for the received wage o¤er
by the rm.
The e¤ort level you choose can be any integer number from 1 to 10. That is you can
decide to provide e¤ort levels of 1, or 2, or 3, ...., or 8, or 9, or 10.
To each e¤ort level correspond some costs the worker has to bear for this e¤ort level.
How the e¤ort levels and costs are related is shown in this table:
The earnings are calculated in the following way:
If you are a rm:
- First, multiply the e¤ort level chosen by the worker with 10,
- Second, subtract the wage you o¤ered,
- Third, add an endowment of 50.
As formula:
Earnings of rm =10e¤ort level wage o¤er+50
Note: if the earnings of the rm determined in this way would be negative they are
set to zero.
If you are a worker:
- First, take the wage o¤ered by the rm,
- Second, subtract the costs associated with e¤ort level chosen (see table),
- Third, add an endowment of 20.
As formula:
Earnings of worker = Wage o¤er cost of e¤ort + 20
In this part of the experiment you will be engaged in the decision situation for 10 suc-
cessive periods. In each period you will be randomly rematched with another participant.
Thus, in no period will your pair consist of the same two people for sure..
If you are a rm, in each period you have to make a wage o¤er without knowing what
e¤ort level will be chosen by the worker. If you are a worker, in each period you have
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Figure B-4: Screenshot: wage o¤er
to decide on the e¤ort level after being informed about the wage o¤er. At the end of a
period rm and worker will be informed about the o¤ered wage and chosen e¤ort levels
in the pair in that period.
If you are a rm, in each period you will make your wage o¤er decision on a computer
screen as shown here:
On this screen, you have indicate the wage level you o¤er the worker. You simply have
to click on one of the circles to indicate your wage o¤er. You can only make one wage
o¤er.
In each period, after you have made and conrmed your wage o¤er you have to estimate
the e¤ort level actually chosen for your wage o¤er.
In each period you will indicate your estimation on a computer screen as shown here:
As in the part 1 of the experiment you can earn money with the accuracy of your
estimate.
- If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate exactly matches the actually
chosen e¤ort by the worker for your wage o¤er), you will receive 3 points extra to your
other earnings from the experiment.
- If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the actual result, you will receive 2 points
extra.
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Figure B-5: Screenshot: expected e¤ort
- If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the actual result, you will receive 1 point
extra
- If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the actual result, you will receive
no points extra.
If you are a worker, In each period, before you are informed about the actually chosen
wage o¤er you have to estimate the wage o¤er actually chosen by the rm.
As in the part 1 of the experiment you can earn money with the accuracy of your
estimate.
- If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate exactly matches the actually
chosen e¤ort by the worker for your wage o¤er), you will receive 3 points extra to your
other earnings from the experiment.
- If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the actual result, you will receive 2 points
extra.
- If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the actual result, you will receive 1 point
extra
- If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the actual result, you will receive
no points extra.
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Next, in each period after receiving your wage o¤er, you will make your e¤ort level
decision. In particular, you will be informed about the wage o¤ered by the rm. You
then have to indicate the e¤ort level you choose. You simply have to click on one of the
circles to indicate your e¤ort level.
After the 10 periods of this part are over you will be asked to ll in a short question-
naire. Thereafter, the whole experiment is over and you will be condentially be paid out
your total earnings in the experiment in cash.
This is the end of the instructions. If you have a question please raise your hand.
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Appendix C
Cooperation preferences and framing
e¤ects
C.1 Additional statistics
C.1.1 Individual contribution schedules per treatment
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Individual contribution schedules
The letters on top of each subgraph indicate how that particular individual was clas-
sied. CC: conditional cooperator; FR: free rider; TR: triangle; OT: other.
C.1.2 Determinants of beliefs in the nitely-repeated public good
game
This table investigates the determinants of beliefs in the nitely-repeated public good
game.
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Treatments CONTROL ORDERED SEQUENTIAL
Period  0:2375  0:3487  0:2477
(0:0302) (0:0606) (0:0570)
Average Contribution in SM 0:0912 0:0003 0:2371
(0:0207) (0:0690) (0:0639)
Average Contribution in One-Shot 0:1343 0:2927 0:4484
(0:0517) (0:0524) (0:0582)
Constant 2:1949 3:2171 2:6695
(0:3144) (0:0504) (0:5111)
Observations 300 330 330
*p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01;
Linear regression with random e¤ects at the session level
Table C.1: Determinants of beliefs in the nitely-repeated public good game
The variables Average Contribution in SM refers to the average contribution in the
strategy method, and Average Contribution in One-Shot refers to the average contribution
in the one-shot game.
C.2 Instructions
These are the instructions for the three parts of the SEQUENTIAL treatment. The
instructions for the other treatments were appropriately adjusted.
C.2.1 General instructions
Welcome to this economic experiment. In the experiment you and other participants will
make decisions. Next to the fee of 5 CHF for showing up in time, you can earn money in
the experiment. How much you earn depends on your own decisions and the decisions of
other participants. At the end of the experiment the show-up fee and the earnings from
the di¤erent parts will be added up and condentially paid out to you in cash.
The experiment consists of three parts that are all independent of one another. For
each part you will receive specic instructions. These instructions will explain how you
make decisions and how your decisions and the decisions of other participants inuence
your earnings. Therefore, it is important that you read the instructions carefully.
From now on you are not allowed to communicate in any other way than specied
in the instructions. Please obey to this rule because otherwise we have to exclude you
from the experiment and all earnings you have made will be lost. Please also do not ask
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questions aloud. If you have a question raise your hand. A member of the experimenter
team will come to you and answer your question in private.
You can now start reading the instructions for the rst part of the experiment. Other
instructions will follow after Part 1 is over.
C.2.2 Specic instructions Part 1
In this part of the experiment, you can earn money with the decisions you make. How
much you earn depends on your own decisions, as well as the decisions of other partic-
ipants. We will not speak of Swiss francs during the experiment, but rather of tokens.
All you earnings will rst be calculated in tokens. At the end of the experiment the total
amount of tokens you earned in this part will be converted to Swiss francs at the following
rate:
1 token = 0.6 Swiss francs
Earnings will be rounded up to the next integer.
At the beginning of this part of the experiment all participants will be divided into
groups of three. You will not get to know the identity of the other group members, neither
during nor after the experiment. The other group members will also not get to know your
identity.
We now describe how this part of the experiment proceeds. First you will be intro-
duced to the basic decision situation, thereafter you will learn more specically how the
experiment is conducted. You will also be asked some control questions that will help you
to understand the decision situation.
The decision situation:
You will be the member of a group of 3 people. Each group member receives an
endowment of 20 tokens. You and each other group member has to simultaneously decide
on the assignment of his/her 20 tokens. You can put any (integer) share of these 20 tokens
into your account A or you can put any (integer) share to account B.
The decision you will make is how many tokens you want to assign to account B. The
assignment of tokens to your account A will automatically be calculated as:
Your assignment to your account A = (20 - tokens you assigned to account B)
Your earnings from your account A:
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For each token you put into your account A, you will earn one token. That is,
Your earnings from your account A= tokens assigned to your account A= (20 - tokens
you assign to account B)
For example, if you put 20 tokens into your account A, your earnings from your account
A will be 20 tokens. If you put, for example, 6 tokens into your account A, your earnings
from this account will be the 6 tokens.
No one except you earns tokens from your account A. You do not earn anything from
the assignments of the other group members to their account A. For example, if you put
10 tokens into your account A, and the other group members each put 20 tokens in their
respective account A, then your earnings from your account A will be 10 tokens.
Your earnings from account B:
For each token you assign to account B, each group member will prot equally. On the
other hand, you will also prot from the other group membersassignments to account
B, and this regardless of whether you assign tokens to account B. For each group member
the earnings from account B will be determined as follows:
Earnings from account B = 0.5 *(sum of assignments to account B of all group mem-
bers)
For example, if you assign 20 tokens to account B and each of the other two members
also assign 20 tokens to account B, then the sum of assignments is 60 tokens. This means
that you and each of the other two group members earn 0:560 = 30 tokens from account
B. If, for example, you assign 6 tokens to account B, and one of the other members assigns
2 tokens and the third one 1 tokens to account B, then the sum of assignments is 9 tokens.
In this case you and each of the other two group members earn 0:5  9 = 4:5 tokens from
account B.
Notice that your decision is to allocate your 20 tokens between your account A and
account B. In order to do so, you will be asked how many, out of these 20 tokens, you
want to assign to account B. The assignment of tokens to account A will automatically
be calculated as:
Your assignment to account A = (20 tokens you assigned to account B)
Your total earnings from your account A, account B and the tokens others assign to
their respective account A are:
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Total earnings = (20 - tokens you assigned to account B) + 0.5*( sum of assignments
to account B of all group members)
For example:
1.If the sum of assignments to account B was (20 + 20 + 20) = 60, then
your total earnings = (20  20) + (0:5  60) = 30
2.If the sum of assignments to account B was (6 + 2 + 1) = 9 and you assigned 6 to
account B, then
your total earnings = (20  6) + (0:5  9) = 18:5
3.If the sum of assignments to account B was (2 + 9+ 19) = 30 and you assigned 2 to
account B, then
your total earnings = (20  2) + (0:5  30) = 33
Control questions decision situation:
Please answer the following control questions. These questions are arbitrary examples
of what could happen in the experiment. They will help you to gain an understanding of
the calculation of your earnings. Your earnings vary with your own decision and with the
decisions of the other group members.
Please answer all the questions and write down your calculations.
1. Each group member is endowed with 20 tokens. Assume that none of the group
members (including you) assigns anything to account B.
What will your total earnings be? ___________
What will the total earnings of each of the other group members be? ___________
2. Each group member is endowed with 20 tokens. You assign 20 token to account B.
Each of the other 2 group members each assigns 0 token to account B.
What will your total earnings be? ___________
What will the total earnings of each of the other group members be? ___________
3. Each group member is endowed with 20 tokens. The other 2 group members assign
a total of 30 tokens to account B.
a) What will your total earnings be, if you assign 0 token to account B?
Your total earnings ___________
b) What will your total earnings be, if you assign 8 tokens to account B?
Your total earnings ___________
c) What will your total earnings be, if you assign 15 tokens to account B?
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Your total earnings ___________
4. Each group member is endowed with 20 tokens. Assume that you assign 8 tokens
to account B.
a) What will your total earnings be, if the other group members assign, in total, 7
tokens to account B?
Your total earnings ___________
b) What will your total earnings be, if the other group members assign, in total, 12
tokens to account B?
Your total earnings ___________
c) What will your total earnings be, if the other group members assign, in total, 22
tokens to account B?
Your total earnings ___________
ONCE YOU ARE DONE FILLING THE CONTROL QUESTIONS, PLEASE RAISE
YOUR HAND AND ONE OF THE EXPERIMENTER WILL COME TO CHECK
YOUR ANSWERS.
The experiment:
In this part of the experiment you will be confronted with the described decision
situation only once. You can put any integer share of your 20 tokens into your account
A or into account B. Each participant has to make two types of decisions in this part of
the experiment, which we will refer to below as the unconditional assignment decision
and the assignment table.
1. Unconditional assignment decision: Here you decide how many of the 20 tokens
you want to put in account B. When making your decision you may want to consult the
summary of the decision situation you received with these instructions.
You will have to indicate your assignment decision on a screen as shown below:
You will see in total 21 such screens, each corresponding to a possible average as-
signment of the other group members to account B. You will never see the same average
assignment twice. That is, each of the 21 screens will refer to a di¤erent average assign-
ment of the other group members to account B. For the sake of brevity, we have shown
to you only two of the 21 successive screens you will see.
After you have made your unconditional assignment decision and your assignment ta-
ble decision (21 successive screens) you have to estimate the actual average unconditional
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Figure C-1: Screenshot: conditional assignment
assignment to account B (rounded to an integer) of the other two group members. You
will be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:
- If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate exactly matches the rounded
actual average assignment of the other group members), you will receive 3 points extra
to your other earnings from the experiment.
- If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the actual result, you will receive 2 points
extra.
- If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the actual result, you will receive 1 point
extra
- If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the actual result, you will receive
no points extra.
You will make your estimation decision on a screen as shown below.
After all participants of the experiment have made their unconditional assignment
decision and their assignment table decision, a random mechanism will select a group
member from every group. For this randomly selected group member only the assignment
table will be the payo¤-relevant decision. For the other two group members only the
unconditional assignment will be the payo¤-relevant decision. Obviously, when you make
your unconditional assignment decision and your assignment table decisions you do not
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Figure C-2: Screenshot: unconditional assignment
know whether the random mechanism will select you or not. Therefore, you will have to
think carefully about both types of decisions because both can become payo¤ relevant for
you. Two examples will make this clear.
EXAMPLE 1: Assume that the random mechanism selects you. This implies that
your relevant decision will be your assignment table. The unconditional assignment is the
relevant decision for the other two group members. Assume that they made unconditional
assignments of 1 and 3 tokens. The average assignment of tokens of these two group
members, therefore, is 2 tokens. If you indicated in your assignment table that you would
assign 1 token to account B if the others put 2 tokens on average in account B, then your
total earnings would be (20   1) + 0:5  5 = 21:5. The other two group members earn
the 2.5 tokens plus their respective earnings from their own account A. If, instead, you
indicated in your assignment table that you would assign 16 tokens if the others assign
two tokens on average, then the total assignment of the group to account B is given by
1 + 3 + 16 = 20 tokens. All group members therefore earn 0:5 20 = 10 tokens from the
account B.Your total earnings would be (20  16)+ 10 = 14 tokens. The other two group
members earn the 14 tokens plus their respective earnings from their own account A.
EXAMPLE 2: Assume that the random mechanism did not select you, implying
that the unconditional assignment of tokens to your account B is taken as the payo¤-
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relevant decision for you and one other group member. Assume that your unconditional
assignment is 16 tokens and the other group member who was also not chosen put 20
tokens in account B. The average unconditional assignment of you and that of the other
group member, therefore, is (20+16)/2=18 tokens. If the group member who was selected
by the random mechanism indicates in the assignment table to assign 1 token to account
B if the other two group members put on average 18 tokens in account B, then the total
contribution of the group to the project is given by 16 + 20 + 1 = 37 tokens. All group
members will therefore earn 0:5  37 = 18:5 tokens from account B. Your total earnings
would be (20   16) + 18:5 = 22:5 tokens. The other two group members earn the 18.5
tokens plus their respective earnings from their own account A. If, instead, the randomly
selected group member indicates in the assignment table to assign 18 tokens to account
B if the others contribute on average 18 tokens to account B,then the total assignment
of the group to account B is given by 16 + 20 + 18 = 54 tokens. All group members
will therefore earn 0:5  54 = 27 tokens from account B. Your total earnings would be
(20   16) + 27 = 31 tokens.The other two group members earn the 27 tokens plus their
respective earnings from their own account A
The random selection of one of the group members will be implemented as follows.
Each group member is assigned an integer number between 1 and 3. Please recall, that
one participant, namely the one with the cubicle number 1, was randomly chosen at the
very beginning of the experiment. After all participants have made all their decisions,
this participant will throw a 6-sided die. The result of this throw determines for which
member number in each group the contribution table decisions are payo¤-relevant. The
member with number 1 is selected if the die gives 1 or 4; the member with number 2 is
selected if the die gives 2 or 5; the member with number 3 is selected if the die gives 3 or
6.
If the participant at cubicle number 1 throws the member number that was assigned
to you, then your assignment table will be payo¤-relevant for you and the unconditional
assignment will be the payo¤-relevant decision for the other group members. Otherwise,
your unconditional assignment is the payo¤-relevant decision for you.
This is the end of the instructions. If you have a question please raise your hand.
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C.2.3 Specic instructions Part 2
In this part of the experiment you can earn money with the decisions you make. How
much you earn depends on your own decisions and the decisions of other participants.
We will not speak of Swiss Francs during the experiment, but rather of tokens. All you
earnings will rst be calculated in tokens. At the end of the experiment the total amount
of tokens you earned in this part will be converted to Swiss Francs at the following rate:
1 token = 0.6 CHF
At the beginning of this part of the experiment all participants will be divided in
groups of three. You will not get to know the identity of the other group members,
neither during nor after the experiment. The other group members will also not get to
know your identity.
The decision situation in this part of the experiment is the same as in part 1. For your
convenience we briey repeat the description of the decision situation.
The decision situation:
You will be the member of a group of 3 people. Each group member receives an
endowment of 20 tokens. You and each other group member has to simultaneously decide
on the assignment of his/her 20 tokens. You can put any (integer) share of these 20 tokens
into your account A or you can put any (integer) share to account B.
The decision you will make is how many tokens you want to assign to account B. The
assignment of tokens to your account A will automatically be calculated as:
Your assignment to your account A = (20 - tokens you assigned to account B)
Your earnings from your account A:
For each token you put into your account A, you will earn one token. That is,
Your earnings from your account A= tokens assigned to your account A = (20 - tokens
you assign to account B)
Recall that no one except you earns tokens from your account A. You do not earn
anything from the assignments of the other group members to their account A
Your earnings from account B:
For each token you assign to account B, each group member will prot equally. On the
other hand, you will also prot from the other group membersassignments to account
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Figure C-3: Screenshot: assignment to account B
B, and this regardless of whether you assign tokens to account B. For each group member
the earnings from account B will be determined as follows:
Earnings from account B = 0.5 *(sum of assignments to account B of all group mem-
bers)
Your total earnings from your account A, account B and the tokens others assign to
their respective account A are:
Total earnings = (20 - tokens you assigned to account B) + 0.5*( sum of assignments
to account B of all group members)
In this part of the experiment you will be engaged in the decision situation for 1 period.
You and the other group members have to make an assignment decision and an esti-
mation of the actual average assignments of the other 2 group members. When you make
your decisions you do not know the decisions of the other group members nor do the other
group members know your decisions.
You will make your assignment decision on a computer screen as shown on the next
page:
On this screen, you have to decide on your assignment of tokens to account B. That
is, you have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you want to put in account B, and
how many tokens you want to put into your account A. When making your decisions
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Figure C-4: Screenshot: expected assignment
you may want to consult the summary of the decision situation you received with these
instructions.
After you have made and conrmed your decision you have to indicate your estimation
of the actual average assignment to account B of the other 2 group members.
You will indicate your estimation on a computer screen as shown on the next page:
As in part 1 of the experiment you can earn money with the accuracy of your estimate.
3. If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate exactly matches the
rounded actual average assignment to account B of the other group members), you will
receive 3 tokens extra to your other earnings from the experiment.
4.If your estimate deviates by 1 token from the actual result, you will receive 2 tokens
extra.
5.If your estimate deviates by 2 tokens from the actual result, you will receive 1 token
extra
6.If your estimate deviates by 3 or more tokens from the correct result, you will receive
no tokens extra.
At the end of the period, you will know your earnings in this part of the experiment
and you will also receive information about the assignment decisions made by the others.
As indicated in part 1 of the experiment, you will next be told the results of part 1. After
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that, the third part of the experiment will start.
This is the end of the instructions. If you have a question please raise your hand.
C.2.4 Specic instructions Part 3
In this part of the experiment you can earn money with the decisions you make. How
much you earn depends on your own decisions and the decisions of other participants.
We will not speak of Swiss Francs during the experiment, but rather of tokens. All you
earnings will rst be calculated in tokens. At the end of the experiment the total amount
of tokens you earned in this part will be converted to Swiss Francs at the following rate:
1 token = 0.06 CHF
At the beginning of this part of the experiment all participants will be divided in
groups of three. You will not get to know the identity of the other group members,
neither during nor after the experiment. The other group members will also not get to
know your identity.
The decision situation in this part of the experiment is the same as in Part 2. In
this part of the experiment you will be engaged in the decision situation for 10 successive
periods. In each period you and the other two group members will be randomly rematched.
Thus, in no period will your group consist of the same three people.
For your convenience we briey repeat the description of the decision situation.
The decision situation:
You will be the member of a group of 3 people. Each group member receives an
endowment of 20 tokens. You and each other group member has to simultaneously decide
on the assignment of his/her 20 tokens. You can put any (integer) share of these 20 tokens
into your account A or you can put any (integer) share to account B.
The decision you will make is how many tokens you want to assign to account B. The
assignment of tokens to your account A will automatically be calculated as:
Your assignment to your account A = (20 - tokens you assigned to account B)
Your earnings from your account A:
For each token you put into your account A, you will earn one token. That is,
Your earnings from your account A= tokens assigned to your account A= (20 - tokens
you assign to account B)
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Recall that no one except you earns tokens from your account A. You do not earn
anything from the assignments of the other group members to their account A
Your earnings from account B:
For each token you assign to account B, each group member will prot equally. On the
other hand, you will also prot from the other group membersassignments to account
B, and this regardless of whether you assign tokens to account B. For each group member
the earnings from account B will be determined as follows:
Earnings from account B = 0.5 *(sum of assignments to account B of all group mem-
bers)
Your total earnings from your account A, account B and the tokens others assign to
their respective account A are:
Total earnings = (20 - tokens you assigned to account B) + 0.5*( sum of assignments
to account B of all group members)
As said above, in this part of the experiment you will be engaged in the decision
situation for 10 successive periods. In each period you and the other two group members
will be randomly rematched. Thus, in no period will your group consist of the same three
people.
In each period you and the other group members have to make an assignment decision
and an estimation of the actual average assignments of the other 2 group members. When
you make your decisions you do not know the decisions of the other group members nor
do the other group members know your decisions. At the end of each period you will be
informed about the total assignments in your group in that period as well as your earnings
in that period.
In each period, you will make your assignment decision on a computer screen as shown
below:
On this screen, you have to decide on your assignment of tokens to account B. That
is, you have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you want to put in account B, and
how many tokens you want to put into your account A. When making your decisions
you may want to consult the summary of the decision situation you received with these
instructions.
In each period, after you have made and conrmed your decision you have to indicate
your estimation of the actual average assignment to account B of the other 2 group
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Figure C-5: Screenshot: assignment to account B
members.
In each period, you will indicate your estimation on a computer screen as shown on
the next page:
As in part 1 and 2 of the experiment you can earn money with the accuracy of your
estimate.
7.If your estimate is exactly right (that is, if your estimate exactly matches the rounded
actual average assignment to account B of the other group members), you will receive 3
tokens extra to your other earnings from the experiment.
8.If your estimate deviates by 1 token from the actual result, you will receive 2 tokens
extra.
9.If your estimate deviates by 2 tokens from the actual result, you will receive 1 token
extra
10.If your estimate deviates by 3 or more tokens from the correct result, you will
receive no tokens extra.
After the 10 periods of this part are over you will be asked to ll in a short question-
naire. Thereafter, the whole experiment is over and you will be condentially paid out
your total earnings in the experiment in cash.
This is the end of the instructions. If you have a question please raise your hand.
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Figure C-6: Screenshot: expected assignment
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Appendix D
Social networks in an experimental
labor market with adverse selection
D.1 Theoretical framework concerning the impact of
the social network: referral market equilibrium
In this appendix, we show that our game has equilibria with properties similar to this
in Montgomery (1991). The central assumption in his model is that workers tend to
refer others of similar ability. Similar to our experiment, in the model, there are two
stages and each worker lives for one stage. A worker can be either of high productivity
(H) or low productivity (L) with an equal probability. Firms can employ at most one
worker per stage, but cannot observe the workers type prior to hiring them. Each stage-1
worker is tied to at most one stage-2 worker with a certain probability (network density),
and a stage-1 worker knows a stage-2 worker of his same type with probability  > 1=2
(homophily or inbreeding bias). Stage-2 workers can have multiple ties with stage-1
workers. At the end of the rst stage, a rm can decide to o¤er a referral wage to the
worker linked with their stage-1 worker. The stage-2 worker can either accept or reject
this o¤er. If he accepts it, then he is hired in the referral market. If he rejects it, he goes
to the public market and receives the equilibrium wage in this market.1As mentioned in
1Our experiment di¤ers from Montgomery´s (1991) model in at least three respects. First, unlike
Montgomery, we do not allow for more than one link for stage-2 workers. Second, in our experiment,
there is no free entry and exit of rms and there are more workers than rms. Third, rms cannot make
simultaneous o¤ers in the referral and public market. We decided to allow for this possibility in our
experiment as we believe that this set-up is more realistic and also closer to the experiment on long-term
127
the chapter, the main ndings of Montgomerys model are the following: (i) A rm will
o¤er a wage in the referral market if, and only if, it employed an H worker in stage 1. (ii)
Wages in the referral market will be higher than in the public market. (iii) Firms will
be willing to pay a "wage premium" in stage 1 in order to attract H workers as this will
improve their chances of also hiring an H worker in stage 2.
Consider a situation in which rms all hired a worker in period 1. In stage 2, rms can
decide to hire by making a referral o¤er or by going to the public market. We are interested
in constructing some market equilibrium for the stage-2 market in the R treatment . We
introduce the following notion of an equilibrium.
Market equilibrium with referral: Price-allocation pair (p; x) is such that,
(i) All rms employ a worker, either in the public market or in the referral market.
(ii) The public market wage is at most equal to the (expected) average productivity in
the public market.
(iii) No rm has an incentive to change the price o¤ered in either one of the two markets.
(iv) Workers accept the highest wage o¤ered. No worker has an incentive to change its
decision rule.
D.1.1 Stage-1: Public Market
It is important to understand what happens in the stage-1 public market in isolation.
First, we need to know whether we are looking for a Walrasian equilibrium, a situation in
which agents are price-takers, or whether there is some game-theoretical structure. The
impact of the price-setting structures has an impact on the resulting market equilibrium.
Walrasian Equilibrium: AWalrasian equilibrium is a price-allocation pair where supply
equal demands
By drawing the supply and demand curves, it is easy to see that there is only one
Walrasian equilibrium at p = 30. This is the only intersection between supply and
demand. .
Game-theoretic structure:
Firms simultaneously set a price at which they are willing to hire a worker. Workers,
upon observing the wage o¤ers, announce simultaneously their decision rule for instance
relationship by Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004).
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a worker may say that he accepts any wage 30  w  35. We now describe the rationing
mechanism (Wilson, 1979, 1980). The rationing mechanism chosen is a key driving-force
of the equilibrium. It starts at the highest wage o¤ered. If there is excess supply at that
wage, workers are assigned randomly to buyers who o¤ered such a price. The unassigned
workers are then successively added to the supply at the second highest price etc... So
there is potentially excess supply at all but the lowest price announced.
For example, consider the following situation where rms o¤er, respectively, 30, 31,
32, and 34. And each workers decision rule is accept wage from w = 35 to w = 30.
Then there is excess supply at w = 34 since all workers accept this o¤er. Each worker
has probability 1=4 of being employed at that wage. One is chosen. Next, three workers
remain and are all willing to accept w = 33. Each has probability 1=3 of being employed
at that wage. One is chosen. Next, two workers remain and are all willing to accept
w = 32 etc.
Because of the choice of the rationing mechanism, workers never have to trade-o¤ a
higher wage with the probability of employment. This is a key driving-force of equilibrium
behavior. For instance, a rationing mechanism which would force all rms to clear their
position simultaneously i.e. selecting simultaneously a worker out of the pool of those
that accept their o¤ers may have a dramatic impact on the equilibrium set.
There is a unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium which corresponds to the unique
Walrasian equilibrum. All rms o¤er a wage of 30, and workers accept any wage greater
than their reservation value.
D.1.2 Stage-2: Referral Market
Consider a market equilibrium wage w  30 , what is the probability that rm j is getting
an H worker? That is, we look for
P (rm j hires an H jw  30)
To calculate this probability, we need to know events in which rm j gets an H. Recall
that 4 workers are chosen out of 6 and assigned with equal to probability to rms. Given
that we sample 4 out of 6 (unordered without replacement), the combination formula
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gives
n!
r!(n  r)! =
6!
4!2!
= 15
Hence there are 15 di¤erent ways of choosing 4 out of 6 when order does not matter.
These 15 ways are
H1H2H3L1; H1H2H3L2; H1H2H3L3; H1H2L1L2
H1H2L1L3; H1H2L2L3; H1H3L1L2; H1H3L1L3
H1H3L2L3; H2H3L1L2, H2H3L1L3; H2H3L2L3
H1L1L2L3; H2L1L2L3; H3L1L2L3
Notice that all types accept such a market wage since it exceeds both types reservation
values. We have that
P (rm j hires an H jw  30) = 3
4
(
3
15
) +
1
2
(
9
15
) +
1
4
(
3
15
) =
9 + 18 + 3
60
=
1
2
Therefore, if all rms o¤er the same wage and all workers accept that wage level, the
probability that rm j hires an H is 1
2
. Given this, the expected payo¤ of the rm is
Fj(wFj ; w  30) = P (rm j hires an H jw  30)(20  30)
+(1  P (rm j hires an H jw  30))(60  30)
=
1
2
( 10) + 1
2
(30) = 10
We are now going to check whether there exists a market equilibrium with referral in
period 2 of the following kind:
(i) each rm who got an H in stage 1 makes a referral o¤er at w = 30
(ii) each rm who got an L in stage 1 makes a public o¤er at w = 10
(iii) Period 2 workers who get a referral accept it
Consider now rm i that hired an H in stage 1 and makes a referral at wR = 30. Given
inbreeding bias , its expected prot is
(30) + (1  )( 10) = 0:75(30) + (0:25)( 10) = 20
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Notice that rm i does want to o¤er a lower referral wage it would not be accepted
by a high type worker. It also does not want to go the public market and o¤er a wage
w = 10 since its prot would not exceed 10. Likewise going to the public market and
o¤ering w > 10 can never be protable. In particular, trying to attract high type worker
on the public market by o¤ering w  30 leads to an expected prot that is obviously less
than 20 the probability to get a high type on the public market never reaches .
We now compute the expected prot of a rm that got an L in period 1, and is therefore
an actor in the stage 2 public market. Before doing so, it is useful to recall some basic
probabilities on the possible matchings that can be realized following hiring in period 1.
(i) Given any match of stage-1 workers to rm in period 1, the link structure between
stage-1 and stage-2 workers is dened as follows:
Probability of a perfect matching: 3
Probability of one mismatch matching: 32(1  )
Probability of a two mismatch matching: 3(1  )2
Probability of a perfect mismatch matching: (1  )3
When a rm hires a period-1 L worker (say worker L1), it faces several possible match-
ings. We need to know these in order to compute the rms expected prots. There are
10 possible such matchings:
L1H1H2H3; L1L2H1H2; L1L2H1H3; L1L2H2H3
L1L3H1H2; L1L3H1H3; L1L3H2H3; L1L2L3H1
L1L2L3H2; L1L2L3H3
In all the matching above, rm i hires worker L1 in period 1. With probability 110 ,
the other rms all got a period-1 H worker. With probability 6
10
, the other rms got a
period-1 L and two period-1 H workers. Finally, with probability 3
10
, the other rms got
two period-1 L workers and one period-1 H worker. Given the rmsstrategies (referral if
hired an H, public market otherwise): with probability 1/10, rm i is alone in the public
market, with probability 6/10 it has to share the public market with another rm, and
with probability 3/10 it has to share the public market with two other rms. We now
compute, for each of the three preceeding probabilities, the probability of each possible
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pool of period-2 workers who are in the public market.
a) With probability 1/10, rm i is alone in the public market:
with probability 3, there are 3 period-2 L in the public market
with probability 32(1 ), there are one period-2 H and two period-2 L in the public
market
with probability 3(1 )2, there are two period-2 H and one period-2 L in the public
market
with probability (1  )3, there are three period-2 H workers in the public market
b) With probability 6/10, rm i shares the public market:
with probability 3, there are one period-2 H and three period-2 L in the public market
with probability 22(1 ), there are two period-2 H and two period-2 L in the public
market
with probability 2(1 ), there are one period-2 H and three period-2 L in the public
market
with probability 2(1 )2, there are two period-2 H and two period-2 L in the public
market
with probability (1 )2, there are three period-2 H and one period-2 L in the public
market
with probability (1   )3, there are three period-2 H workers and one period-2 L in
the public market
c) With probability 3/10, rm i shares the public market with two other rms (only
one rm makes a referral):
with probability 3, there are two period-2 H and three period-2 L in the public market
with probability 22(1   ), there are two period-2 H and three period-2 L in the
public market
with probability 2(1 ), there are three period-2 H and two period-2 L in the public
market
with probability 2(1   )2, there are three period-2 H and two period-2 L in the
public market
with probability (1 )2, there are two period-2 H and three period-2 L in the public
market
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with probability (1   )3, there are three period-2 H workers and two period-2 L in
the public market
We are now ready to compute rm is expected prot from o¤ering a wage of 10 in
the public market. Let us rst compute the probability to employ a worker given the
wage o¤ered. For rm i not to want to make a referral of 10 directly, the probability of
employment should be greater than .
P(Hiring a period-2 L in pub marketjwP = 10) =
(1=10)[1  (1  )3)] + (6=10)[1  0:5((1  )2 + (1  )3] +
(3=10)[1  2=3(2(1  ) + 2(1  )2 + (1  )3)]
Plugging for  = 0:75,we get that,
P(Hiring a period-2 L in pub marketjwP = 10)  0:9296
Since P(Hiring a period-2 L in pub marketjwP = 10) > , rm i has no incentive to
try to get a low quality worker through a referral o¤er.
Given the probability of employment, rm is expected prot is
P(Hiring a period-2 L in pub marketjwP = 10)  (20  wP )  9:2968
We need now to check two things: local and non-local deviations. First, we should
check that rm i does not want to deviate to o¤ering a market wage of 11 local deviation.
Next, we should check that rm i does not want to deviate to o¤ering a market wage of
30 and try to attract the period-2 H workers who did not receive a referral o¤er.
Checking for small deviations: rm i o¤ers w0 = 11
Given the way the rationing mechanism works, workers only respond to market in-
centives and can safely ignore the probability of employment. That is, whenever workers
observe that a rm o¤ers a higher wage than the other rms in the public market, workers
all accept the o¤er of rm i and can ignore the fact that each workers does the same.
This is so because, in e¤ect, this strategy for worker j does not lead to a decrease in the
probability that j is employed. Therefore, whenever rm i o¤er a higher wage than the
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prevailing public market wage, it captures the entire supply in the public market. To
compute rm iexepcted prots, we proceed as above and rst compute the probability
of employing a worker given the wage o¤ered.
P(Hiring a period-2 L in pub marketjw0 = 11 > wP ) = 1  (1  )3)  0:9843
Firm iexpected prots from o¤ering a wage of 11 is thus:
P(Hiring a period-2 L in pub marketjw0 = 11 > wP )  (20  w0)  8:8593
Hence this deviation cannot be protable.
Checking for large deviations: rm i o¤ers w=30
In such a case, the probability of employing a worker is now equal to 1. However
we need to distinguish cases in which the rm will hire a period-2 L worker and the
case in which it will hire a period-2 H worker. As before, we compute the probability of
employment before computing the expected prot. We compute separately the probability
of hiring a period-2 L and the probability of hiring a period-2 H worker.
P(Hiring a period-2 L in pub marketjw0 = 30 > wP )=
(1=10)[3 + 1
2
(32(1  ) + 3(1  )2)  (1  )3]+
(6=10)[3
4
(3) + 1
2
22(1  ) + 3
4
2(1  ) + 1
2
2(1  )2 + 1
4
(1  ) + 1
4
(1  )3]+
(3=10)[3
5
3 + 3
5
22(1  ) + 2
5
2(1  ) + 2
5
2(1  )2 + 3
5
(1  )2 + 2
5
(1  )3
Plugging for  = 0:75 we get,
P(Hiring a period-2 L in pub marketjw0 = 30 > wP ) = 0:60875
Hence,
P(Hiring a period-2 H in pub marketjw0 = 30 > wP ) = (1  0:60875) = 0:39125
Firm is expected prots from o¤ering w0 = 30 in the public market is thus
0:60875  (20  30) + 0:39125(60  30) = 5:65
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Description of average wage o¤ered
Average wages No Referral Referrals
Average o¤ered wage by rm 19.24 19.37
Average accepted wage by worker 26.62 25.51
Table D.1: Averages wages o¤ered and accepted
Hence this deviation cannot be protable.
Now if rm i is o¤ering a wage w0 = 31, given our assumption on workersresponse to
incentives, rm i is capturing the entire market as each period-2 worker responds positively
ot its o¤er. Its expected prot is then
1
2
(20  31) + 1
2
(60  31) = 29 11
2
= 9
Hence this deviation cannot be protable either. We have exhausted all the possible
deviations on behalf of the rms. It is straightforward that given wages o¤ered (public
market and referral) that workers respond optimally. We conclude that we have con-
structed a market equilibrium with referral.
D.2 Robustness check: all wages o¤ered
Result 1: Average wage o¤ered are lower than average accepted wages
SUPPORT: We notice that on average rms o¤er lower wages than the ones that are
accepted. In the NR treatment the average wage o¤ered is 19.24, in the R treatment it is
19.34. In contrast, the NR treatment the average accepted wage is 26.62 and 25.51 in the
R treatment. The di¤erence is conrmed by a Wilcoxon sign-rank test (p value=0.0431
for NR and p value= 0.0277 R treatments). This result is explained by the fact that
rms make several low wage o¤ers that are not accepted. In contrast, higher wage o¤ers
are mostly accepted by workers. Indeed, in the NR treatment 13.52 % of the o¤ered
wages that are less or equal to 21 are accepted whereas 92 % of the o¤ered wages that
are greater or equal to 30 are accepted. In the R treatment, 18.62 % of the o¤ered wages
that are less or equal to 21 are accepted whereas 77.88 % of the o¤ered wages that are
greater or equal to 30 are accepted.
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Result 2: Firms are more likely to make o¤ers that satisfy the participation constraint
of high-ability workers in the rst stage of treatment R, than in treatment NR.
SUPPORT: We nd that there is a higher percentage of o¤ered wages w > 30 in the
rst stage of the R treatment. Indeed, in stage 1 of the NR treatment 85.81% of the
o¤ered wages are below 30 against 77.26% for the R treatment. The fraction of o¤ered
wages with w > 30 is greater in the rst stage of treatment R (22.74%) than in treatment
NR (14.19%). Using the proportion of o¤ered wages strictly greater than 30 in stage 1
in each session as an independent observation, we nd that the di¤erence is statistically
signicant (Mann-Whitney; p value=0.0176).
Result 3: Three wages are the most o¤ered in each treatment, 15, 20 and 31. Firms on
average o¤er a wage of 20.
SUPPORT: In each treatment and stage, we observe a concentration of wages between 15
and 25 and 31 and 35 with a peak at 15, 20 and 31. I f we only consider accepted wages,
in each stage and treatment, 31 is the modal accepted wage. But, if we concentrate on
all o¤ered wages, the results are slightly di¤erent. O¤ered wages are mainly concentrated
below 20. On average, in both stages and treatments we nd that o¤ered wages are
not signicantly di¤erent from 20 (Wilcoxon sign-rank test; p value=0.8927 for the NR
treatment; p value=0.2489 for the R treatment) but are signicantly di¤erent from 15
and 30 (Wilcoxon sign-rank test; p value=0.0431 for the NR treatment; p value=0.0277
for the R treatment).
Result 4: O¤ered wages in the referral market are higher on average than those in the
public market.
SUPPORT: The average o¤ered wage in the referral market in the second stage of treat-
ment R is 21.52. In contrast, the average o¤ered wage in the public market is 17.98 in the
second stage of the R treatment. In line therefore with our expectations and Montgomery
(1991), private o¤ers are signicantly higher than public o¤ers (Wilcoxon signed-rank test
at the session level; p value=0.0277 both for accepted wages). For completeness, we re-
port that wages accepted in the second stage of treatment NR are (weakly) signicantly
lower than those in the referral market of treatment R (Mann-Whitney at the session
level; p value=0.01005 for accepted wages).
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D.3 Instructions
These are the instructions from the Referrals treatment. The instructions for the other
treatment were appropriately adjusted.
D.3.1 General instructions
Welcome! You will be now taking part in an economic experiment. In the experiment
you and other participants will make decisions. How much money you earn depends on
your own decisions, the decisions of other participants, and random events. At the end
of the experiment the earnings from the experiment will be added up and condentially
paid out to you.
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period you have to make decisions,
which you will enter on a computer screen. There are 15 periods in total. You will also
receive specic instructions for the experiment. These instructions will explain how you
make decisions and how your decisions, the decisions of other participants and random
events inuence your earnings. Therefore, it is important that you read these instructions
very carefully.
From now on you are not allowed to communicate in any other way than specied
in the instructions. Please obey to this rule because otherwise we have to exclude you
from the experiment and all earnings you have made will be lost. Please also do not ask
questions aloud. If you have a question raise your hand. A member of the experimenter
team will come to you and answer your question in private.
D.3.2 Specic instructions Firms
In this experiment you can earn money with the decisions you make. How much you earn
depends on your own decisions, the decisions of other participants, and random events.
We will not speak of Euro during the experiment, but rather of points. All your earnings
will rst be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment the total amount of points
you earned will be converted to Euro at the following rate:
1 point = 0.0225 Euro
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First you will be introduced to the basic decision situation, thereafter you will learn
more specically how the experiment is conducted. You will also be asked some control
questions that will help you to understand the decision situation.
 Periods
The experiment consists of 15 periods and each period consists of two stages called
stage 1 and stage 2.
In each period you will make decisions on a labor market. In stage 1 and stage 2 of
the labor market each rm may o¤er wages to workers. If a worker accepts a wage o¤er
a labor contract is concluded between the involved rm and worker.
 Groups
At the beginning of the experiment all participants will be randomly assigned either the
role of a rm or the role of a worker. Everyone will keep his/her assigned role throughout
the 15 periods.
Workers will be divided into two groups of the same size:
- Half of the workers will be active in stage 1 (stage 1 workers). Active means that a
worker can accept a wage o¤er and be hired.
- The other half will be active in stage 2 (stage 2 workers).
For example, if a worker is active in stage 1, it means that he will be inactive in stage
2. And vice-versa. Inactive means that a worker does not make any decisions.
If you are going to be a worker, whether you are a stage 1 or a stage 2 worker is
determined at random at the beginning of each period. That is, a participant in the role
of a worker will be a stage 1 worker in some periods and a stage 2 worker in other period,
depending on the random event
Number of participants
In total 16 participants are active in each period: 4 rms, 6 stage-1 workers, and 6
stage-2 workers.
Stage-1 workers are active in stage 1 only ( Inactive in stage 2)
Stage-2 workers are active in stage 2 only ( Inactive in stage 1)
Firms are active in both stage 1 and stage 2
Note: In each period and stage there are more workers than rms.
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WorkersTypes
In each stage (i.e. both stage 1 and stage 2) there are two types of workers:
- Low productivity workers produce 20 points if hired
- High productivity workers produce 60 points if hired
The productivity of a worker is that workers private information and it is therefore
only known to him/her.
Workers only know their own productivity and do not know and also do not get to
know the productivity of specic other workers.
Firms also do not know any specic workersproductivity before hiring a worker.
All participants know that:
In each stage, there are 3 low productivity workers and 3 high productivity workers.
After a rm has hired a worker, this workers productivity is disclosed to the rm.
The productivity of a worker and whether he/she is active in stage 1 or stage 2 is
randomly assigned at the beginning of each period. Hence, a participant in the role of a
worker will be a low productivity worker in some periods and a high productivity worker
in some other periods, as he/she will be a stage-1 worker in some periods and a stage-2
worker in some other periods, depending on the chance event.
 Link between stage-1 and stage-2 workers:
At the beginning of each period, each stage-1 worker is randomly linked to one (and
only one) stage-2 worker (called referral worker). Each stage-2 worker is linked to only
one stage-1 worker. Importantly, the likelihood that a stage 1 worker is linked to a stage
2 worker of the same productivity is 75% (i.e. probability=0.75). As a stage 1 worker,
you do not know the productivity of your referral worker. As a rm, recall that you do
not know the productivity of stage 1 and stage 2 workers before a worker is hired.
All participants know that:
The likelihood of a stage-1 worker to be linked to a stage-2 worker of the same pro-
ductivity is 75% (probability=0.75).
For example, if a rm has hired a high productivity stage-1 worker then there is a
chance of 3 out of 4 that this worker is linked to a high productivity stage-2 worker. The
chance that the high productivity stage-1 worker is linked with a low productivity stage-2
worker is 1 out of 4.
This links are changed and formed randomly at the beginning of each period.
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  Stages and trading phase
Which kind of decision you have to make depends on your role (rm or worker). In
each period the procedures are as follow:
Each period consists of two trading phases called stage 1 and stage 2. Each trading
phase lasts at most 2 minutes.
Stage 1: Firms and stage 1 workers participate in a public market where each rm can
make wage o¤ers and each worker can respond to wage o¤ers by any rm. If a stage-1
worker accepts a wage o¤er from a given rm, a labor contract is concluded and the rm
learns this stage 1 workers productivity.
Each wage o¤er is binding and a rm may employ at most one worker in stage 1. As
long as none of her wage o¤ers is accepted, the rm can make as many wage o¤ers as it
wishes.
A stage-1 worker may accept at most one wage o¤er.
Once a wage o¤er is accepted the involved rm and worker leaver the market are not
active any more in stage 1 of this period.
Stage 2: Firms and stage-2 workers participate in a public and/or referral market.
Firms can submit two types of wage o¤ers: public o¤ers or/and referral o¤ers.
Public o¤ers: Like in stage 1, a public wage o¤er is submitted to all stage-2 workers
and can be accepted by any stage-2 worker.
Referral o¤ers: A rm may make an o¤er to the stage-2 worker who is linked with the
rms stage-1 worker in the way described above. Referral wage o¤ers made by a rm are
submitted only to the stage-2 referral worker of this rm. A referral wage o¤er made by
a rm can be accepted (or rejected) only by this rms referral worker.
Firms are free to make wage o¤ers in both markets or only in one.
Note: If a rm makes a referral o¤er it does not know the productivity of its referral
worker. However, a rm knows:
- The productivity (20 or 60) of the worker hired in stage 1
- The likelihood that a stage-1 worker is linked to a stage-2 worker of the same pro-
ductivity is 75% (probability=0.75).
If a stage-2 worker accepts a wage o¤er, a labor contract is concluded and the rm
learns its stage-2 workers productivity.
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A rm may employ at most one worker in stage 2. It can make as many public and
referral wage o¤ers as it wishes. A stage 2 worker may accept at most one wage o¤er.
In stage 1 and in stage 2, submitted wages by a rm have to follow an improvement
rule. That is, subsequent wages o¤ers of a rm have to be increasing. Submitted wages
can be accepted at any time during the trading phase.
 The Experimental Procedures in Detail
As explained above, there are 4 rms, 6 stage-1 workers and 6 stage-2 workers. In
each stage, 3 workers are low productivity workers and 3 are high productivity workers.
Each stage-1 worker is linked with exactly one stage-2 worker. Each stage-2 worker is
linked with exactly one stage 1worker.
The likelihood of a worker to be linked to a worker of the same productivity is 75%.
If you are a rm you stay a rm throughout the whole experiment. If you are a worker
you stay a worker throughout the whole experiment. However, each workers productivity
and the stage in which he/she is active are newly and randomly assigned in each period.
During the experiment you will enter your decisions on a computer screen. In the
following we describe in detail how you make decisions in each period and stage.
YOU are a rm YOU have to make wage o¤ers.
1A-The trading phases if you are a rm
  Stage 1 of each period
Each period starts with stage 1. During stage 1 each rm may hire a stage 1 worker.
In order to do so each rm can submit as many wage o¤ers as it wishes. Recall that, in
each stage, there are more workers (6) than rms (4). As a rm, in each stage 1 you will
see the following screen:
 In the top left corner of the screen you see in which period of the experiment you
are.
 In the header Help, you see in which period and stage of the experiment you are
as well as some additional useful information.
 In the top right corner of the screen you see the time remaining in this period and
stage, displayed in seconds. Each stage lasts 2 minutes (120 seconds). When this time is
up the trading phase is over. Hereafter, no further o¤ers can be submitted or accepted in
this stage.
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Figure D-1: Screenshot: wage o¤ers in the public market
 Once the above screen is displayed the trading phase starts. As a rm you now have
the opportunity to submit wage o¤ers to stage 1 workers on a public market.
o You can submit a public wage o¤er by using the right side of the screen. You have
to enter a wage in the empty box and then click the OKbutton to submit your o¤er.
After you click OKthe o¤er will be displayed to all workers. Public o¤ers are seen by
all rms and stage-1 workers.
o To determine which wage you o¤er you just have to enter a (integer) number between
0 and 60.
o On the left side of your screen you see the header Firms o¤er. All public o¤ers
in stage 1 are displayed there. Your public o¤ers as well as those of all others rms will
be displayed. A public o¤er can therefore be accepted by any worker.
o You can make as many wage o¤ers as you want. Each wage o¤er that is submitted
can be accepted at any time during the trading phase. But wage o¤ers have to follow the
improvement rule: each new o¤er that you make must be higher than the previous one.
o In each stage each rm can hire at most one worker. Once a stage 1 worker has
accepted your o¤er you will be notied in the header Wage agreed on in your contract".
As you can conclude only one trade in each stage all your other o¤ers will be automatically
canceled. Also, you will not be able to submit any further o¤ers.
 Once all rms have hired a worker or after 2 minutes have gone, stage 1 is over.
 No rm is forced to submit o¤ers, and no worker is forced to accept a wage o¤er.
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Figure D-2: Screenshot: wage o¤ers in the public and referral markets
 After stage 1 is over each rm learn the productivity of the worker it has hired in
stage 1. That is, it learns if the worker it has hired produces 20 or 60 points.
  Stage 2 of each period
During stage 2 each rm hires at most one stage-2 worker.
Note: the likelihood of a stage-1 worker to be linked to a stage-2 worker of the same
productivity is 75% (probability=0.75)
The main di¤erence between stage 1 and stage 2: rst, now other workers, the stage-2
workers, are active; second, two markets are now open, the public market and the referral
market. Recall that, in each stage, there are more workers (6) than rms (4). You will
see the following screen:
 In the top left corner of the screen you see in which period of the experiment you
are.
 In the header Help, you see in which period and stage of the experiment you are
as well as some additional useful information.
 In the top right corner of the screen you will see the time remaining in this period
and stage, displayed in seconds. The trading phase in each stage lasts 2 minutes (120
seconds). When this time is up the trading phase is over. Hereafter, no further o¤ers can
be submitted or accepted in this stage.
 Once the above screen is displayed the stage 2 starts. As a rm you now have
the opportunity to submit wage o¤ers to stage-2 workers on a public market or/and the
referral market.
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o Public o¤ers. The rules are precisely as in stage 1. All public wage o¤ers appear on
the left side of the screen. To enter a public wage o¤er you have to click on the button
public market, enter the wage in the empty box wage o¤er. And then click on the
OKbutton. Public o¤ers are seen by all rms and stage-2 workers.
o Referral o¤ers. A referral o¤er is transmitted to one stage-2 worker only. Specically,
it is transmitted to your referral worker, i.e. to the stage-2 worker who is linked with your
stage 1 worker. Only the referral worker is informed about the referral wage o¤er and
only this referral worker can accept the o¤er. Note that each rm can have at most one
referral worker. No two rms will have the same referral worker.
No other rm or worker will be informed about your referral o¤er(s). All referral o¤ers
appear in the middle of the screen in the header "your referral wage o¤ers". Your referral
worker can only receive referral o¤ers from you.
o You can only make referral o¤ers if you have hired a stage-1 worker. If you havent
hired a stage-1 worker you may use only the public o¤ers.
o If you want to submit a referral o¤er, select "referral market" and then enter your
wage o¤er in the empty box. Then click on the "OK" button.
o To determine which wage you o¤er you just have to enter a (integer) number between
0 and 60.
o Like in stage 1, you can make as many public wage o¤ers and referral o¤ers as you
want, as long as you follow the improvement rule.
Each wage o¤er, public or referral, which is submitted, can be accepted at any time
during the trading phase.
oIn each stage each rm can hire at most one worker. Once a stage-2 worker has
accepted your o¤er it will be notied in the header Wage agreed on in your contract". As
you can conclude at most one trade in each stage all your other o¤ers will be automatically
canceled. Also, you will not be able to submit any further o¤ers.
 Once all rms have hired a worker or after 2 minutes are over, stage 2 ends.
 No rm is forced to submit o¤ers, and no worker is forced to accept a wage o¤er.
 After stage 2 is over each rm learns the productivity of the stage-2 worker it has
hired.
1B-Determination of your earnings (rm)
Before Period 1 starts, each rm is given an initial budgetof 120 points.
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As a rm you can submit wages between 0 and 60 points.
Each wage has to be an integer number, that is (0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,...,60)
In each stage a hired worker can be of low or high productivity. A high productivity
worker produces 60 points if he is hired and a low productivity worker produces 20 points
if he is hired.
If one of your o¤ers is accepted, your earnings depend on the productivity of the
worker and the wage that is accepted by the worker.
In each stage, your earnings are calculated in the following way:
 if you hire a worker:
You earn the productivity of your worker minus the accepted wage plus an extra 20
points .
Your earnings in a stage = workers productivity - accepted wage + 20
Please note that as a rm, you can make losses (negative earnings) in each period.
These losses have to be paid out of your budget of 120 points and earnings in other
periods. Note, also that you can always avoid losses through your own decisions. In each
stage, you will see your earnings in that stage as well as your current budget.
 If you dont hire any worker during a stage you receive 0 points in that stage.
No contract in a stage = 0 points
Your total earnings in one period is equal to the total of your earning in stage 1 and 2
Earnings in a period = earnings stage 1+ earnings stage 2
 After stage 1 you will see the "earning screen". The screen looks as follows.
Screenshot: prots of the rms
 After stage 2 is over, you will see a second earning screen which looks as follows:
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 Once you have nished studying the earning screen please on the "continue" button.
Otherwise it will automatically change to the next period after 1 minute.
After the 15 periods are over you will be asked to ll in a short questionnaire. There-
after, the experiment is over and you will condentially be paid out your total earnings
in the experiment in cash.
The earnings of the workers are calculated this following way:
Before Period 1 starts, each worker is given an initial budget (endowment) of 120
points. These 120 points will be added to his nal earnings at the end of the 15 periods.
Workers earnings will depend on whether he accepts a wage o¤er or not, and in case
the worker does not accept an o¤er it will depend on his productivity.
A worker can receive any wage between between 0 and 60.
In each period, workers earnings are calculated in the following way:
 Low productivity worker:
oIf a he accepts a wage in the stage in which he is active:
He earns the wage that he has accepted
oIf he does NOT accept a wage in the stage he is active:
He earns (reservation wage) 10 points
Earning of the low productivity worker in the stage in which he is active
= accepted wage if hired
Or
= 10 points if not hired
Earning of the low productivity worker in the stage in which he is inactive
= 10 points
Total earnings in a period: earnings when active + earnings when inactive
 High productivity worker:
If he accepts a wage in the stage in which he is active:
He earns the wage he has accepted
If he does NOT accept a wage in the stage in which he is active:
He earns 30 points
Earning of a high productivity worker in the stage in which he is active
= accepted wage if he is hired
or
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= 30 points if he is not hired
Earnings of a high productivity worker in the stage in which he is inactive
= 30 points
Total earnings in a period: earnings when active + earnings when inactive
D.3.3 Specic instructions Workers
In this experiment you can earn money with the decisions you make. How much you earn
depends on your own decisions, the decisions of other participants, and random events.
We will not speak of Euro during the experiment, but rather of points. All your earnings
will rst be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment the total amount of points
you earned will be converted to Euro at the following rate:
1 point = 0.0225 Euro
First you will be introduced to the basic decision situation, thereafter you will learn
more specically how the experiment is conducted. You will also be asked some control
questions that will help you to understand the decision situation.
 Periods
The experiment consists of 15 periods and each period consists of two stages called
stage 1 and stage 2.
In each period you will make decisions on a labor market. In stage 1 and stage 2 of
the labor market each rm may o¤er wages to workers. If a worker accepts a wage o¤er
a labor contract is concluded between the involved rm and worker.
 Groups
At the beginning of the experiment all participants will be randomly assigned either the
role of a rm or the role of a worker. Everyone will keep his/her assigned role throughout
the 15 periods.
Workers will be divided into two groups of the same size:
- Half of the workers will be active in stage 1 (stage 1 workers). Active means that a
worker can accept a wage o¤er and be hired.
- The other half will be active in stage 2 (stage 2 workers).
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For example, if a worker is active in stage 1, it means that he will be inactive in stage
2. And vice-versa. Inactive means that a worker does not make any decisions.
If you are going to be a worker, whether you are a stage 1 or a stage 2 worker is
determined at random at the beginning of each period. That is, a participant in the role
of a worker will be a stage 1 worker in some periods and a stage 2 worker in other period,
depending on the random event
Number of participants
In total 16 participants are active in each period: 4 rms, 6 stage-1 workers, and 6
stage-2 workers.
Stage-1 workers are active in stage 1 only (inactive in stage 2)
Stage-2 workers are active in stage 2 only (inactive in stage 1)
Firms are active in both stage 1 and stage 2
Note: In each period and stage there are more workers than rms.
WorkersTypes
In each stage (i.e. both stage 1 and stage 2) there are two types of workers:
- Low productivity workers produce 20 points if hired
- High productivity workers produce 60 points if hired
The productivity of a worker is that workers private information and it is therefore
only known to him/her.
Workers only know their own productivity and do not know and also do not get to
know the productivity of specic other workers.
Firms also do not know any specic workersproductivity before hiring a worker.
All participants know that:
In each stage, there are 3 low productivity workers and 3 high productivity workers.
After a rm has hired a worker, this workers productivity is disclosed to the rm.
The productivity of a worker and whether he/she is active in stage 1 or stage 2 is
randomly assigned at the beginning of each period. Hence, a participant in the role of a
worker will be a low productivity worker in some periods and a high productivity worker
in some other periods, as he/she will be a stage-1 worker in some periods and a stage-2
worker in some other periods, depending on the chance event.
 Link between stage-1 and stage-2 workers:
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At the beginning of each period, each stage-1 worker is randomly linked to one (and
only one) stage-2 worker (called referral worker). Each stage-2 worker is linked to only
one stage-1 worker. Importantly, the likelihood that a stage 1 worker is linked to a stage
2 worker of the same productivity is 75% (i.e. probability=0.75). As a stage 1 worker,
you do not know the productivity of your referral worker. As a rm, recall that you do
not know the productivity of stage 1 and stage 2 workers before a worker is hired.
All participants know that:
The likelihood of a stage-1 worker to be linked to a stage-2 worker of the same pro-
ductivity is 75% (probability=0.75).
For example, if a rm has hired a high productivity stage-1 worker then there is a
chance of 3 out of 4 that this worker is linked to a high productivity stage-2 worker. The
chance that the high productivity stage-1 worker is linked with a low productivity stage-2
worker is 1 out of 4.
This links are changed and formed randomly at the beginning of each period.
  Stages and trading phase
Which kind of decision you have to make depends on your role (rm or worker). In
each period the procedures are as follow:
Each period consists of two trading phases called stage 1 and stage 2. Each trading
phase lasts at most 2 minutes.
Stage 1: Firms and stage 1 workers participate in a public market where each rm can
make wage o¤ers and each worker can respond to wage o¤ers by any rm. If a stage 1
worker accepts a wage o¤er from a given rm, a labor contract is concluded and the rm
learns this stage 1 workers productivity.
Each wage o¤er is binding and a rm may employ at most one worker in stage 1. As
long as none of her wage o¤ers is accepted, the rm can make as many wage o¤ers as it
wishes.
A stage 1 worker may accept at most one wage o¤er.
Once a wage o¤er is accepted the involved rm and worker leaver the market are not
active any more in stage-1 of this period.
Stage 2: Firms and stage-2 workers participate in a public and/or referral market.
Firms can submit two types of wage o¤ers: public o¤ers or/and referral o¤ers.
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Public o¤ers: Like in stage 1, a public wage o¤er is submitted to all stage-2 workers
and can be accepted by any stage-2 worker.
Referral o¤ers: A rm may make an o¤er to the stage-2 worker who is linked with the
rms stage-1 worker in the way described above. Referral wage o¤ers made by a rm are
submitted only to the stage-2 referral worker of this rm. A referral wage o¤er made by
a rm can be accepted (or rejected) only by this rms referral worker.
Firms are free to make wage o¤ers in both markets or only in one.
Note: If a rm makes a referral o¤er it does not know the productivity of its referral
worker. However, a rm knows:
- The productivity (20 or 60) of the worker hired in stage 1
- The likelihood that a stage-1 worker is linked to a stage-2 worker of the same pro-
ductivity is 75% (probability=0.75).
If a stage-2 worker accepts a wage o¤er, a labor contract is concluded and the rm
learns its stage-2 workers productivity.
A rm may employ at most one worker in stage 2. It can make as many public and
referral wage o¤ers as it wishes. A stage 2 worker may accept at most one wage o¤er.
In stage 1 and in stage 2, submitted wages by a rm have to follow an improvement
rule. That is, subsequent wages o¤ers of a rm have to be increasing. Submitted wages
can be accepted at any time during the trading phase.
 The Experimental Procedures in Detail
As explained above, there are 4 rms, 6 stage-1 workers and 6 stage-2 workers. In
each stage, 3 workers are low productivity workers and 3 are high productivity workers.
Each stage-1 worker is linked with exactly one stage-2 worker. Each stage-2 worker is
linked with exactly one stage 1worker.
The likelihood of a worker to be linked to a worker of the same productivity is 75%.
If you are a rm you stay a rm throughout the whole experiment. If you are a worker
you stay a worker throughout the whole experiment. However, each workers productivity
and the stage in which he/she is active are newly and randomly assigned in each period.
During the experiment you will enter your decisions on a computer screen. In the
following we describe in detail how you make decisions in each period and stage.
You are a worker
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Figure D-3: Screenshot: workerswage o¤ers in the public market
1A-The trading phases if you are a worker
Stage 1 of each period
In this stage, only stage 1 workers are active. Stage 2 workers are inactive and they
will have to wait till stage 2 starts.
During stage 1, each stage 1 worker can be hired by a rm. Recall that, in each stage,
there are more workers (6) than rms (4). As a worker you will see the following screen:
In the top left corner of the screen you see in which period of the experiment you
are.
In the header Help, you see in which period and stage of the experiment you are,
your productivity, as well as some additional useful information.
In the top right corner of the screen you see the time remaining in this period and
stage, displayed in seconds. The trading phase in each stage lasts 2 minutes (120 seconds).
When this time is up the trading phase is over. Hereafter, no further o¤ers can be
submitted or accepted in this stage.
Once the above screen is displayed the trading phase starts. As a worker you can
now accept public wage o¤ers submitted by the rms. You do this by selecting a wage in
the header "Firms o¤ers" and then click the "Accept" button. All wage o¤ers appear in
this header and can be seen by all rms and workers.
 In any stage each worker can accept at most one wage o¤er. Once you have accepted
a wage o¤er it is notied in the header Wage agreed on in your contract" at the bottom
of the screen. As you can accept at most one wage, you will not be able to accept any
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Figure D-4: Screenshot: workerswage o¤ers in the public and referral markets
further o¤ers.
 Once all rms have hired a worker or after 2 minutes are over, stage 1 ends.
 No rm is forced to submit o¤ers, and no worker is forced to accept a wage o¤er.
 After stage 1 is over, each rm learns the productivity of the worker it hired.
  Stage 2 of each period.
If you are a stage-1 worker, you are inactive and you will have to wait until stage-2 is
over. Only stage-2 workers are active in this stage.
During stage 2 of the trading phase each stage-2 worker can be hired by a rm. Recall
that, in each stage, there are more workers (6) than rms (4). As a worker you will see
the following screen:
 In the top left corner of the screen you see in which period of the experiment you
are.
 In the header Help, you see in which period and stage of the experiment you are,
your productivity, as well as some additional useful information.
 In the top right corner of the screen you will see the time remaining in this period
and stage, displayed in seconds. The trading phase in each stage lasts 2 minutes (120
seconds). When this time is up the trading phase is over. Hereafter, no further o¤ers can
be submitted or accepted in this stage.
Once the above screen is displayed, stage 2 starts. As a worker you now have the
opportunity to accept at most one wage on a public market or on the referral market.
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o Public o¤ers. The rules are the same as in stage 1. All public wage o¤ers appear in
the right side of the screen. As a worker you can now accept public wage o¤ers submitted
by the rms. You do this by selecting a wage in the header "Firms public o¤ers" and
then click the "Accept" button. All wage o¤ers can be seen by all rms and workers.
o Referral o¤ers. All referral o¤ers appear in the left side of the screen. You can
only receive referral o¤ers if your stage-1 linked worker has been hired. A referral o¤er is
submitted to you only (if any). You are the only one to receive it and you are the only
one who can accept it. No other rm or worker will be informed about that o¤er. If you
want to accept a referral wage o¤er, you select a wage in the header "Your referral wage
o¤er" and then click the "Accept" button.
o Like in stage 1, you can receive many public and/or referral o¤ers. Each wage o¤er
that is submitted can be accepted at any time during the trading phase.
o In any stage each worker can accept at most one wage. Once a stage-2 worker has
accepted a wage o¤er it is notied it in the header Wage agreed on in your contract" at
the bottom of the screen. As you can accept at most one wage, you will not be able to
accept any further o¤ers.
 Once all rms have hired a worker or after 2 minutes are over, stage 2 ends.
 No rm is forced to submit o¤ers, and no worker is forced to accept a wage o¤er.
1B-Determination of your earnings (worker)
Before Period 1 starts, each worker is given an initial budget (endowment) of 120
points. These 120 points will be added to your nal earnings at the end of the 15 periods.
Your earnings will depend on whether you accept a wage o¤er or not, and in case you
do not accept an o¤er it will depend on your productivity.
You can receive any wage between 0 and 60.
In each period, your earnings are calculated in the following way:
 If you are a low productivity worker:
o If you accept a wage in the stage in which you are active:
You earn the wage you have accepted
o If you do NOT accept a wage in the stage you are active:
You earn (reservation wage) 10 points
Your earning in the stage in which you are active
= accepted wage if you are hired
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or
= 10 points if you are not hired
Your earning in the stage in which you are inactive = 10 points
Your total earnings in a period: earnings when active + earnings when inactive
 If you are a high productivity worker:
o If you accept a wage in the stage in which you are active:
You earn the wage you have accepted
o If you do NOT accept a wage in the stage in which you are active:
You earn 30 points
Your earning in the stage in which you are active
= accepted wage if you are hired
or
= 30 points if you are not hired
Your earning in the stage in which you are inactive = 30 points
Your total earnings in a period: earnings when active + earnings when inactive
Earnings Screens (workers)
Whether you are a low or a high productivity worker, you will see two earning screens.
If you are active in stage 1, you will see two earnings screen. One at the end of stage
1, and one at the end of stage 2. The screens look as follows:
Screenshot: earnings of the workers
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Screenshot: earnings of the workers
If you are active in stage 2, you will see two earning screens. One at the end of stage
1, and one at the end of stage 2. The screens look as follows:
Screenshot: earnings of the workers
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Screenshot: earnings of the workers
Once you have nished studying the earnings screen please click on the "Continue"
button. Otherwise it will automatically change to the following period after 2 minutes.
Recall that at the end of the 15 periods, your total earnings made during the 15 periods
will be calculated and your endowment of 120 points will be added to these earnings.
After the 15 periods are over you will be asked to ll in a short questionnaire. There-
after, the experiment is over and you will condentially be paid out your total earnings
in the experiment in cash.
Determination of the earnings of the FIRMS
Before Period 1 starts, each rm is given an initial budgetof 120 points.
A rm can submit wages between 0 and 60 points.
Each wage has to be an integer number, that is (0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,...,60)
If one of o¤ers is accepted, the earnings of a rm depend on the productivity of the
worker and the wage that is accepted by the worker.
In each stage, the earnings of a rm are calculated in the following way:
If it hires a worker:
It earns the productivity of its worker minus the accepted wage plus an extra 20 points
Earnings of a rm in a stage = workers productivity - accepted wage + 20
If it does not hire any worker during a stage it receives 0 points in that stage.
No contract in a stage = 0 points
Total earnings in one period is equal to the total of the rms earnings in stage 1 and
2
Earnings in a period = earnings stage 1+ earnings stage 2
D.3.4 Control questions public market decision situation
Please answer the following control questions. These questions are arbitrary examples of
what could happen in the experiment. In the experiment you will be either a worker or a
rm. The questions will concern both roles. They will help you to gain an understanding
of the calculation of your earnings. Your earnings vary with your own decision and with
the decisions of the other person you are paired with.
Please answer all the questions and write down your calculations.
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Once you are done, please RAISE YOUR HAND and the experimenter will come check
your answers.
1. A rm did not make an o¤er in stage 1 and 2. What are the rms total earnings
in this period?
- The rms earnings =___________
3. A rm hired a high productivity worker in stage 1 at a wage of 30. In stage 2 the
rm hired a high productivity worker at a wage of 38.
- The rms earnings in stage 1= ___________
- The rms earnings in stage 2= ___________
- The rms total earnings in this period= ___________
- Earnings of the hired stage-1 worker in stage 1= ___________
- Earnings of the hired stage-2 worker in stage 2= ___________
- Total earnings of stage-1 worker =___________
- Total earnings of stage-2 worker =___________
4. A rm hired a low productivity worker in stage 1 at a wage of 20 and a low
productivity worker in stage 2 at a wage of 20.
- The rms total earnings in this period= ___________
- Earnings of the hired stage-1 worker in stage 1= ___________
- Earnings of the hired stage-2 worker in stage 2=___________
5. A rm hired a high productivity worker in stage 1 at a wage of 31 and a low
productivity worker in stage 2 at a wage of 25.
- The rms total earnings in this period= ___________
- Earnings of the hired stage-1 worker in stage 1= ___________
- Earnings of the hired stage-2 worker in stage 2 = ___________
6. A rm made several wage o¤ers in stage 1 but did not manage to hire anyone.
- The rms earnings in stage 1= ___________
7. At the end of stage 1, one of the stage-1 high productivity worker is not hired.
- This workers earnings in stage 1= ___________
- This workers earnings in stage 2=___________
8. At the end of stage 2, one of the stage-2 high productivity worker is not hired.
- This workers earnings in stage 1= ___________
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- This workers earnings in stage 2=___________
9. At the end of stage 1, one of the stage-1 low productivity worker is not hired.
- This workers earnings in stage 1= ___________
- This workers earnings in stage 2=___________
This is the end of the instructions.
PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND, the experimenter will come check your answers.
D.3.5 Control questions referral market decision situation
Please answer the following control questions. These questions are arbitrary examples of
what could happen in the experiment. In the experiment you will be either a worker or a
rm. The questions will concern both roles. They will help you to gain an understanding
of the calculation of your earnings. Your earnings vary with your own decision and with
the decisions of the other person you are paired with.
Please answer all the questions and write down your calculations.
Once you are done, please RAISE YOUR HAND and the experimenter will come check
your answers.
1. A rm did not make an o¤er in stage 1 and 2. What are the rms total earnings
in this period?
- The rms earnings =___________
2. A rm did not hire a worker in stage 1, can it make a referral wage o¤er in stage 2?
3. A rm hired a high productivity worker in stage 1 at a wage of 30. In stage 2 the
rm hired a high productivity worker at a wage of 38.
- The rms earnings in stage 1= ___________
- The rms earnings in stage 2= ___________
- The rms total earnings in this period= ___________
- Earnings of the hired stage-1 worker in stage 1= ___________
- Earnings of the hired stage-2 worker in stage 2= ___________
- Total earnings of stage-1 worker ( stage 1+ stage 2)=___________
- Total earnings of stage-2 worker (stage 1+stage 2) =___________
4. A rm hired a low productivity worker in stage 1 at a wage of 20 and a low
productivity worker in stage 2 at a wage of 20.
- The rms total earnings in this period= ___________
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- Earnings of the hired stage-1 worker in stage 1= ___________
- Earnings of the hired stage-2 worker in stage 2=___________
5. A rm hired a high productivity worker in stage 1 at a wage of 31 and a low
productivity worker in stage 2 at a wage of 25.
- The rms total earnings in this period= ___________
- Earnings of the hired stage-1 worker in stage 1= ___________
- Earnings of the hired stage-2 worker in stage 2 = ___________
6. A rm made several wage o¤ers in stage 1 but did not manage to hire anyone.
- The rms earnings in stage 1= ___________
7. At the end of stage 1, one of the stage-1 high productivity worker is not hired.
- This workers earnings in stage 1= ___________
- This workers earnings in stage 2=___________
8. At the end of stage 2, one of the stage-2 high productivity worker is not hired.
- This workers earnings in stage 1= ___________
- This workers earnings in stage 2=___________
9. At the end of stage 1, one of the stage-1 low productivity worker is not hired.
- This workers earnings in stage 1= ___________
- This workers earnings in stage 2=___________
This is the end of the instructions.
PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND, the experimenter will come check your answers.
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